Defining Rights: Contesting the Contra War Through Human Rights Advocacy, 1981-1988 by Moore, Erik
 
 





DEFINING RIGHTS: CONTESTING THE CONTRA WAR THROUGH  





SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Degree of 
















DEFINING RIGHTS: CONTESTING THE CONTRA WAR THROUGH  
HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY, 1981-1988 
 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 








































































© Copyright by ERIK MOORE 2018 












This project took shape from a conversation in a legal history course with 
Kathleen Brosnan about the shortcomings of international law. I expressed my 
disappointment that international law, historically, seemed to reinforce inequality, 
empire, and intervention. Though I do not recall the exact wording, Dr. Brosnan 
asked if human rights changed things, changed the focus or effect of international 
law-a deceptively simple question. I cannot remember how I responded, but I do 
know that through the end of my course work and comprehensive exams I continued 
thinking about how human rights and different conceptions of law influenced U.S. 
foreign relations. My focus narrowed considerably, but this dissertation is my 
attempt to explore that basic curiosity. 
I have received immeasurable assistance and support in my journey to 
complete my doctoral degree and to bring this research project to completion. From 
the history department at the University of Oklahoma to friends and family, this 
really was a group effort. The shortcomings of this project are my own, but I 
received essential support to enable me to complete my course work, visit archives 
without limitation, and put together a final product of which I am proud. 
Graduate students rely on the financial generosity of others, and I was 
fortunate enough to receive everything I needed. There were tense times, but it 
worked out. I thank Cliff Hudson for his contribution to the history department to 
fund the Hudson Family Fellowship for select doctoral students at OU. I appreciate 
his dedication to the study history and the interest he took in our work. I especially 
treasured the annual dinners with Mr. Hudson and the other Hudson fellows. In this 
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time of shrinking grant funds, doctoral students at OU can still benefit from the 
Graduate College’s Robberson Research & Creative Endeavors Grant, which 
allowed me visit the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. The Samuel Flagg 
Bemis Dissertation Research Grant from the Society for Historians of American 
Foreign Relations provided critical funds that enabled a two-week trip to libraries in 
Philadelphia and New York. The history department also provided essential funding 
through the Bea-Mantooth Estep Scholarship in Latin American History and the 
Anne Hodges & H. Wayne Morgan Fellowship. The Morgan Fellowship served as 
the last piece in the research funding puzzle that allowed me to take an extended visit 
to archives in Managua. In my final year at OU, the Graduate College again came 
through for me, awarding the Bullard-Wethington Dissertation Completion 
Fellowship.  
The history department at the University of Oklahoma has been a wonderful, 
supportive academic home for me these past five years. I appreciate all the staff has 
done for me. Christa Seedorf worked through more than a couple moments of 
confusion or panic on my part over funding and travel issues. Janie Adkins had all 
the answers to my questions about the program, comprehensive exams, and 
dissertation deadlines, and she often answered them before I realized I had questions. 
The former director of graduate studies, Judith S. Lewis, helped secure additional 
funding for me at a critical point, and for that, I am so grateful. I thank my 
dissertation committee, Jim Cane-Carrasco, Charles D. Kenney, Raphael B. Folsom, 
and Kathleen A. Brosnan, for their work with on this project. I feel fortunate to have 
had this amazing collection of scholars reading my work and engaging me as a 
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scholar. Their comments were diverse, insightful, and have helped me shape this 
dissertation into a stronger piece of scholarship. 
My primary advisor and mentor, Alan McPherson, has been a remarkable 
source of guidance through the research and writing. The genuine interest and 
investment he made in my progress through the PhD program at OU was a 
reassuring boost to my confidence on more than one occasion. Then the speed and 
thoroughness with which he reviewed my writing was incredible. Dr. McPherson 
held high expectations for the intellectual strength of the argument and evidence 
while maintain rigorous standards for clarity in writing. All students should be so 
fortunate. I could not have hoped for a better dissertation advisor. I aspire to give my 
students the kind of dedication Alan McPherson gave to me. 
My family bore a heavy burden to allow me to see this through. The 
emotional, and often material, support of my parents and my wife’s parents helped 
make this all possible. They quietly and patiently watched me leave the practice of 
law to pursue a new profession, and they never questioned my sanity out loud, 
though I think we all did (do) silently at some point. They provided support, 
excitement, and joy at every step. My three sons have lived knowing only of their 
father as a graduate student. That was hard, for them and me. Two of my three boys 
were born after I started graduate school, and my oldest was too young to remember 
much before I started graduate school. I tried to make the most of my time with them 
but giving up their dad for days or weeks was not something for which they would 
have ever asked. They often had a hard time understanding. 
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My wife’s burden weighed heaviest. She encouraged me to leave the practice 
of law and to pursue my passion. She supported the choice to continue my graduate 
studies at the University of Oklahoma and leave our parents and siblings in Kansas 
City. While I was absent from the house for class, writing, or travel, she kept our 
boys happy and healthy, and with three active, rough, and moody boys who never 
stopped eating, that was a herculean task. I had it easy. This does not happen without 
her. 
Thank you, everyone. 
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Non-governmental organizations successfully limited U.S. support of 
counterrevolutionary guerrillas (Contras) in Nicaragua in the 1980s by advocating 
for peace through a lexicon of human rights. NGOs deployed their message of 
opposition through a variety of methods, but the mobilization of thousands of 
activists rallying around the cause of human rights in public demonstrations proved 
most effective for influencing policy. In addition, the work of NGOs altered the 
debate over the Contra War and framed the policy issue as a question of human 
rights and not question of geopolitics and anti-communism. 
Conflicting ideas about human rights underpinned the policy debate and the 
tension between the two governments. NGOs opposing the Reagan administration’s 
Contra policy and Cold War interpretations of international relations then-prevalent 
in Washington adhered to what this dissertation refers to as the Anticolonial Human 
Rights discourse. These organizations and developing nations throughout the world 
interpreted human rights as including economic, social, and cultural rights, collective 
rights of self-determination and national sovereignty, and political and civil rights. 
Meanwhile, the Reagan administration followed the Democratic Human Rights 
discourse, which elevated political and civil rights above all other rights. Reagan 
believed that protecting democracy ultimately protected human rights and that the 
Contras, or freedom fighters as Reagan referred to them, fought for democracy. The 
Sandinista government objected to foreign interference and U.S. support of an 
insurrection while NGOs also rejected the violation of Nicaragua sovereignty and the 
use of violence to achieve policy objectives.  
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TWO SIDES OF A COIN: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CONTRA WAR 
 
On July 19, 1982, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN or 
Sandinistas) celebrated the third anniversary of the Nicaraguan Revolution’s victory 
over Anastasio Somoza Debayle, which had ended decades of authoritarian rule by 
the Somoza family dynasty. In the city of Masaya, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, 
coordinator of the Junta of the National Reconstruction Government, spoke about the 
rights of the Nicaraguan people and of the opportunities provided by the new 
government. Nicaraguans now enjoyed the right to freely organize in unions and 
associations. Nicaraguans also won the right to guide their own economy so that 
citizens had the means to provide for their families. After three years, the agrarian 
reform recovered vast tracts of land for distribution to more than six thousand 
families, cooperatives, and individuals. As small producers gained greater access to 
land, rural farmers enjoyed access to credit that had not existed before the 
Sandinistas took power. Ortega touted a much-improved health care system, 
bolstered by an additional $200 million for the nation’s hospitals. Those hospitals 
treated more than double the number of people they had under the Somoza regime. 
In addition, the country reduced the illiteracy rate from 50.3 percent to 12.9 percent. 
Ortega also celebrated the building of 6,500 kilometers of roads since the triumph.1 
However, danger lurked, and Ortega warned of the struggle ahead. Nicaragua 
was under attack from individuals who would roll back the hard-won rights and 
                                                 
1 Daniel Ortega Saavedra, “Discurso Del Comandante de La Revolución, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, 
Coordinador de La JGRN,” Tercer Aniversario de La Revolución Popular Sandinista Y Veintiun 




opportunities of the revolution. He reminded Nicaraguans they needed to fight to 
defend their progress. The people should prepare to follow the example of the 
legendary Augusto César Sandino’s soldiers, sacrificing and fighting for their homes 
against foreign intervention. To that end, Ortega celebrated the brave Sandinista 
military standing against the contrarevolucionarios (Contras) who were armed, 
trained, and funded by the United States. Ortega proclaimed that the greatest 
resource against the U.S. intervention was the courage of Nicaraguans “defending 
their sovereign right to have the weapons and technical means needed to guarantee 
their health, education, production, freedom to organize their homeland.”2 
Human rights groups who monitored conditions in Nicaragua described a 
different scenario, one in which Ortega’s regime represented a threat to Nicaraguan 
rights, not a defense of them. Amnesty International (AI) reported that the 
Sandinistas suspended the right of habeas corpus, which allowed individuals to 
challenge the legitimacy of their detention and prevent arbitrary arrests by 
government officials.3 The Sandinistas then arrested and prosecuted political 
dissenters and labor organizers simply for their association or political activity. The 
Nicaraguan military forced the evacuation and relocation of entire villages of 
indigenous people, approximately 8,500, along Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast with only 
hours’ notice. Military officials ordered the villages burned, property destroyed, and 
livestock slaughtered. In addition, the Sandinistas engaged in large-scale arrests of 
Miskito Indians before and during the relocation, detaining approximately 135 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 73, 82-83. 
3 Nicaragua Background Briefing: Persistence of Public Order Law Detentions and Trials (New 
York: Amnesty International Publications, 1982), 2. 
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individuals, most held without cause or suspicion of wrongdoing. AI concluded that 
many of the arrests took place to intimidate and influence community leaders and 
church officials, a violation of individual liberty and a method of governing used by 
autocrats.4  
The differences in interpretation by Ortega and AI reflected a fundamental 
disagreement over the hierarchy of rights. The Sandinistas claimed that the U.S. 
intervention, through a proxy guerrilla force, threatened Nicaraguan sovereignty and 
self-determination, rights the Sandinistas elevated above all others. From those rights 
the FSLN could ensure other human rights for Nicaraguans. AI did not take a 
position on the counterrevolution or the politics of the Sandinistas, but AI did reject 
the notion that Nicaraguans should sacrifice rights of due process, bodily integrity, 
and fair trials. 
Complicating the issue further, no consensus definition or method of 
enforcement existed for human rights. Activists and world leaders did agree that 
Nicaraguans faced repression, violence, and other abuses. However, without an 
agreement over who committed the violations and what rights should be defended, 
governments could not agree on a policy for protecting human rights. The 
administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan even disagreed over the 
influence human rights should have over U.S. foreign policy. Carter and human 
rights advocates in the United States called for an expansive definition of human 
rights in the United States and a larger role for human rights in foreign policy. 
Reagan minimized the importance of human rights outside the context of fighting 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 3–10. 
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communism and promoting democracy. As such, Reagan supported the Contras 
fighting against the supposedly communist Sandinista government.  
The ideological divide over human rights in Nicaragua mirrored the 
intellectual development of human rights in the post-war era as two competing 
discourses emerged. What this study calls the Anticolonial Human Rights discourse, 
prominent in the developing world, arose in defiance of foreign intervention, 
oppression, and inequality. It recognized political and civil rights. It also included 
social, economic, and cultural rights along with collective rights of national 
sovereignty and self-determination. Within this discourse, a hierarchy of rights arose 
in which governments of developing nations tended to value national sovereignty 
and self-determination first, followed by social, economic, and cultural rights, and 
then, finally, political and civil rights. What this dissertation dubs the Democratic 
Human Rights discourse, meanwhile, expressed a conservative approach to 
government while demonizing the Soviet Union and what advocates saw as global 
communism. The Democratic Human Rights discourse recognized as human rights 
political and civil rights and minimized, if not excluded, sovereignty and self-
determination and social, economic, and cultural rights. The Sandinistas and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) advocating for peace in Nicaragua adhered to 
the Anticolonial discourse, though they disagreed on the hierarchy of rights 
recognized within that discourse. The United States government during the Carter 
administration accepted the Anticolonial Human Rights discourse as a legitimate 
expression of human rights, but both the Carter and Reagan administrations 
articulated foreign policy in Democratic Human Rights terms. That is not to say that 
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advocates for democracy in Nicaragua all shunned economic rights or vice-versa. 
Overlap occurred among the separate but parallel discourses, but this study reveals 
how the differences between those objectives that led to the separate discourses 
influenced international relations. 
Amid these differing views over definition and hierarchy of rights, NGOs 
advocating for peace in Nicaragua successfully used human rights discourse against 
President Reagan to limit U.S. support for the counterrevolution and help end the 
Contra War. Through a combination of grassroots activism, Congressional lobbying, 
and human rights investigations and reporting, these organizations worked to reframe 
the Contra War as an issue of human rights and not Cold War anti-communism. In 
doing so, NGOs contributed to a shift in the political discourse over Nicaragua in 
which human rights became a required talking point and consideration in foreign 
policy. If Reagan spoke about Nicaragua and human rights, he initially did so in 
vague terms, choosing instead to emphasize Nicaragua as a pawn of the Soviet 
Union. NGOs forced Reagan to adopt human rights as part of a public diplomacy 
strategy and as a military and political strategy in Nicaragua, though only nominally.  
The debate over human rights as they related to the Contra War reflected 
larger challenges in international relations in applying principles of law to disputes 
involving a major power such as the United States. Ironically, in the case of 
Nicaragua, domestic non-state actors pressed for the enforcement of internationally 
accepted legal principles in human rights through political means and sought to 
define America’s interpretation of human rights. With no international institutions 
empowered to force governments to abide by international law or a clearly defined 
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understanding of human rights, local grassroots mobilization and activism served as 
an alternative. 
Organizations such as the Nicaraguan Network and the Coalition for a New 
Foreign and Military Policy (later renamed the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy or 
CFNFP) built networks of contacts throughout the country with whom they 
communicated to activate thousands of concerned citizens for demonstrations, media 
work, and public education programs to protest U.S. Nicaragua policy. They also 
built up lobbying operations in Washington to leverage their influence in Congress 
against the Contras. Investigations by NGOs such as AI, Americas Watch (AW), and 
the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) revealed the widespread, 
systemic human rights abuse committed by the Contras as NGOs reinforced the 
argument that the abuse came with funding from the United States. These NGOs 
worked to shine a light on the violence and destruction created by the U.S.-funded 
Contra War by producing reports based on interviews and affidavits from victims 
and witnesses of the abuse. Representatives from the NGOs also testified before 
Congress regarding the investigations and briefed Congressional staffers on 
conditions in Nicaragua. 
The debate over the meaning of human rights and the influence human rights 
should have on U.S. foreign policy contributed to a larger debate over human rights 
in international law and politics that began during World War II. In 1941, on board 
the USS Augusta off the coast of Newfoundland, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt 
met the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, to discuss war objectives. At the 
so-called Atlantic Conference, the two leaders drafted the Atlantic Charter, which 
7 
 
adopted Roosevelt’s heretofore domestic Four Freedoms—freedom of speech and 
religion and from want and fear—as global standards. The Atlantic Charter 
reimagined the individual’s relationship to international law, acknowledging the 
possibility that international law could apply directly to the individual and not just 
sovereign states. This principle underpinned the concept of human rights. By 
stripping away the intervening layer of the state, human rights law empowered the 
individual with standing to assert claims against the state or other entity for 
violations of fundamental rights.5 
Even in the 1940s, the Four Freedoms and human rights received varied 
interpretations, and these would persist through the twentieth century. FDR’s 
government believed that each nation had a responsibility to ensure the financial 
security and welfare of its citizens. Roosevelt and post-war planners foresaw 
international institutions empowered to protect the economic opportunity and 
prosperity of citizens around the world, which would also help ensure international 
security. However, more conservative-minded Americans interpreted the Four 
Freedoms as an assertion of individual liberty, self-reliance, and domestic 
consumption.6 
After the war, the Allies formed a new international order around the ideals 
of the Atlantic Conference, beginning with the United Nations (UN) in 1945.7 The 
UN then created the Commission on Human Rights to define and formalize the 
                                                 
5 Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press, 2005), 4. 
6 Ibid., 46–61. 




mechanisms for defending human rights. The Commission ratified the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, whose preamble stated, “Member 
States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, 
the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”8 The UDHR recognized political freedoms and civil rights 
Americans long considered fundamental to a functioning society and civic life such 
as “life, liberty, and security of person,” the right to be free from torture and slavery, 
the right to equality before the law and due process, the right to privacy, the right to 
free exercise of religion, and the right to freedom of expression. Yet the UDHR went 
further and followed Roosevelt’s apparent intentions for international governance 
that considered economic, social, and cultural rights as human rights, such as the 
right to a living wage to provide for one’s family, the right to social services for 
financial and personal security, and the right to education.9  
In 1966, the UN refined its conception of human rights while clarifying the 
distinction in the types of rights through the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These covenants 
recognized the rights of individuals not as citizens of a nation but as members of a 
global community entitled to certain dignity in life and their person and economic 
and social opportunity. Both covenants provided that  
 
[I]n accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of 
free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from 
fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby 
                                                 
8 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948), 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html. 
9 Ibid., 2–8. 
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everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, 
social and cultural rights….10  
 
 
Both covenants also proclaimed the right to self-determination to enable people to 
“freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.”11 The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that 
each nation must respect the rights of individuals without regard for race, ethnicity, 
religion, or political affiliation. It also addressed rights related to due process, equal 
protection under the law, freedom from arbitrary or cruel punishment and torture, 
freedom of speech, religion, and association, and other civil rights.12 The Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights affirmed rights to organize trade unions, to 
livable wages, to strike, to social security insurance, to marriage through mutual 
consent, to paid leave for childbirth for working mothers, to adequate and nutritious 
food and access to clothing and housing, and to the right of free primary education 
for all.13 The covenants clearly established these rights as a part of international law 
but also explicitly made what had only been an intellectual distinction among rights, 
bolstering the position of those who ranked one class of rights over the other. 
Read together, these documents fulfilled an expectation originally put 
forward by Roosevelt in his New Deal legislation of the 1930s that ran counter to a 
powerful tradition in the United States of valuing political and civil rights above all 
other rights. As Americans faced the Great Depression and as social upheaval 
                                                 
10 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (United Nations, 1966), 1, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx. 
11 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” 2; “International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights” (United Nations, 1966), 1, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 
12 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” 
13 “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” 2–5. 
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plagued nations throughout the world, FDR concluded that freedom required 
economic and social stability, without which people could not benefit from their 
political freedom and civil liberties.14 However, the U.S. Constitution established a 
federal government that governed through restraint, holding only those powers 
granted to it by the people. The Bill of Rights reaffirmed specific limits on the 
government to ensure liberty. Subsequent Constitutional amendments expanded the 
scope of freedom and American democracy but did not create obligations on the 
government to provide social goods, such as health care or housing, or economic 
benefits, such as employment. Not until the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century reform movements did Americans experiment with social welfare 
services and financial protections, though still not as rights.15 Even the Civil Rights 
Movement of the mid-twentieth century focused on civil liberties, such as the right to 
vote and the equal protection under the law. Toward the end of the 1960s and 1970s, 
activists such as Martin Luther King, Jr., identified structural problems in American 
society that would not be cured through political and civil rights. In the final years of 
his life, King saw racial injustice as part of a bigger issue of social and economic 
injustice. King argued that without equal access to employment and other economic 
                                                 
14 Matthew Jones, “Freedom from Want,” in The Four Freedoms: Franklin Roosevelt and the 
Evolution of an American Idea, ed. Jeffrey Engel (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 125–
27. 
15 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955); 
Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Michael 
McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005); Andrew Wender Cohen, The Racketeer’s Progress: 
Chicago and the Struggle for the Modern American Economy, 1900-1940, Cambridge Historical 
Studies in American Law and Society (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Charles 
Postel, The Populist Vision (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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opportunities, African Americans, and anyone else, could not realize the freedom to 
which they were entitled.16 
The UDHR and the subsequent covenants recognized the importance of both 
categories of rights, Anticolonial and Democratic, but the U.S. Congress refused to 
follow. Domestic politics caused the U.S. government to withdraw from the 
international human rights movement in the 1950s. Eleanor Roosevelt served as 
Washington’s most visible and celebrated delegate to the commission drafting the 
UDHR. Segregationists interpreted her criticism of civil rights in the United States 
and international human rights agreements as threats to established racial order. In 
addition, anti-communists in Congress declared the Human Rights Commission and 
the UDHR part of a communist conspiracy. Under pressure from both groups, 
President Dwight Eisenhower pulled the United States out of the Commission. The 
Senate did not ratify the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights until 1992, and it 
never ratified the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 17 
Beginning in the 1950s, anti-communism dominated U.S. Cold War foreign 
policy and overshadowed concerns with human rights.18 Officials in the 
administration of Harry Truman considered communism and the Soviet Union a 
threat to American values and the very existence of the United States.19 These 
concerns led President Eisenhower and his successors to befriend authoritarian 
                                                 
16 Thomas F. Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle 
for Economic Justice (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 245–55. 
17 Kathryn Sikkink, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004), 38-42. 
18 Ibid., 39–40. 
19 James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, “A Report to the National 
Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950, 




governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that could stand strong against 
communist insurgents. Repressive regimes supposedly defended democracy by 
fighting against the communists, and, when doing so, benefitted from U.S. friendship 
through military and economic aid. Washington tolerated the methods through which 
these regimes did their work because they fulfilled the bigger goal of defeating 
Soviet communism. Consequently, policies of anti-communism often had 
detrimental effects on human rights around the world.20 
Changes in international politics in the 1970s left the American people 
questioning the premise of the Cold War and how the United States could continue 
accepting human rights violations by its allies. With the coming of détente, China 
and the Soviet Union looked more like established, world powers operating within an 
international order and less like radical states seeking global revolution.21 Democrats 
in Congress found that the narrow focus on the Soviet Union no longer fit within the 
realities faced by the United States and grew more vocal in questioning Cold War 
orthodoxy.22 Americans also started to doubt that communists in Latin America 
posed any threat to U.S. national security.23 Democrats wanted to incorporate human 
rights concerns into U.S. foreign policy and turn their attention to other regions that 
they believed presented more significant danger or opportunity.24 Furthermore, 
media outlets and NGOs in the United States and in Latin America provided 
disturbing information about widespread violence, torture, and state-sponsored 
                                                 
20 Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 40–42. 
21 Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 145–46. 
22 Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb, IL: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 11; Rabe, The Killing Zone, 145. 
23 Rabe, The Killing Zone, 146. 
24 Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 11. 
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terrorism by anti-communist authoritarians receiving U.S. aid.25 Evidence of human 
rights abuses in Latin America raised questions about what Washington hoped to 
accomplish in Latin America and at what cost.26 
With the growing concern over the direction of U.S. foreign policy, Congress 
asserted more control over foreign relations in the 1970s. New laws limited the 
president’s ability to the take the country to war without Congressional approval and 
raised human rights as necessary components for U.S. foreign policy decisions.27 
Donald Fraser (D-MN) held hearings through the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the House Foreign Relations Committee. His subcommittee’s 1974 
report on human rights violations around the world formed the foundation for future 
U.S. human rights policy.28 Investigations led by Senator Frank Church (D-ID) 
uncovered CIA involvement in plots to overthrow governments in Iran, Guatemala, 
and Chile, and to conduct assassinations in Indonesia and Cuba. Congress also 
passed the Harkin Amendment in 1975 to prevent sending economic aid to 
governments violating human rights. The International Security Assistance and Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976 called on Washington to refrain from aiding any 
government abusing human rights and required the Secretary of State to produce a 
                                                 
25 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); James N. Green, We Cannot Remain Silent: 
Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2010); Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011); William Michael Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom 
Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy toward Argentina (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
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report documenting the human rights record of each nation receiving aid for security 
purposes.29 
Jimmy Carter embraced human rights as a candidate for president in 1976 
and pledged a new moral foundation for foreign policy rather than continuing to 
adhere to the orthodox containment policy of the Cold War. Once in office, his 
administration adopted a definition of human rights consistent with the Anticolonial 
Human Rights discourse. Carter acknowledged that individuals of the developing 
world saw economic and social rights as the most significant rights of all, and, for 
the United States to value only political and civil rights, such as rights to vote, to free 
expression and association, and to bodily integrity, would be self-defeating.30 
Carter’s emphasis on human rights and the appointment of activist Patricia Derian to 
lead the human rights agency within the State Department helped to significantly 
reduce the number of murders and disappearances in Latin America.31 Yet, Carter’s 
desire to change the foundations of U.S. foreign policy only went so far. He still put 
geopolitics ahead of human rights when it came to critical Cold War allies such as 
the Philippines, Iran, Israel, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea. In Latin 
America, Carter remained reluctant to alienate countries like Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile.32 
Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, offered a stark contrast in human rights 
policy and in approach to foreign relations. After he received the Republican 
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nomination for president, Reagan declared that the United States would build peace 
by reasserting global power. He condemned the policies of Carter, arguing that “the 
cold, hard fact of the matter is that our economic, military, and strategic strength 
under President Carter is eroding.” Reagan and neoconservatives within his 
administration opposed détente and believed that U.S. weakness derived from 
policies of accommodation to the Soviets that began with Richard Nixon.33 Neocons 
wanted to reassert U.S. dominance. In specifically addressing Carter’s human rights 
policy that involved Derian and other administration officials publicly shaming 
governments, Reagan stated that “[o]ur relations must be solidly based on shared 
economic and security interests, not upon mutual recrimination and insult.”34 He 
accused the Carter administration of alienating allies and allowing the Soviets and 
Cubans to extend their influence in the vacuum of power. 
Once in office, President Reagan wanted to confront the Soviet threat with 
massive military spending, increased nuclear capabilities, and aid for those resisting 
communism throughout the world, the so-called “Reagan Doctrine.”35 Reagan sought 
to renew relationships with governments, including authoritarian regimes, that could 
help with resisting communism.36 He accepted that some of these allies did not 
practice the same form of governance or hold the same values as the United States. 
Reagan determined that the best policy was to attempt to change their behavior and 
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institutions as a friend rather than removing U.S. support, offending an otherwise 
pro-U.S. leader, and risking a totalitarian takeover.37  
The new administration planned to deemphasize human rights while 
prioritizing international terrorism supported or directed by Moscow.38 The 
administration did not want to push too hard to improve human rights because 
officials believed that such a stance unfairly pressured U.S. friends while leaving out 
adversaries, over whom the United States had no diplomatic influence. Rigid human 
rights policies also invited anti-democratic states to further drive a wedge between 
the United States and its allies and undermine those governments. The United States 
would no longer act for short-term gains against instances of repression or torture. 
Rather, the administration would pursue the long game, seeking gradual, 
fundamental change toward democracy and freedom. Administration officials would 
hold the United States out as an example of freedom and human rights for the world. 
However, the Reagan administration did plan to publicly condemn the human rights 
abuses of the Soviet bloc unilaterally and through institutions in the United 
Nations.39 
Central America offered a safe location for the United States to begin 
reasserting dominance, and Washington had little regard for that dominance’s 
immediate effect on human rights given that the larger objective was establishing 
democracy. Neocons viewed the leftist revolutions in Central America as part of a 
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Soviet mission to encircle the United States, which required a U.S. response of 
renewed international political authority and military power.40 Officials also did not 
believe the Soviets would risk a military confrontation to protect communists in 
Central America.41 Central America also consisted of states governed by 
authoritarians who could carry out U.S. foreign policy objectives. In 1979, Reagan’s 
future UN ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick, provided the intellectual foundation for 
this policy in her article “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” in which she 
reassured Americans that the country should support authoritarian regimes because 
they could help stem the tide of international communism. She distinguished 
between authoritarian regimes and the real threat to freedom, totalitarian states such 
as the Soviet Union and Cuba.42  
That distinction did not sit well with some members of Congress, and, after 
constant confrontation over human rights during the first year of his presidency, 
Reagan repackaged his Central America policy as democracy promotion. Democracy 
promotion did not directly address human rights violations, nor did improving 
human rights conditions equate to democratic reform. However, the Reagan 
administration pursued democracy and anti-communism as a way of improving 
human rights conditions.43 The focus on democracy promotion also revealed the 
narrow construction of human rights by neocons and the Reagan administration 
following the Democratic Human Rights discourse. They considered only political 
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and civil rights as human rights, a break from international interpretations as 
articulated by the United Nations and the UDHR. 
Members of Congress took notice of the narrow interpretation and looked to 
the administration to explain. Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Human 
Rights and International Organizations, Elliott Abrams, then the assistant secretary 
of state for the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, explained that 
deemphasizing economic and social rights reflected the administration’s hierarchy of 
rights prioritizing what it considered “the vital core of human rights.” Attempting to 
resolve issues associated with economic or social rights spread resources too thin. 
Abrams then circled back to object to characterizing economic or social rights as 
human rights. “We must separate those goods, those goals that the Government 
ought to encourage over the long term from the rights the Government has absolute 
duty to respect at any time.”44 Abrams, illustrating well the hierarchy of rights 
contained in the Democratic Human Rights discourse, argued that the United States 
should “not blur the distinction between the two categories. The rights that no 
government can violate should not be watered down to the status of rights that 
governments just do their best to secure.”45 Countries can chose the political or 
economic system right for them, but, according to Abrams, they must do so through 
free elections to allow people the opportunity to make the choice.46 Defending 
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democracy and preventing a nation from falling under the influence of communism 
protected citizens’ right to make that choice and protected human rights.47 
The Nicaraguan Revolution tested the administration’s commitment to 
democracy promotion and its ability to package human rights as a more limited 
bundle of rights than previously conceived in the United States, at the UN, and in 
Nicaragua. Reagan faced consistent opposition to this interpretation and his foreign 
policy objectives with respect to Nicaragua. Human rights activists and progressive 
NGOs rejected Reagan’s strategy of pursuing democracy by supporting authoritarian 
regimes and, in the case of Nicaragua, Reagan’s strategy of supporting paramilitary 
forces intent on overthrowing the Nicaraguan government. Nicaragua was a unique 
case for the administration. Rather than engaging in quiet diplomacy to encourage a 
government to change behavior, the United States openly supported, encouraged, 
funded, armed, and trained the Nicaraguan Contras.  
Human rights advocates held the Reagan administration as an essential party 
and co-offender to the ongoing human rights abuse by the Contras. Contra opponents 
argued that, without the president providing financial and military assistance and 
political support, the Contras would not pose near the danger they did. Congress 
proved fertile ground for the human rights-based arguments of anti-Contra activists, 
but, absent compelling reasons to deviate, members of Congress still subscribed to 
Cold War geopolitics and remained reluctant to appear conciliatory toward 
communists. NGOs offered the human rights violations of the Contras, the conduct 
of the CIA in Nicaragua, the Latin American-driven peace process, and the Iran-
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Contra Affair as the compelling reasons for deviation and did so to frame the 
administration’s Contra policy as a human rights violation.  
 
 
This study focuses on the contribution of NGOs to the human rights 
discourse as it related to Nicaragua in the 1980s. It examines how NGOs defined 
human rights and how effective those NGOs were at operationalizing human rights 
as a language of advocacy against President Reagan’s policy of supporting the 
Contras in a guerrilla war against the Sandinista government. The source material is 
largely drawn from archives of several of the most prominent NGOs in the United 
States with respect to human rights and the Contra War, such as AI, the Nicaragua 
Network, CFNFP, AW, and WOLA. These organizations were representative and at 
times guided the larger anti-Contra human rights movement in the United States. The 
research also closely analyzes the human rights language used by pro-Contra 
organizations, members of Congress, the president, his advisors, and cabinet, and the 
public diplomacy materials the administration produced. Speeches, announcements, 
and declarations of Nicaraguan officials and opposition leaders further shed light on 
the transnational human rights dialogue used to sway public opinion. The study’s 
analysis covers the Sandinistas’ rise to power in the late 1970s and concludes in 
1988 with the signing of the peace agreement between the Sandinistas and the 
Contras in Sapoá. With the signing of the Sapoá Accord, the war ended, and U.S.-
Nicaragua relations entered a new phase involving a new president and U.S. relations 
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with anti-Sandinista political parties and the government of Violeta Barrios de 
Chamorro after the 1990 election.  
The research makes several contributions to the study of human rights, U.S.-
Nicaragua relations, and the ways in which domestic politics and political activism 
influenced U.S. foreign policy. This study illuminates human rights as a contested 
political and legal construction in international affairs. The Reagan administration, 
members of Congress, NGOs, and the Nicaraguan government each advocated for 
their own interpretation and hierarchy of rights. By identifying the extent to which 
NGOs and the Reagan administration followed and/or influenced international 
human rights trends, this dissertation establishes the Contra War debate as a 
significant episode for understanding the development of human rights both in the 
United States and internationally. The dissertation also tells a new story of U.S.-
Nicaragua relations in the 1980s by considering the perspective of NGOs in the 
United States and the transnational network in which they operated to stop the 
Contra War. Furthermore, it reframes the Contra War within a human rights 
discourse to help make sense of a complicated course of events and the political 
rhetoric surrounding those events. This study also sheds light on an episode in U.S. 
history in which organizations and individual activists played important roles in 
international politics and, at times, restrained the power of the president with 
grassroots organizing and a morally compelling argument. The strategies and 
methods of NGOs changed over time as organizations adapted to obstacles of 
challenging a popular president and trying to roll back long-established principles of 
Cold War politics.  
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Perception guided the human rights debate over Nicaragua policy. This study 
reflects on how Americans and Nicaraguans perceived human rights, how advocates 
for or against the Contras shaped those perceptions, and how perceptions of human 
rights influenced U.S. relations with Nicaragua. Scholars are examining the origins 
of human rights, their development in law and politics, and the meaning of human 
rights as developed within that intellectual history.48 This dissertation adds a new 
dimension by analyzing popular, rather than the academic or legal, applications of 
human rights. The debate over human rights in American politics did not take place 
in a courtroom or a law school seminar but, rather, in newspapers through op-ed 
pieces, in the offices of Congressional staff through activist lobbying delegations, 
and on streets throughout the United States through mass demonstrations. By 1979, 
the year the Sandinistas took power, Americans and Nicaraguans accepted the 
presence of human rights in international law and politics and understood the 
influence human rights advocacy could have on international relations.  
The contestation over what constituted human rights underpinned the larger 
political divide between Washington and Managua and revealed the weakness of 
international law in the twentieth century, a pressure point in international relations 
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that this dissertation explores in detail. International law existed only with the 
consent and participation of sovereign governments, and scholars are producing a 
wide array of work investigating how governments interpreted international law in 
ways that supported various interests. Studies find that international law legitimized 
empire-building and global inequality, encouraged peace yet led to war, and 
extended the power of nations into the sovereign territory of others.49 Without an 
institution with legal supremacy over nations, no body of law or legal system 
controlled international behavior and relations, so international law came to serve 
those with the power to dictate its meaning and establish community standards. The 
post-World War II institutions democratized international law somewhat and led to 
agreements and covenants that defined human rights, but only for those countries 
that signed off on the agreements. Even then, interpreting the terms of the 
agreements regarding human rights remained open to the eye of the beholder, and the 
international community interpreted human rights in a variety of ways. The 
amorphous human rights legal structure proved self-defeating in the case of 
Nicaragua. The Sandinistas, the Contras, and the Reagan administration all claimed 
to act in the interest of human rights. No international organization had the authority 
or ability to act against the interest of the Contra War participants. 
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In the post-World War II era, Cold War politics and decolonization came to 
influence further development of international law, particularly as it related to human 
rights. Akira Iriye and Petra Goedde find that anti-communists in the United States 
accused the Soviets of human right violations for repression of free speech, free 
exercise in religion, and other political and civil freedoms, whereas the Soviets 
called the economic exploitation of the U.S. worker an ongoing human rights 
violation.50 Ned Richardson-Little finds the Socialist Party in East Germany claimed 
that the government served human rights and that socialism represented self-
determination of the East German people while Western liberal capitalism engaged 
in oppression of the individual and global imperialism.51 In nations emerging from 
decades, if not centuries, of colonial rule and exploitation, people understood human 
rights as referring to the basic economic and social rights of available housing, food, 
education, and medical care, in addition to the right to self-determination.52 
The uncertainty of what constituted a human right has also occupied 
historians as they seek to unpack the term in various political and cultural contexts, a 
task on which this study focuses. Brad Simpson concludes that “there was no single 
‘human rights movement’ with clear goals or agreement on what constituted a core 
human right.” Simpson considers discourses of human rights as forums of constant 
negotiation and contestation in which rights of self-determination often lost out to 
the West’s conceptions of human rights as individual liberty and free enterprise. “If 
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human rights advocates during the 1970s focused on crimes against the individual 
and the body, many postcolonial states and more politically radical solidarity 
campaigns continued to frame human rights demands in an anticolonial context.” In 
that regard, Simpson finds that self-determination as a human right resonated with 
many newly independent and developing nations.53 This dissertation builds on 
Simpson’s framework of discourse to identify two distinct discourses, the 
Democratic Human Rights discourse and the Anticolonial Human Rights discourse, 
that framed the debate over Nicaragua policy. In doing so, this study shows the 
influence that the distinctions in human rights had on international affairs. 
While historians reveal how human rights advocacy wielded greater influence 
on U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s, especially during the Carter administration, this 
study demonstrates that the case of Nicaragua pushed human rights to the foreground 
of Reagan’s policy debate. Scholars such as Robert Pastor and Kenton Clymer 
address the significance of human rights for Carter, although both express skepticism 
about whether Carter fully deserved the admiration of contemporary political 
commentators and historians. They find Carter’s human rights policy inconsistent 
and the execution ineffective.54 Nevertheless, Carter did make an attempt to embrace 
the human rights movement and spoke about the importance of economic and social 
rights that gained a greater following among progressives in the 1970s. Michael 
Stohl and David Carleton examine Reagan’s approach to human rights. They identify 
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international terrorism as a primary human rights concern for the Reagan 
administration.55 This dissertation seeks to provide more nuance and detail to human 
rights policy and underlying principles for the Reagan administration through the 
case study of Nicaragua. Reagan’s human rights position had more to do with 
democracy promotion, anti-communism, and power projection than it did just with 
terrorism. 
The role of Congress in foreign relations and human rights policy is an 
important and growing topic of the historiography, and this dissertation builds upon 
that scholarship by taking a closer look at the relationship between the legislative and 
executive branch. Kathryn Sikkink argues that the shift in U.S. foreign policy to 
incorporate human rights in the 1970s came from changing ideas regarding human 
rights after experiences in détente, Vietnam, and the Civil Rights era. Members of 
Congress and administration officials institutionalized those new ideas in federal law 
and Congressional oversight.56 Barbara Keys finds that members of Congress first 
acted on human rights after allegations of torture by the Greek junta in the 1960s and 
1970s. The Greek episode coincided with a general sense of responsibility for the 
Vietnam War experience and an increasing public awareness in the United States of 
the Holocaust and the silence of the German people in the midst of the tragedy.57 
Members of Congress who came together on the Greek issue laid the foundation for 
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future work on human rights issues and legislation in the 1970s.58 David P. Forsythe 
agrees with the importance of Congress in U.S. human rights history, contending that 
Congress, not Carter, made human rights a prominent issue in the 1970s. 
Furthermore, Congress forced Reagan to consider human rights in foreign policy.59 
This dissertation expands on the work of Congress and human rights and examines 
how human rights perpetuated a contentious relationship between the two branches 
of government in the 1980s through the case study of the Contra War. 
This dissertation also adds to the work of scholars are exploring how the 
lexicon of human rights served as an important tool in a variety of ways and contexts 
for activists. William Patrick Kelly’s work addresses activism in the 1970s and finds 
that activists started using the language of human rights as a “depoliticized 
framework,” emphasizing morality over politics, to conceptualize and attack the 
state-sponsored violence in Latin America. Although human rights were not 
unknown, Kelly argues that activists did not make wide use of the language of 
human rights until the 1970s. However, the problem of interpretation remained open. 
Ironically, relying on human rights as a vocabulary for advocating change actually 
reduced the degree of change sought. Human rights advocacy that focused on ending 
violence and torture sacrificed radical social revolution that activists often sought, 
particularly in Latin America.60 Carl Bon Tempo emphasizes the differences in 
interpretation of human rights among NGOs to refute the teleological narrative of a 
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unified human rights movement. NGOs did not all work together toward a common 
cause. Groups such as Freedom House subscribed to the Democratic Human Rights 
discourse while the more progressive NGOs followed the Anticolonial Human 
Rights discourse.61 Kenneth Cmiel focuses on Amnesty International’s work 
exposing human rights violations through global information networks and the 
strategies it used to raise money and to collect and distribute information. Cmiel 
finds NGOs essential subjects for human rights study because of the work they did 
investigating and advocating for human rights and supporting the work of Congress 
before Carter ever reached the White House. Groups of the 1970s may have 
acknowledged the importance of economic and social rights, but, Cmiel concludes, 
they generally advocated for civil rights.62 
This study also adds to the historiography of NGOs advocating for human 
rights for Latin America by probing deeper into the Nicaraguan case that has largely 
been left out of the historiography while other Latin American nations are the subject 
of excellent analysis. James N. Green covers Brazil, showing that the work of the 
human rights activists opposing U.S. support for the Brazilian dictatorship 
successfully changed U.S. policy.63 Green argues that the Brazilian activists created 
the model for human rights activism and transnational networking that others 
followed in the 1970s and 1980s.64 Kelly works on Christian groups advocating for 
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human rights and Christian responsibility in Chile and Brazil in the 1970s.65 Vanessa 
Walker’s dissertation covers Chile and Argentina in the 1970s, examining the role 
non-government actors played as mediators between government and the public in 
forming and implementing policy. She argues that in the complexity of international 
diplomacy and domestic politics, human rights took on greater objectives within the 
larger picture of U.S. foreign policy and it contributed to a diplomatic lexicon for 
framing the purpose of United States.66  
The scholarship leaves out Nicaragua because Nicaragua did not fit the 
pattern of state-sponsored violence. The direct political attacks on Nicaragua by the 
Reagan administration for human rights violations ran counter to general U.S. policy 
in relations with Latin America of quiet diplomacy and reluctance to denounce the 
conduct of other governments. However, Nicaragua is essential for studying the 
history of human rights precisely because the state did not engage in widespread 
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violations—though it certainly did violate some rights. The complexity of the human 
rights issues was greater in Nicaragua, and policy makers and activists thus struggled 
with that complexity more mightily. Neither the Contras nor the Sandinistas 
presented good options for Nicaragua in terms of human rights, but both sides of the 
debate asserted principled stands based on their respective perception of conditions 
and politics in Nicaragua as interpreted through one of human rights discourses. 
Nicaragua presents a unique case study in which a theoretical debate manifested into 
policy debate involving hard choices affecting millions of lives.   
This dissertation also widens the field of players in the debate over Nicaragua 
policy in the 1980s to include NGOs as critically important. Historians have not yet 
considered NGOs to the extent contained in this research, nor have historians 
adequately analyzed NGOs in the context of the human rights debate over Nicaragua. 
Van Gosse examines the influence of the Nicaragua solidarity movement without 
addressing the human rights component of organizations’ advocacy.67 Christian 
Smith examines activism of the anti-Contra movement using statistical analysis to 
profile the demographics of NGOs Sanctuary, Witness for Peace, and the Pledge of 
Resistance. Like Gosse, Smith does not examine human rights in the context of the 
Contra War other than to mention human rights.68 Hector Perla studies Nicaragua 
solidarity organizations and the role Nicaraguan exiles played in the development 
and inspiration of the solidarity movement in the United States. Like Goss and 
Smith, Perla does not address human rights as a component of activism. Perla also 
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argues that the Sandinistas played a role in starting the anti-war movement as a 
strategy for opposing Reagan from inside the United States. His analysis of Central 
American agency through solidarity contests a North American-centric focus on 
activism and corrects the impression that clever Sandinista operatives manipulated 
U.S. activists. He also demonstrates that this translational network of NGOs on 
behalf of Nicaragua represented a method for relatively weak actors to withstand and 
resist overwhelmingly more powerful actors, in this case the United States.69 
Bradford Martin does investigate the activity of NGOs based in the United States, 
specifically Witness for Peace, but Martin only mentions the human rights issues 
involved in the operations of Witness for Peace without substantive discussion of 
human rights advocacy or the role of human rights in policy formation.70 
Roger Peace offers a more focused study of the anti-Contra War campaign of 
NGOs, going into far greater depth than other scholars who make only passing 
mentions. Peace concedes that the anti-Contra War campaign failed to stop the war, 
but he contends that the effort did strengthen the resolve of the public and Congress 
against Reagan’s policies, which limited the administration’s options.71 Peace also 
examines the politics at issue, the framing of the debate, the organizational structure 
of anti-war groups, their strategies, and the transnational nature of the anti-war 
campaign.72  
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Peace concludes that, among the various arguments made by activists, 
claiming the Contras committed terrorism in Nicaragua worked best but only into 
1985.73 The portrayal of the Contras as terrorists drifts close to an analysis of human 
rights arguments, but terrorism and human rights were related but discrete concepts. 
Furthermore, analysis of allegations of terrorism as a rhetorical tool for the anti-
Contra movement only scratches the surface of a more complete answer for why 
calling the Contras terrorists at times succeeded in influencing Congress and at other 
times failed. Peace eschews a treatment of human rights to focus instead on the 
organizational structure and functioning of the NGOs. The human rights analysis of 
this dissertation provides context and substance to explain the anti-Contra 
movement. This dissertation also helps explain the message underpinning the human 
rights advocacy that Peace addresses in general terms. Furthermore, while Peace 
focuses his book on the work of NGOs, he makes no use of NGO archives or 
publications. Those archives make up a central component of the research for this 
project that reveal the inner strategy for deploying a human rights discourse and the 
methods NGOs used to construct an anti-Contra movement.  
Similar to Peace, David Bassano demonstrates the significance of NGOs in 
U.S.-Nicaragua relations and U.S. domestic politics and touches on the importance 
of human rights advocacy. Bassano does not conceptualize the Sandinista revolution 
and the Contra War in terms of human rights, which this study does do, but focuses 
instead on the refugee and immigration assistance programs of Amnesty 
International USA, the National Lawyers Guild, and the Committee in Solidarity 
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with the People of El Salvador.74 He argues that the refugee protection provided by 
NGOs succeeded in reducing the scale and effect of human rights abuses on the 
people of Central America.75 
This dissertation argues that NGOs used human rights advocacy effectively 
to limit U.S. support of the Contras and help bring the Contra War to an end. The 
research is organized chronologically into five chapters. The first chapter examines 
how conflicting interpretations of human rights influenced U.S.-Nicaragua relations 
after the revolution and contributed to escalating tension between the two 
governments. The second chapter identifies early efforts by NGOs to articulate 
human rights-based opposition to the Reagan’s administration’s Contra program 
while Nicaraguan officials also accused the United States of violating Nicaraguan 
human rights by supporting the Contras. Human rights made for a compelling case as 
the Reagan administration founds its policy of supporting the Contras in danger 
through 1983. Chapter three continues to show the success NGOs achieved using 
human rights to reframe the Contra War away from the Cold War interpretation of 
international affairs. NGOs and their allies in Congress rallied enough votes to defeat 
Contra funding in 1984. However, the events of chapter four demonstrated the 
strength of the Democratic Human Rights discourse and Cold War politics in 
Washington. NGOs and Contra opponents suffered setbacks when the administration 
turned human rights around to its benefit and won approval of $100 million for the 
Contras in 1986. Chapter five explains how NGOs organized nationwide grassroots 
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campaigns against the Contra War while taking advantage of new enthusiasm in the 
movement and growing opposition to Reagan’s Contra policy. NGOs helped reshape 
how Americans saw Nicaragua as a human rights crisis outside the Cold War 
political construct and, by doing so, helped end funding for Contra military 
operations. With the funding cut off, the Contras agreed to a cease fire and peace 
agreement with the Sandinistas in 1988, paving the way for the presidential election 
in 1990.  
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CHAPTER 1 – RISE OF THE SANDINISTAS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN REVOLUTION AND 
COUNTERREVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA, 1978-1982 
 
Human rights provided a framework for understanding the Nicaraguan 
Revolution and a lexicon for political advocacy over U.S.-Nicaragua relations during 
and after the revolution. Contradictory views of the two governments over human 
rights influenced relations between the United States and Nicaragua after the 
Sandinistas took power in 1979. The legal and political differences contributed to 
nearly a decade of war in Nicaragua. In Washington, officials saw the Sandinistas 
and the Nicaraguan revolution through a Cold War prism, identifying the Sandinistas 
as a leftist movement, controlled by either the Cubans or the Soviets, or both, and 
building a totalitarian state through repression and violence. A Soviet ally on the 
mainland of the Americas threatened regional and national security, and, therefore, 
threatened democracy and freedom in the Western Hemisphere. President Ronald 
Reagan and his administration formed policy and spoke about the Nicaraguan 
government in these geopolitical terms that implied principles consistent with the 
Democratic Human Rights discourse. However, the president declined to address 
human rights explicitly as a component of U.S. foreign policy early in his 
administration. In contrast, the Sandinistas promoted the revolution in Anticolonial 
Human Rights terms, proclaiming a popular uprising against a dictator and puppet of 
Washington. The revolution served as a rebuke to the United States and its long 
history of intervention in Nicaragua. 
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In addition, NGOs operating within the United States interpreted human 
rights consistent with the Anticolonial Human Rights discourse while criticizing both 
governments’ records. Human rights advocacy opposing Reagan’s Contra War 
questioned how the narrow focus on anti-communism that underpinned the 
Democratic Human Rights discourse could really serve human rights. In doing so, 
NGOs pushed the Reagan administration into an open debate over its Nicaragua 
policy in human rights terms. These organizations used different tactics, and they 
focused on different aspects of human rights in Nicaragua. Each organization also 
had its own constituency and, consequently, its own specific objectives while all 
worked toward the same goal of stopping U.S. support for the counterrevolution in 
Nicaragua. Human rights served as the common vehicle of advocacy, which often 
led NGOs to work together. The Reagan administration would not fully deploy 
human rights as a strategy until forced to do so in the face of significant resistance to 
its policies. 
 
1. Revolution for Human Rights 
The Sandinistas defined human rights based on their experiences living under 
and resisting the U.S.-backed Somoza regime. They believed that Washington had 
trampled on Nicaraguan self-determination and sovereignty in the early twentieth 
century beginning with a nearly twenty-year military occupation followed by a brutal 
authoritarian dynasty that ruled Nicaragua until 1979 with the assistance of the 
United States. At the time, Nicaragua served as a strong U.S. ally in the Cold War 
and a bulwark against leftist movements in Central America. Though the United 
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States did not come to the rescue of its ally as Nicaragua succumbed to revolution, 
President Jimmy Carter still tried to guide the transition of power away from the 
Sandinistas toward a more pro-U.S. bloc of moderates. Washington failed to fully 
appreciate the popular appeal the Sandinistas enjoyed. Nor did Washington 
understand the importance of human rights to those forming the new Nicaraguan 
state and how Nicaraguans defined human rights in reaction to a history of U.S. 
political, economic, and cultural domination. 
The United States invaded Nicaragua in 1912 to protect U.S. citizens and 
property seemingly in danger during a civil war, and the U.S. military then attempted 
to bring stability to Nicaragua through a new political order. Much of the population 
opposed the foreign occupying force and rebelled against the violation of Nicaraguan 
sovereignty and the foreign interference in domestic politics, most notably in the 
rebellion led by Augusto César Sandino, from whom the Sandinistas took their 
name.1 U.S. forces occupied the country until 1933 when Franklin Roosevelt 
withdrew all remaining troops but left behind a U.S.-trained security force called the 
National Guard. The National Guard would dominate Nicaraguan society and 
politics for over four decades.2 Anastasio Somoza García used his control over the 
National Guard to win the presidency in 1936 and established authoritarian rule over 
the country, whether through his own direct rule or through puppet governments, 
until his assassination in 1956. His sons, Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle, continued the family’s hold on power, in large part by cultivating a 
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close relationship with the United States as its ally in the Cold War. The relationship 
with the Somoza regime served Washington’s interests by maintaining U.S. 
influence over the Nicaraguan government while Somoza received economic aid and 
other development assistance.3  
A devastating earthquake struck Managua in 1972, killing approximately ten 
thousand people and exposing the Somoza regime’s corruption. Then-president 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle failed to provide the humanitarian aid people needed or 
to provide the assistance necessary for rebuilding even the capital city of Managua. 
Instead, Somoza supported his military’s looting and personal gain. He and his allies 
awarded themselves government contracts so that they received the windfall from 
international aid.4 The outrage among Nicaraguans following the earthquake began 
Somoza’s fall from power and the rise of the Sandinistas.  
Somoza’s blatant disregard for the suffering of his people led to widespread 
unrest, and, by 1973, a rising number of Nicaraguans, including elites and business 
owners, started supporting the Sandinista insurgency. The Sandinistas, along with 
other anti-Somoza groups, gained more support as the National Guard pillaged and 
destroyed villages to root out insurgents.5 Adding to the unrest, popular newspaper 
publisher and Somoza critic Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal was murdered in 
January 1978. Chamorro’s murder fueled even more anger toward the government 
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and sparked massive anti-Somoza demonstrations and strikes throughout the country, 
which produced even more support for the Sandinistas.6 
The Sandinistas formed in Cuba and Nicaragua in 1961 to resist the 
oppression and corruption of the Somoza regime and the influence from the United 
States. Prior to the 1972 earthquake, the Sandinistas remained small, with little 
influence in national politics. Somoza’s National Guard consistently defeated the 
FSLN in confrontations throughout the 1960s.7 The resistance movement found new 
life and gained broader appeal in the mid-1970s in large part because of economic 
hardship among the rural and working-class populations and the repression by 
Somoza.8 The Sandinistas promised better working conditions in mines, farms, 
schools, and elsewhere, the right to form unions, the reduction of crime and 
corruption stunting economic growth, greater access to improved housing, and an 
end to torture and murder committed by the state.9 The Sandinistas also framed their 
insurrection as a struggle against imperialism and the oppressive influence, political 
and economic, of the United States.10 As the Sandinista movement engaged in 
sustained attacks on National Guard posts in September 1978, they earned the esteem 
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of those angered by the government. The insurgents posed no real threat to 
government forces then, but the movement gained thousands of new recruits.11  
The FSLN, working with other anti-Somoza groups, formed a diverse 
coalition and launched a major offensive on May 29, 1979, which Sandinista 
leadership confidently, and accurately, announced as the “final offensive.”12 In 
addition to the fighting, businesses throughout Nicaragua supported the FSLN by 
closing their stores as part of a general strike that approached 100 percent 
participation in some cities. With widespread popular support and coordination 
among different factions, the rebels controlled León, Nicaragua’s second largest city, 
a week into the offensive, and by June 10, 1979, the guerrillas fought the National 
Guard neighborhood to neighborhood in the capital city of Managua.13 Somoza 
remained defiant in power as the Sandinistas sensed that victory was close and called 
for all Nicaraguans to join in the battle against their oppressor.14 
President Carter did not initially give the civil unrest in Nicaragua much 
attention until human rights violations by Somoza forced his hand. He and his State 
Department focused more on negotiating terms for the transfer of the Panama Canal 
to Panama, addressing the challenges of a Middle East peace agreement, and 
working with the Soviets on an arms reduction treaty. Also, the Carter administration 
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did not think the Sandinistas presented a threat to the Somoza government. Reports 
in 1977 of atrocities by the Somoza regime and then the Chamorro assassination 
caused the White House to turn its attention to Nicaragua. Administration officials 
tried to convince Somoza to change his tactics and stop the repression and violence, 
threatening to cut off financial and military aid, but those threats received strong 
pushback from Somoza’s allies in Congress.15 As officials in Washington debated, 
human rights groups called for intervention against Somoza or at least a recognition 
of human rights abuses. NGOs criticized the United States government for failing to 
do anything. AI documented hundreds of cases of torture, disappearances, and 
summary executions and publicized its findings widely.16  
The administration initially approached the crisis with the intent not to 
resolve human rights issues but instead to maintain the friendly Somoza government 
in power. However, officials quickly determined that only a military intervention 
could save Somoza, an option that administration officials and critics rejected. The 
Sandinistas’ “final offensive,” the second major uprising since September 1978, 
convinced the White House to find a way to guide the transition of power to 
moderates within the anti-Somoza coalition.17 After much negotiation, Somoza 
resigned on July 17, 1979, leaving Francisco Urcuyo Maleanos, president of the 
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lower house of the Nicaraguan legislature, to lead the government.18 Despite efforts 
of the Carter administration to influence the transition away from the Sandinistas, 
they officially took over the government on July 19, ending a revolution that had 
killed approximately fifty thousand Nicaraguans.19 
As early as June 1979, the Sandinistas started working with other opposition 
forces to plan a new direction for Nicaragua, rejecting repression and claiming to 
usher in an era of democracy and social and economic equality. As they anticipated 
Somoza’s demise, the FSLN announced the formation of a provisional government, 
called the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction. The Junta consisted 
of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of Pedro Chamorro, Dr. Sergio Ramirez 
Mercado, Alfonso Robelo Callejas, Moises Hassan, and Daniel Ortega. Ramirez and 
Ortega came from the FSLN, and the others came from private sector factions within 
the anti-Somoza coalition.20 The Junta served as the top executive authority of the 
provisional government. Also, the Council of State would serve as the temporary 
national legislature made up of thirty-five members elected from the various political 
and social organizations. The Supreme Court of Justice would be the judicial branch 
of the government-in-waiting.21  
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Once formed, the Junta announced that it planned for a national project of 
reconstruction focused on rebuilding the economy and creating a democracy 
appropriate for Nicaragua based on those principles emphasized during the 
revolution, including self-determination, political and civil rights for all Nicaraguans, 
and cultural, social, and economic rights.22 In its Platform, the Junta declared that it 
would create a democracy that guaranteed the rights of every citizen of Nicaragua, 
ensured full political participation and universal suffrage, sought equality in social 
and economic opportunity, and protected the right to freedom of expression, 
worship, and association.23 The Junta promised the new government would address 
the country’s “gravest national problems: hunger, unemployment, malnutrition, 
illiteracy, housing – all of which are the legacy of 50 years of Somocismo.”24 The 
Sandinistas intended on building a government and society responsive to the basic 
needs of the people, extending the protections of government beyond the right to 
vote or the right of free expression. The Sandinistas also used these social programs 
as tools to build the new Nicaraguan state and consolidate national power. 
The Junta took specific steps to reassure Nicaraguans and the world that the 
new government would uphold human rights as understood and defined by the UN 
and the Organization of American States (OAS). The Platform included a declaration 
to end laws that violated the dignity of the person, including “murder, 
disappearances, torture and illegal detentions, and home searches.” The Junta 
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affirmed a policy of nonalignment for Nicaragua while seeking “self-determination, 
economic justice, and mutually beneficial relations with those nations that respect 
the revolutionary process in Nicaragua.”25 Leadership also promised to hold free 
elections for local officials and for national office.26 After the fall of Somoza, the 
Junta ratified the American Convention on Human Rights and the UN’s Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. The new government also signed the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International American Charter of 
Social Guarantees.27 
Once in power and faced with governing, revolutionaries in Nicaragua did 
not maintain the cohesion they enjoyed while fighting to bring down a government, 
but the various factions did come together over human rights. Unity within the new 
government and popular support among the anti-Somoza coalition started slipping 
away when moderates in the FSLN began breaking off from the Marxists in early 
1980.28 Problems arose, in large part, from disputes over the appropriate form of 
democracy for Nicaragua. Frustrated moderates expressed their continued support 
for the reforms and policies of the Junta, but they sought a quicker transition to 
democracy through elections. They also wanted a political alternative to the leftists 
within the Sandinista government.29  
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In July, the anti-Somoza coalition fully broke apart when the Nicaraguan 
government seemed to many, including members of the Junta, to be moving too far 
to the left and away from immediate elections.30 Robelo represented the strongest 
voice for the private sector in the government. Robelo, one of five members of the 
governing Junta, first announced in mid-March 1980 the formation of a new party, 
the Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense.31 He subsequently resigned from the 
Junta on April 22, a day after the Sandinistas announced a plan to expand the 
Council of State, a move that would provide a path for the Sandinistas to take a 
majority of the seats rather than the originally planned one-third.32 Chamorro, 
another moderate on the Junta, resigned on April 19 supposedly because of health 
and family reasons. The resignations of Robelo and Chamorro dealt a blow to the 
credibility of the Sandinista government and indicated growing discord between the 
more radical Sandinistas in government and the moderates among the private 
sector.33  
The break among the anti-Somoza coalition did not yet rise to crisis or civil 
war, as all parties still seemed willing and capable of coexisting and reaching 
political compromise, if not joining in a government based on a common view of 
Nicaraguan human rights consistent with the Anticolonial Human Rights discourse. 
In June 1981, the various factions, including representatives from the Sandinistas, 
met in a forum in Managua to discuss the future of the Nicaraguan state. Participants 
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agreed on various principles upon which they could build the new government, all of 
which aligned with previous statements from the governing Junta that recognized 
and defended political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights of the Nicaraguan 
people. Participants also adopted a position grounded in anti-imperialism and self-
determination. As such, the forum concluded that the revolution stood for 
democracy, pluralism, and anti-imperialism and that those principles must continue 
in the new government and Nicaraguan society.34 
The Sandinistas and the opposition parties agreed that Nicaraguan 
“[d]emocracy and its exercise must be conceived with realistic criteria, adequate to 
our socio-economic, political and historical context.” Nicaraguans alone would set 
the terms of their new government and implement democracy consistent with their 
needs, culture, and traditions, and pluralism formed a core principle of Nicaragua’s 
future. Assertions of self-determination and political and economic independence 
served as a strong rebuke to the decades of U.S. dominance through the Somoza 
regime and attempts to continue controlling Nicaragua’s destiny. Forum participants 
also remained focused on economic opportunity as a right to individuals and 
reforming the structure of society and the economy to enhance that opportunity. 
They called for a mixed economy with private property and state property while also 
seeking economic stimulation through efficient national planning.35 
The national debate over the future of the Nicaraguan government and the 
principles upon which the society would be built offered an unprecedented 
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opportunity for Nicaraguans to determine their own destiny after decades of 
repression and foreign influence. The discussion took place outside the advice and 
consent of the United States, much to the displeasure of the administrations of Carter 
and then Reagan. Democracy remained a point of contention in Nicaraguan politics 
and between Managua and Washington. The Sandinistas and other participants of the 
1981 forum agreed that the democracy of Nicaragua would not look like the 
democracy sought by President Reagan. The Sandinistas seemed to accept 




For both the Carter and Reagan administrations, creating democracy in 
Nicaragua served objectives in national security and human rights, but each 
administration pursued democracy through different political ideology and strategy. 
Once the Somoza regime fell, the Carter administration chose to offer friendship and 
financial assistance to the Sandinista government with the hope that the United 
States could maintain some influence over Nicaraguan politics and guide a transition 
to democracy favorable to the U.S. worldview. Carter also wanted to keep ties with 
moderates in the government and private sector to help them into positions of power 
in Managua, which served the cause of anti-communism.36 Reagan pursued 
democracy and human rights in Nicaragua by rejecting the legitimacy of the 
Sandinistas and offering support to what he called the democratic opposition, or the 
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Contras. For Reagan, human rights came from democracy, and democracy came 
from aggressive opposition to communism, which, in Nicaragua, came through the 
Contras. 
Before Carter provided funding to the Nicaraguans, administration officials 
wanted to see evidence that the Sandinistas would fulfill their pledge to the OAS to 
respect human rights. Managua found conditions on aid highly offensive. Nicaragua 
faced a pressing need for national reconstruction after a war to unseat a dictator who 
personally drained the treasury and who was known for human rights abuses while 
receiving financial and military support from the United States for decades.37 U.S. 
policy toward Nicaragua aid reflected the underlying tension between the two 
governments over human rights. The Nicaraguans wanted to address poverty, 
hunger, and unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity while Washington relied 
on democratic institutions to preserve human rights. Until those institutions existed, 
Washington preferred a staunchly anti-communist, though authoritarian, ally in 
Nicaragua, which led the Carter and Reagan administrations to support an armed 
counterrevolutionary movement.  
Washington did initially provide the requested financial aid to Nicaragua. 
First, Congress approved nearly $9 million in aid, which the administration designed 
and introduced to support the national reconstruction in Nicaragua and build closer 
ties between the two governments. The aid package earmarked $8.8 million for 
reconstruction and price stabilization, while only $23,600 went to military training 
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for Sandinista soldiers at a U.S. base in Panama and to a tour of bases in the United 
States by Nicaraguan officers.38 The Carter administration also asked Congress to 
appropriate $75 million in Nicaragua aid for fiscal year 1980 to improve 
infrastructure, healthcare, housing, and education.39 The administration hoped the 
investment could expand U.S. influence and further build relationships with the 
Nicaraguan government based on cooperation and nonintervention and strengthen 
ties to Nicaragua’s private business sector, community organizations, press, and 
churches.40 Carter also intended for the money to curb the influence of Cuba and to 
support human rights by aiding “those moderate and democratic Nicaraguans who 
are struggling to preserve individual freedoms, political pluralism, the democratic 
process, and a strong, free enterprise participation in their economy.”41 Officials in 
the State Department believed that a strong private sector created a loyal and 
powerful counterweight to an anti-U.S. sentiment in Managua.42 Even as the State 
Department remained optimistic over future U.S.-Nicaragua relations, Carter hedged 
his bet by secretly funding armed anti-Sandinista groups forming in Nicaragua and 
Honduras.43 
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Carter’s decision to build a relationship and offer financial assistance to the 
Nicaraguans received a skeptical, if not hostile, response from much of Washington 
guided by the Cold War politics of anti-communism and the Democratic Human 
Rights discourse. Nicaragua appeared to many as a threat to political freedom and 
civil liberties. The conservative-leaning Council for Inter-American Security referred 
to the FSLN as the “Sandinista Marxist Party of Nicaragua” and part of a plan of the 
Soviet Union to “communize first Central America and then all of Latin America.” 
The organization declared Cuba and Nicaragua operated as central components to 
this plan.44  
Members of Congress expressed similar concerns about human rights in 
Central America and the Cold War implications of a Sandinista government. Those 
concerns carried through as conditions placed on the administration’s allocation of 
the funds once the bill did win approval. Congress required Carter to certify that the 
Sandinistas did not support terrorism, a concern that arose from allegations that 
Nicaragua wanted to spread revolution and provided arms to leftist guerrillas in El 
Salvador who also allegedly had ties to the Cuban government. Carter would issue a 
report regarding the human rights conditions in Nicaragua that would alert Congress 
to any systematic restrictions on political and civil rights by the Sandinistas. The 
legislation required the president to stop payment if he determined Nicaragua 
presented a threat to security or to democratic institutions in other Latin American 
countries.45  
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Months of debate and revisions of the Nicaraguan aid proposal raised 
concerns in Managua about the true intentions of the U.S. government. Sandinista 
leadership knew well the history of U.S. intervention in Latin America and often 
accused the United States of engineering a coup d’état in Chile in 1973 against 
Marxist president Salvador Allende. Managua remained vigilant against any such 
U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.46 Nevertheless, Congress did approve the $75 million 
in aid for Nicaragua in early June 1980.47 Carter did not sign the legislation until 
September 12, 1980, at which time he certified for Congress that the Nicaraguan 
government did not participate or support in terrorism or acts of violence against 
other countries.48 
The era of somewhat good feelings between the Nicaraguan government and 
the Carter administration ended when U.S. officials determined they had enough 
evidence to prove that the Sandinistas supplied arms to guerrillas in El Salvador. 
Carter then announced through a Presidential Determination to Congress in January 
1981 that he had suspended further aid.49 These findings confirmed suspicions in the 
White House and in Congress that an international communist conspiracy threatened 
Central America with totalitarianism. Nicaragua had not only aligned itself with 
communists but also actively participated in spreading communist revolution. In 
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addition to cutting aid, Carter secretly authorized an additional $1 million for the 
CIA to lend support to anti-Sandinista organizations.50  
With the newly authorized funds, the CIA tapped into an opposition 
movement in Nicaragua that started to coalesce as soon as the Sandinistas took 
power in 1979. The dissent came from diverse sectors of the population, such as the 
business community, the wealthy, the middle class, rural peasants, and indigenous 
communities.51 Much of the opposition’s various grievances centered on human 
rights and the belief that the Sandinistas did not represent the fulfillment of the 
Anticolonial Human Rights discourse articulated during and after the revolution. 
Moderates who fought against Somoza opposed the authoritarianism they saw 
emerging out of the new Sandinista regime.52 Others felt left out of the new 
Nicaragua, unable to see how the Sandinista reforms protected their economic, 
social, or cultural rights. The Sandinistas alienated the rural peasantry with agrarian 
reforms and the centralization of credit and consumer goods within the urban centers. 
Peasants also suffered from collectivization policies that created large scale farms for 
production, and they feared that the state intended to stop the traditional forms of 
agriculture by families in favor of cooperative production.53 Indigenous people living 
along the Atlantic Coast opposed attempts to incorporate them within a revolutionary 
state and suffered brutal repression in response. The Sandinistas claimed throughout 
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the 1980s that their policies and reforms created economic opportunity for 
Nicaraguans, improved the standard of living, increased production, and provided 
improved access to social welfare programs, health care, and education. However, 
failing to adequately address the human rights arguments of influential sectors of the 
population consistently undercut that argument. 
The Sandinistas’ failures to address human rights demands of the Nicaraguan 
people also produced the unyielding counterrevolutionary movement. Individuals 
within the various sectors of society came together to form armed and non-armed 
opposition groups. Among the armed opposition, many joined with displaced 
members of the former National Guard. Those who took up arms against the 
government were referred to generally as Contras. Carter first offered support to the 
Contras, but Reagan greatly enhanced the U.S. commitment, in dollars and in 
political capital, as part of his broader, more aggressive approach to communism.   
“I believe that U.S. promotion of human rights and support for democracy in 
the Western Hemisphere reinforce each other. History shows us that the most 
effective guarantee of human rights lies in the creation and strengthening of open 
democratic institutions of government.” According to Reagan, broad representation 
of a nation’s people within democratic governments led democracies to protect 
human rights. Because of that broad representation, democracies enjoyed more 
stability, were reluctant to use violence, and produced more continuity in policy.54 
However, failing to embrace democracy indicated to the president that a nation 
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rejected freedom and civil liberties, thus human rights. No middle ground existed in 
this Cold War context. Therefore, Nicaragua’s seeming embrace of communism and 
Soviet and Cuban friendship created a threat to human rights and to security in the 
Americas. 
Claims that the Sandinistas supported Salvadoran rebels through arms 
shipments reinforced concerns about the danger of communists in Nicaragua and the 
threat to democracy, prompting both the Carter and Reagan administrations to 
support the Contras.55 A large capture of documents indicating that one hundred tons 
of military supplies had reached the insurgents through Cuba and Nicaragua and that 
several hundred tons more were still coming bolstered the U.S. case.56 In addition, a 
CIA report from the summer of 1981 identified Nicaragua as a pawn in a larger plan 
of the Soviets and Cubans for spreading communism in the Western Hemisphere and 
predicted that Nicaragua would continue to slide further toward totalitarianism.57 
The situation in Nicaragua seemed to be getting more dangerous to U.S. 
interests, but analysts cautioned that anything looking like intervention by the United 
States to support counterrevolution would arouse anti-American sentiment in Latin 
American nations already sensitive to a history of U.S. intervention.58 Instead of 
direct military action against the Sandinistas, Reagan first used economic pressure to 
force change. Reagan followed Carter’s lead by terminating all remaining financial 
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assistance to Nicaragua and cutting off loans from the United States.59 The president 
also expanded the covert operation of supporting the insurgent Contras by increasing 
funding levels and expanding the scope of the operation.60 Through a secret 
Presidential Finding in March 1981, Reagan authorized the CIA to organize, train, 
and equip an anti-Sandinista guerrilla army.61 The Committee on Intelligence in the 
U.S. House of Representatives approved the covert operation for the sole objective 
of stopping the flow of arms to Salvadoran insurgents. The committee prohibited 
operations intended to overthrow the Sandinista government or provoke a conflict 
between Nicaragua and neighboring Honduras.62  
The administration joined its covert counterrevolution with a public 
diplomacy strategy of attacking the human rights record of the Sandinistas and 
branding Nicaragua as a totalitarian state in the making. Over time, Reagan and his 
administration appropriated the language of human rights from progressive NGOs 
and Democrats to improve the image of its foreign policy and win support for anti-
Sandinista groups.63 Ironically, the administration also used the covert Contra 
operation to create a human rights crisis in Nicaragua, correctly anticipating that the 
Sandinistas would respond to the Contra threat through repression. 
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3. The Sandinista Threat to Human Rights 
Until the public learned the full scope of the Contra operation, the Reagan 
administration laid the groundwork for aggressive anti-communist policies by 
branding the Sandinistas as human rights violators. Reagan consistently demonized 
the Sandinistas for the forced relocation of indigenous people on the Nicaragua 
Atlantic Coast and the destruction and violence that followed. White House officials 
pointed to Managua’s policies of repression and press censorship as signs of a 
strengthening totalitarian state. Reagan also consistently reminded the public of the 
Sandinistas’ broken promise to the OAS to hold elections.  
The Sandinista treatment of indigenous people served as the administration’s 
strongest evidence for human rights abuse. Before the Permanent Council of the 
OAS, Reagan reminded the world that the Nicaraguan government had admitted to 
the “forced relocation of about 8,500 Miskito Indians.” He also declared that his 
administration had “clear evidence that since late 1981, many Indian communities 
have been burned to the ground and men, women, and children killed.”64 The 
example and the imagery worked well for Reagan to demonstrate the brutal nature of 
the Sandinista government. 
Conditions on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua were quite different from that 
on the Pacific. Sandinista officials of the urbanized Pacific Coast wanted to bring the 
modernizing reforms of the revolution to the more rural and sparsely populated 
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Atlantic Coast.65 Miskito, Mayanga, and Rama Indians and creoles occupied the 
Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, mostly in Zelaya Province. Most of the Indian 
population was Miskito, and the total number of Indians in 1979 was between 
100,000 and 175,000. No large landowners dominated the area, and farmers had 
access to whatever land they needed. Some communities participated in communal 
land ownership in which a community member could use land not then in use. Also, 
the indigenous people did not usually receive services from the national government. 
If they received social services, those typically came from local church organizations 
or other charities.66 They maintained a separate culture and spoke indigenous 
languages and English.67  
The Sandinistas tried to incorporate these indigenous groups into the national 
project of revolutionary reconstruction, imposing upon them programs of agrarian 
reform, education, and health care and threatening cultural identity.68 The 
Nicaraguan government also engaged in economic development and infrastructure 
projects designed to increase the production capacity of the region.69 These programs 
served to extend services to the Nicaraguan people while the government programs 
also extended government participation and/or control over society, which the 
indigenous groups on the Atlantic Coast resisted.70 The Sandinistas who worked with 
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the indigenous groups held prejudices against Atlantic Coast people, believing them 
to be backward in culture, religion, and agriculture and in need of modern reforms.71 
In the face of these challenges, the Miskito people maintained a strong community 
and developed a militancy to their politics as some leaders advocated for autonomy 
and even sovereignty for indigenous peoples.72  
The Sandinista government committed one of its most visible human rights 
violations when it forcibly relocated indigenous communities in reaction to the 
perceived threats to the government and the alleged ties to the Contras. The 
Nicaraguan military forced approximately eight thousand Miskitos to move from the 
Coco River region to five new settlements fifty miles south. Another ten thousand 
fled to neighboring Honduras as refugees.73 President Reagan saw to it that the 
Nicaraguans paid an enormous political price for this operation. The Reagan 
administration argued that the treatment of the Miskito Indians revealed the brutality 
of a totalitarian government in Managua, and the administration provided arms, 
training, and funding for indigenous resistance. The administration intended to use 
the mistreatment as propaganda while maintaining tension among the two groups to 
undermine the Sandinista government.74 
Elsewhere in Nicaragua, the U.S. Embassy reported rising tensions and a 
growing siege mentality among Nicaraguan leadership that prompted ever greater 
levels of repression. In early 1982, Minister of the Interior Tomás Borge warned his 
colleagues of growing activity of separatist groups and counterrevolutionary groups, 
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of attempted sabotaging or hijacking of airplanes, and of attacks on the Nicaraguan 
military. Borge also noted anxiety within the government about the 
counterrevolutionary groups operating in Costa Rica and a meeting in Costa Rica of 
opposition leaders including Alfonso Robelo. Ortega communicated the same unease 
about his government’s survival when he spoke at a mass meeting in Managua on 
February 21, 1982. Ortega accused the Reagan administration of funding the 
counterrevolutionary forces responsible for bombing the Managua airport the 
previous night and warned that those same U.S.-funded counterrevolutionaries 
planned to kill members of the FSLN to weaken the unity of the government. As 
Reagan and officials in his administration refused to comment on CIA ties to the 
Contras, Ortega declared Reagan’s silence served as confirmation that the United 
States sponsored terrorism in Nicaragua.75 The Sandinistas knew of Reagan’s plans 
to aggressively provoke confrontation in Nicaragua, having obtained a previously 
confidential report produced for then-candidate Reagan by a team of foreign policy 
advisers. Commonly known as the “Santa Fe Document,” the report declared war 
was the normal state of international relations and that Latin America was one of the 
hot spots for World War III, a conflict in which the United States already found itself 
with communists. To respond to the grave threat, the United States needed to reassert 
hegemonic control over the Western Hemisphere through military and economic 
means. The Sandinistas took this report as a direct threat.76 Nevertheless, Ortega still 
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intended to carry out the revolution’s goals of pluralism in society and politics and 
peace in Central America, but now he would use a heavier hand of government to 
implement reform and defend the state.77 
The threats that preoccupied Borge and Ortega led the Nicaraguan 
government to impose severe restrictions on its citizens, which supported the claims 
of the Reagan administration that the Sandinistas intended on creating a totalitarian 
state. On March 15, 1982, the Communications Media Directorate declared the 
government believed there existed a “conspiracy against our people and their 
revolution, promoted by the current administration of the U.S. Government....”78  
Ortega accused the CIA of directing the bombing of bridges. Nicaraguan officials 
had also speculated that other incidents of sabotage were part of a larger coordinated 
operation.79 The Nicaraguan government declared a state of National Emergency 
beginning March 15 and suspended “all radio newscasts, political party opinion 
programs or those of any other organizations.” It required that all “radio stations... 
join in network with The Voice of Nicaragua... for the transmission of the newscast 
‘The Voice of the Defense of the Fatherland’.” In addition, all written media 
publications needed to be submitted to the Communications Media Directorate for 
review before publishing. The government declared that the restrictions would last as 
long as the national emergency continued.80  
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The Sandinista government also restricted the activity and organizing of 
opposition political groups, private sector organizations, media outlets, and labor 
organizations through laws designed to suppress opposition and free speech. The 
state restricted freedom of movement and prevented opposition leaders from leaving 
the country. The Sandinistas prohibited any further discussion in the Council of State 
regarding restrictions on media and political parties. Security forces arrested people 
out of suspicion for their ties to counterrevolutionaries. CIA analysts also concluded 
that the Nicaraguan government held nearly five thousand political prisoners, many 
of whom reported torture or had been killed in custody.81 Intelligence analysts 
determined that when Nicaraguan officials believed opposition forces posed a threat 
to the revolution, the human rights violations would increase as the Nicaraguan 
government defended itself.82 Operation planners wanted to continue pushing the 
Sandinistas into human rights violations and then accuse the Sandinistas of human 
rights violations. 
The administration and its supporters in Congress used the human rights 
violations to attack the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan government. Jesse Helms (R-
NC), chairman of the Senate’s Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs for the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, conducted a hearing over human rights conditions 
in Nicaragua in November 1981 after reports of Indians killed along the Atlantic 
Coast. Helms noted that reports accused the Sandinistas of “burning entire villages to 
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the ground, burning people alive, burying them alive – a systematic, thorough, and 
sustained program of extermination….”83 His witness, Elliott Abrams, assistant 
secretary of state for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, felt confident that 
naïve, if not dangerous, impressions of governments like that in Nicaragua would 
“be eliminated by a sober, informed and consistent balance in our approach to human 
rights.”84 The FSLN did not offer a novel form of governance or an expansive 
defense of rights. The FSLN was a violent threat to national security and regional 
stability. 
Abrams testified that the Sandinistas consistently restricted civil liberties as 
the government moved closer to the Soviets and other communist countries. The 
Sandinista government’s pursuit of pluralism and respect for justice, as promised 
through the revolution, had eroded since 1979 as it put elections off until 1985 
claiming that the people had chosen their leaders and voted through the revolution. 
The Sandinistas also packed the Council of State with their own party members 
rather than maintain it as an institution for political debate and opposition as 
appropriate in a democracy, which, according to Abrams, was consistent with the 
larger move by the Sandinistas to reduce the freedom of political expression and 
dissent. The Sandinistas restricted freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and 
workers’ rights to strike and to bargain for better pay. As proof of Nicaragua’s 
participation within a global operation to advance communist revolution, Abrams 
pointed out that Nicaragua hosted approximately six thousand Cubans supposedly as 
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advisers, including as many as two thousand military advisers. Nicaragua also 
housed advisers from other communist countries such as North Korea, East 
Germany, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union.85 
Treatment of the Miskito, Mayanga, and Rama Indians was the most 
disturbing behavior by the Sandinista government, according to Abrams, and 
demonstrated the government’s true nature. Abrams testified that, “[u]sing the 
transparent and flimsy excuse of development plans, and alleged desire to integrate 
the Miskitos into the rest of society, the Sandinistas have viciously attacked these 
Indians tribes, killing many Indians.”86 He further cited a report by Freedom House, 
issued on February 22, 1982, that described  
 
forced mass evacuation of Indian communities, 20 villages emptied, 5 
firebombed, and many Indians placed in what they called ‘protected’ 
hamlets; the burial alive of 15 Indians…; imprisonment or expulsion 
of clergy and Indian leaders; and destruction of the Indians’ economic 
and political as well as religious institutions.87 
 
However, Abrams claimed to know nothing of Miskitos in military operations 
against the Nicaragua government, and he suspected that Sandinistas alleged 
Miskitos joined anti-government forces as a propaganda technique to legitimize 
security operations against the Miskitos and the relocation camps.88  
While Abrams’s testimony identified verifiable human rights abuses by the 
Sandinista government, the specific conduct that amounted to human rights 
violations did not concern the administration as much as the larger threat of a 
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communist Nicaragua. An exchange with Senator Edward Zorinsky (D-NE) revealed 
the administration’s priorities in terms of human rights. Zorinsky asked how the 
United States could support Guatemala and El Salvador when both those 
governments adopted policies of even greater repressive force than that of 
Nicaragua. Abrams declined to take issue with Zorinsky’s characterization of the 
human rights record of Guatemala or El Salvador. Instead, Abrams claimed that the 
State Department did not make comparisons when forming policy, but “the problem 
with Nicaragua is, of course, where it is heading. In El Salvador you have a 
government committed to heading toward democracy.” For Abrams, the pursuit of 
democracy, or the appearance of that pursuit, served as a determinative factor in 
weighing the significance of human rights abuses. “[W]hat we are seeing in El 
Salvador is a government attempting to have a free election to move toward 
democracy, and in Nicaragua a government attempting to destroy democracy.”89 
Abrams took the position that a country did not necessarily need to meet specific 
human rights requirements and that “as long as it has a good political purpose,” it 
could receive aid and friendship from the United States.90 
The president made similar comparisons between El Salvador and Nicaragua 
before the OAS. Reagan declared that Nicaragua had served as an incubator for 
violence through paramilitary insurgencies since the Sandinistas took power in 1979. 
Furthermore, Nicaraguans failed to fulfill the promises made in 1979 to the OAS that 
the Sandinista government would uphold human rights and hold free elections. “Two 
years later, these commitments can be measured by the postponement of elections 
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until 1985, by repression against free trade unions, against the media, minorities, and 
in defiance of all international civility….”91 El Salvador, however, implemented land 
reform and, according to Reagan, successfully pursued democracy. The Salvadoran 
government also encouraged guerrillas to lay down their arms and to participate in 
the electoral process. Reagan then altered the historical narrative of imperialism in 
Latin America to a more favorable Cold War context in which the Soviet Union, not 
the United States, violated self-determination and national sovereignty. Reagan 
contrasted Nicaragua and El Salvador within the Soviet imperialism construct, 
emphasizing the political and military domination by the Soviets over states such as 
Nicaragua while the people of El Salvador, free from foreign influence, pursued their 
own path toward democracy.92 
The president again raised the issue of self-determination and democracy in a 
revealing exchange with Venezuelan intellectuals and political leaders. More than 
two hundred Venezuelans wrote to the president in September 1982 asking that he 
exercise restraint and practice a policy of non-intervention in Central America to 
promote peace and self-determination. These notable Venezuelans expressed concern 
that the tension in Central America would explode into a regional war and draw in 
other Latin American countries. Reagan sympathized with their concern over a 
widening war. Yet, the president identified communist intervention as the greatest 
threat to peace in Central America while he also proclaimed his intent to defend the 
right to self-determination. He blamed the regional instability on political and 
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economic underdevelopment in Central America and on the Soviets, Cubans, and 
Nicaraguans taking advantage of the social and economic weakness of countries to 
spread communism.93 Reagan declined to address the potential, or on-going, U.S. 
intervention in the region, but he did offer that the United States government would 
provide up to $350 million in funds for economic development to Central America 
and Caribbean nations. He further pledged to continue helping develop democratic 
institutions among allied nations and support that development through such events 
as conferences intended to build skills and experiences in democratic governance and 
participation. “The commitment to democracy, self-sustaining economic 
development and non-intervention which we [the United States and Venezuela] share 
does not, however, characterize the action of Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet 
Union.” He argued that the communist nations supported the insurgency in El 
Salvador while Honduras and Costa Rica suffered from attacks of Nicaraguan 
terrorists.94 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, further clarified 
the administration’s position on human rights and the narrow focus on the 
connection to democracy. Kirkpatrick disputed claims for economic or social rights, 
arguing that those “rights” were goals to which people should aspire but not demand 
from governments. The Sandinista declarations of principles upon which the 
government would be established emphasized social equality, economic opportunity, 
access to land and resources, and government services such as education and health 
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care. Yet Kirkpatrick reasoned “that rights should not be confused with wishes, or 
goals, and that the list of human rights cannot be indefinitely lengthened like a 
shopping list in a global supermarket.” The Reagan administration elevated as 
human rights only political and civil rights, such as the right to vote, to peacefully 
assemble, to free speech and to due process, above all other claimed rights. 
According to Kirkpatrick, those rights were “the prerequisites to other social and 
economic rights” because political and civil rights depended on government restraint. 
She emphasized that the state of the economy meant nothing to those basic rights 
that depended on government inaction, and the government should not be held 
responsible for economic development or industrialization of the nation. A 
government should be held responsible for its policies concerning the exercise of 
power and control over its citizens.95  
In the eyes of administration officials such as Abrams and Kirkpatrick, the 
Nicaraguan government exercised little restraint toward its people and engaged in 
policies of repression since coming to power in 1979. The repression to which the 
Reagan administration referred only increased as the Nicaraguan government 
consolidated power over subsequent years. The Sandinistas moved against each 
segment of society to assert its control over them while also building up a large 
military and security force to impose its will.96 Reagan and his administration saw 
democracy as the answer to the repression in Nicaragua pursued policies in 
furtherance of democracy promotion in Nicaragua in the form of counterrevolution 
through the Contras. 
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4. The Contra Opposition 
Progressive NGOs operating in the United States and devoted to peace in 
Nicaragua rejected the Democratic Human Rights discourse as articulated by the 
Reagan administration. Instead, NGOs tried to influence U.S. foreign policy through 
their own human rights advocacy based on the Anticolonial Human Rights discourse. 
NGOs also called for greater recognition of the importance of human rights for U.S. 
foreign policy. While the goals and underlying ideology were very similar, the 
messaging of NGOs differed. The organizations deployed a variety of strategies in 
defense of human rights based on the organization’s origins, constituency, structure, 
and political agenda. As the conflict in Nicaragua wore on through the 1980s, the 
different agendas and strategies for influencing policy translated into varied levels of 
success in Washington. Yet each organization offered important contributions to 
push a human rights discourse into the debate over Nicaragua policy and forced the 
Reagan administration to engage human rights as a factor in its public diplomacy, if 
not official diplomacy. Despite their different approaches to human rights advocacy 
and their different membership, they all sought peace in Nicaragua, which led 
organizations such as the Nicaraguan Network, CFNFP, and WOLA to work 
together in nation-wide grassroots campaigns and lobbying efforts. 
The Nicaragua Network, originally called the National Network in Solidarity 
with the Nicaraguan People, operated as a solidarity organization claiming to support 
the Nicaraguan people and the Sandinista reforms through fundraising and grassroots 
organizing. Solidarity organizations in the United States advocated on behalf of a 
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nation or people, such as El Salvador or Nicaragua. The solidarity movement 
emerged from the influential coalitions of religious organizations and peace 
organizations that lobbied Congress toward the end of the Vietnam War in the early 
1970s.97 The Nicaragua Network grew to be the largest Nicaragua solidarity 
organization in the United States.98  
As a solidarity organization, the Nicaragua Network differed from other 
NGOs working against Reagan’s Nicaragua policy because its primary objective was 
to support the Sandinista government and Nicaraguan Revolution in the United 
States. It explicitly supported Sandinista reforms and argued that the Sandinista 
government stood for and defended human rights. Other NGOs such as CFNFP 
occasionally acknowledged the benefits of Sandinista reforms but mainly directed 
their efforts against the detrimental effects of U.S. policy. Analysis of the Nicaragua 
Network’s records does not reveal the organization took orders from the FSLN or 
engaged in close collaboration with the Nicaraguan government at an organizational 
level. The Nicaragua Network did provide a U.S.-based voice that could translate the 
policies and ideas of the Sandinistas into a palatable, effective message for the 
United States. 
In February 1979, Nicaraguan refugees, small Nicaragua solidarity groups 
from around the country, human rights organizations, and religions organizations 
formed the Nicaragua Network to construct a grassroots support network within the 
United States. Prior to the Sandinista victory, Nicaraguan refugees directed the 
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operations of the Nicaragua Network in major cities like New York, San Francisco, 
Chicago, Los Angeles, and Washington in the late 1970s to educate the public about 
the horrors of the Somoza government and to generate support for the revolution.99 
Through their leadership and participation in the Nicaragua Network, exiles played a 
significant role in the initial phase of activism against Somoza and then in support of 
the Sandinista government.100 Activist and scholar Van Gosse found the Nicaragua 
Network was very successful in organizing demonstrations in support of the 
Sandinistas during and after the revolution.101 The Nicaragua Network was so adept 
at mobilizing activists that The Washington Post noted the organization’s uncommon 
ability to “raise the ire of their counterparts who [supported] Reagan.” The solidarity 
organizations associated with El Salvador and Guatemala also worked closely with 
the Nicaragua Network and organized demonstrations against U.S. policy in Central 
America and the United States militarizing political conflicts.102 
Organizers of the Nicaragua Network in its first years focused on informing 
the American public about the Sandinista Revolution and government and about U.S. 
policy toward Nicaragua in the context of Sandinista reforms and efforts to rebuild 
the country. The organization hoped to mobilize concerned citizens to change U.S. 
policy toward Nicaragua to one based on the ideology of the Anticolonial Human 
Rights discourse, seeking “peace with justice, mutual respect and the right to self-
determination.”103 This articulation of human rights through justice and self-
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determination matched the Sandinista pronouncements of principles underpinning 
the new government. 
Attitudes in Washington in 1980 turned decidedly against Nicaragua, a 
development that caught the Nicaragua Network by surprise, and the presidential 
campaign of that year painted an even darker picture for future U.S.-Nicaragua 
relations. In March 1980, after the $75 million aid package stalled in Congress, the 
Nicaragua Network’s Coordinating Committee concluded that the organization 
should emphasize building political support in the United States for the revolution to 
prevent Nicaragua’s isolation internationally.104 The organization wanted to correct 
what members saw as a misinformation campaign against the Nicaraguan 
government. Members of the organization’s Implementation Committee found that 
the U.S. media presented a “distorted and negative” view of Nicaragua. The 
organization’s leadership determined that the Nicaragua Network would respond by 
developing contacts with national and local media, sending letters to national and 
local newspaper editors, issuing press releases from the National Office, organizing 
mass demonstrations, and offering testimonials from people returning from 
Nicaragua.105  
As the Reagan administration publicly linked the Sandinistas with the Soviets 
and Cubans and sought to isolate the Nicaraguan state, the Nicaragua Network 
countered through arguments in human rights that established the Nicaraguan 
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Revolution as a social and political movement against repression and foreign 
interference. The organization referred to the revolution as “a popularly-supported, 
pluralistic and democratic process.” Furthermore, the organization argued that the 
reforms by the Sandinistas formed a better Nicaragua through a mixed economy of 
government-managed natural resources and property working with a robust private 
sector and government run social programs to ensure equal opportunity in society. 
The Sandinistas more efficiently and equitably managed the economy than had the 
Somozas, and these reforms served the needs of the people. The FSLN confiscated 
all land and property owned by Somoza and his friends, which amounted to nearly a 
third of the national economy. According to the Nicaragua Network, the state then 
utilized resources and the land for the benefit of the Nicaraguan people. Also, the 
mixed economy model best served the unique interests and needs of Nicaragua. 
While the government nationalized natural resources and minerals and took control 
over the nation’s foreign trade, sixty percent of the nation’s economy remained in the 
private sector “with the understanding that workers’ rights and the national interest 
must prevail over narrow profit motivation.” These measures gave the people equal 
access to land, fair wages, appropriate working conditions, union organization, an 
improved standard in living between 1979 and 1981, and reductions to the 
unemployment rate.106  
The Nicaragua Network contrasted the Sandinista government’s policies with 
the destabilizing militarism of the United States government in Central America. As 
the Sandinistas implemented reforms, Reagan authorized large military exercises 
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with Honduras to intimidate Managua, increased CIA involvement in Contra 
operations, and ordered the invasion of Grenada, all of which violated national 
sovereignty in Latin America and risked provoking a regional conflict.107 However, 
calling for greater U.S. support for the Sandinistas using terms and ideas such as 
“collectivization,” which certainly sounded to Americans like communism, may 
have been tone deaf to the political and cultural environment of a 1980s United 
States steeped in Cold War anxieties. The Nicaragua Network’s strategy of 
proclaiming the greatness of Sandinista policies would continue to be a tough sell, 
and the organization would gradually shift tactics to focus on the human rights 
abuses committed by the Contras and the United States. Until then, the Nicaragua 
Network would have to address both the successes and failings in human rights by 
the Sandinistas. 
Not all NGOs who advocated for peace and human rights in Nicaragua 
followed the Sandinista worldview or invested in the success of the Revolution. 
WOLA differed from the Nicaragua Network in approach and objective. WOLA 
remained independent from both the U.S. government and the Nicaraguan 
government, criticizing both for human rights violations. WOLA emphasized the 
importance of democracy for ensuring human rights, but it rejected the use of 
guerrilla fighters to create democracy. From its beginning, WOLA claimed to 
operate as an “impartial and nonpartisan” organization defending human rights in 
Latin America, building the institutions critical for democracy, shaping U.S. foreign 
policy to be more responsive to human rights in Latin America, and cooperating with 
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like-minded organizations in the United States and abroad. WOLA considered itself 
as representing and providing leadership and coordination for organizations in Latin 
America and human rights organizations operating in the United States focused on 
Latin America.  
Organizers wanted WOLA to serve the unique needs and perspectives of 
Latin Americans while also educating the U.S. public and policymakers in 
Washington. WOLA representatives offered nonpartisan, expert testimony in 
Congressional hearings over legislation or inquiries related to democracy and human 
rights in Latin America. It also organized visits from Latin American cultural and 
political leaders as part of its seminar programs that helped engage U.S. 
policymakers with Latin American concerns.108 WOLA hosted Violetta Chamorro 
and Daniel Ortega, both members at the time of the Nicaraguan governing Junta, in 
August 1979 and hosted a reception for the Sandinistas in the WOLA office.109 
WOLA also conducted studies in Latin American countries, such as Nicaragua, to 
assess and report on human rights conditions and politics.110 
WOLA articulated a position on human rights and the Sandinistas that gave 
the benefit of the doubt to the new Nicaraguan government and the reforms the 
Nicaraguans intended to enact to rebuild the country and shape society. WOLA also 
gave credit to the Sandinistas for attempting to resolve the human rights crisis 
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brought on by Somoza and the revolution. This position also revealed what WOLA 
stated in explicit terms elsewhere, that it defined human rights through the 
Anticolonial Human Rights discourse.111 In contrast, the Reagan administration 
considered the very existence of the Sandinista government a threat to human rights 
in Nicaragua because of Sandinista connections to the Soviets and the apparent 
embrace of totalitarianism endangered democracy. 
WOLA had taken a keen interest in U.S. policy and human rights well before 
the Sandinistas took power in July 1979. Religious organizations had lobbied 
officials in Washington on human rights policy throughout the 1970s, but they had 
little experience or knowledge of the legislative process. Their outrage over the coup 
in 1973 that deposed Salvador Allende in Chile and their presumption of U.S. 
involvement motivated these religious organizations to work with Joe Eldridge, a 
former Methodist missionary, to establish a permanent and professional presence in 
Washington to promote human rights in Latin America policy.112 Founded in 1974 
by Eldridge, WOLA received its initial funding from these religious organizations 
and gradually expanded its support base and acquired significant influence in 
Washington over Latin America policy.113 
From its inception, WOLA took part in research and reporting on human 
rights conditions, lobbied policy makers, and engaged in activism.114 The 
organization provided information to churches and put out newsletters and press 
                                                 
111 Ibid. 
112 “Joe Eldridge WOLA Storytime,” 1–2. 
113 Shaw, “Mimeographs Roar in Propaganda War.” 
114 Peace, A Call to Conscience, 113. 
76 
 
releases while also providing knowledgeable witnesses to testify before Congress.115 
Leadership and participants in WOLA activities included prominent liberal political 
figures and members of Congress such as Representative Thomas Harkin (D-IA). 
Donald M. Fraser, then the mayor of Minneapolis but formerly a strong voice for 
human rights in Congress as a Democratic representative from Minnesota, also 
worked with WOLA.116 In addition, WOLA helped organize and lead the Nicaragua 
Network, and WOLA served as one of the Nicaragua Network’s most influential 
voices in Washington throughout the Contra War.117 
During the Sandinista insurgency WOLA published its Special Updates to 
highlight the repression and violence by the Somoza government. Its October 1978 
report found that, on average, Somoza’s National Guard killed three Nicaraguans 
each day for curfew violations. The report further stated that Somoza had 
demonstrated his “disdain for popular opinion, for human life, and for the welfare of 
the nation” by refusing to step down from office in the face of widespread dissent 
and demonstrations and “by his ordering the destruction of population centers.” 
WOLA reasoned that Somoza would eventually step down, but his resignation would 
happen on terms of his choosing, which made the international community’s 
engagement in the conflict’s resolution to force out Somoza that much more critical. 
118 Analysts also cautioned that even after the removal of Somoza, he could still 
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control the government from his home in Miami and pursue a remilitarizing of the 
Nicaraguan state.119 
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico, Colombia, Barbados, Jamaica, the OAS, and 
officials from the Nicaraguan government who subsequently resigned or were fired 
all accused the Somoza government of human rights abuses, yet the United States 
government remained silent. WOLA argued that “[o]nly the Carter Administration 
appeared reluctant to define itself” with respect to Somoza’s human rights abuses 
and Nicaragua’s future.120 The report contended that, unless the United States played 
an important role in supporting the new Nicaraguan government, Managua would 
look elsewhere for support. U.S. assistance would be fundamental for the new 
government to follow through on its intentions to build a pluralist society with a 
mixed economy and democratic government.121 
Following the Sandinista triumph in July 1979, and unlike the Nicaragua 
Network, WOLA advocated for human rights in broad terms, taking jabs at both the 
Reagan administration and the new Nicaraguan government. In November of 1981, 
WOLA lodged an official protest with the Nicaraguan Ambassador in Washington 
for failing to stop or condemn rioting outside the home of Alfonso Robelo the 
previous month after he broke with the Sandinista government and resigned from the 
Junta. WOLA’s protest noted that this type of conduct by the government occurred 
with other opposition leaders, too. WOLA affirmed that it had been a supporter of 
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the Nicaraguan government previously, yet it demanded that the government refrain 
from similar actions and restore its reputation internationally. It also condemned the 
imprisoning of three opposition leaders for political purposes.122 
Eldridge, speaking for WOLA, had hoped for better decisions from the 
Sandinistas. He argued that “the negative international consequences of the 
infringements of these rights are considerable. WOLA has been queried by a number 
of Congressional offices, including supporters of Nicaragua, for an explanation of 
these recent developments,” which WOLA had difficulty providing. Eldridge called 
on the Nicaraguan government to pursue policies that respected the rights of all 
while still pursuing the goals of the revolution.123 
Though not claiming affiliation with the Sandinistas, CFNFP was decidedly 
opposed to Reagan’s foreign policy. CFNFP used human rights arguments in its 
attempts to dismantle the U.S. Cold War narrative and challenge lawmakers to 
interpret politics in Nicaragua and elsewhere as localized matters of violence and 
inequality. Whereas WOLA provided reporting and participated in activism, CFNFP 
coordinated lobbying campaigns and organized grassroots activism much like the 
work of the Nicaragua Network. CFNFP had a much broader participation and 
constituency level than WOLA and wider base of support than did the Nicaragua 
Network. The Coalition formed in 1976 with a focus on peace and human rights but 
took a strong interest in Latin American issues, particularly in Central America. 
CFNFP played a leading role among anti-Contra War activists in lobbying Congress 
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and organizing demonstrations throughout the nation. The organization provided 
information on the progress of bills and provided “talking points” memos to its 
members and allies to communicate with their members of Congress. CFNFP also 
developed media campaigns, held press conferences, and issued periodic press 
releases in furtherance of its agenda.124 
The Coalition formed as a non-profit organization in Washington D.C. for 
“the promotion of social welfare….”125 It operated based on the proposition that “a 
peaceful world must be built on cooperation, independence, social and economic 
justice, and environmental integrity….” As such, CFNFP initially focused its work 
on reducing the use of military force and intervention as components of U.S. foreign 
policy and growing the movement within the United States devoted to ending the 
arms race. 126 Members of the Coalition consisted of organizations from around the 
country that all paid fees to support the Coalition’s operation.127 National 
organizations joining CFNFP needed to have an established national constituency, 
and local organizations needed to have a demonstrated ability in grassroots 
organizing in their communities.128 By 1982, the Coalition had grown to operate on a 
budget of several hundred thousand dollars, and it anticipated further growth. The 
Coalition grew from an income of $45,000 in 1976 to a projected revenue between 
$476,000 and $506,000 for 1982, with $200,000 coming from foundations or large 
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donors.129 CFNFP was one of the largest, most influential progressive advocacy 
organizations in the country. The Congressional Quarterly called the Coalition the 
“nerve center” for lobbying work in Washington on issues related to Central 
America.130 Members of Congress, including Rep. Harkin or their staff, regularly 
attended CFNFP meetings.131 
Because the organization was so large and engaged in diverse issues, CFNFP 
formed working groups that could take the lead in organizing and strategizing on 
specific issues or regions of the world and report back to CFNFP’s executive 
committee.132 CFNFP organized the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) to 
focus efforts on human rights issues, and HRWG then narrowed the focus even 
further when it formed the Central America Working Group (CAWG). CAWG 
directed and organized the efforts of activists and progressive organizations devoted 
to human rights and peace in Central America.133 Highlighting the influence and 
reach of the Coalition and its working groups, CFNFP noted in late 1982 that 
hundreds of grassroots activists from around the nation called CFNFP’s human rights 
organizers looking for information and planning materials.134  
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CFNFP advocated for human rights in U.S. policy broadly and with little 
regard for the actions of the Sandinista government. Unlike the Nicaragua Network, 
CFNFP did not advocate specifically for the Sandinistas or apply a similar human 
rights argument in support of the revolution. Also, in contrast to WOLA’s human 
rights work, CFNFP did not engage in fact-finding missions or devote resources to 
building democracy in Latin America. CFNFP engaged in and organized lobbying 
campaigns that mobilized thousands of activists throughout the country and a core of 
progressive leaders in Washington throughout the course of the Contra War to 
change U.S. policy under Reagan and influence Congress and the American people. 
The Coalition used human rights as a method to shame legislators and the 
administration to change votes or policy regarding Contra funding. 
However, the working groups of CFNFP were closer ideologically to the 
Nicaragua Network than was the national organization. Organized in 1979 out of 
concern for pervasive abuses of human rights throughout Central America, the 
Coalition’s CAWG tended toward positions of solidarity with Nicaragua. CAWG 
held the United States largely responsible for the conditions in Central America 
because of Washington’s “history of political and military intervention…, and 
because of its economic domination of the area.” CAWG’s Statement of Principles 
proclaimed that the CAWG supported self-determination for Central American 
people, creating the political, economic, and social institutions to best fit their needs, 
supported efforts to develop effective, responsive government, and understood 
human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. CAWG also 
determined to “bring the policy of the United States in Central America into 
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conformity with its stated commitment to human rights.” To fulfill its principles 
toward Central America, CAWG concluded it would engage in fundraising for 
humanitarian aid for Central America, provide education to the public regarding 
Central America, communicate with government officials through a variety of means 
in order to influence policy, and publish articles and literature supportive of its 
principles.135 
CAWG led lobbying efforts to provide aid to the Nicaraguan people, sending 
to its members instructions to contact representatives in Congress and request they 
support Carter’s proposed legislation that provided $75 million in aid to 
Nicaraguans. Writing on behalf of CAWG, Diane Passmore also requested 
contributions to HAND, the Nicaragua Network’s charitable organization formed to 
provide material and financial aid to Nicaraguans.136 CAWG also maintained a close 
working relationship with Rep. David Bonior (D-MI), the chair of the House 
Democratic Task Force on Central America. Bonior lobbied other members of 
Congress and tracked diplomatic relations while also coordinating efforts with 
CAWG and other similar organizations. Bonior also spoke to the media on behalf of 
the Democrats to present the party’s position on Central American issues.137 
CAWG created three sub-committees, one for El Salvador, one for 
Guatemala, and one for Nicaragua to allow for appropriate focus on country-specific 
work. The Nicaragua sub-committee worked closely with the Coalition for a Free 
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Nicaragua and other Nicaraguan exiles, lobbying officials in Washington and 
creating public education programs and forums. “The emphasis of the Nicaraguan 
Sub-Committee is on making available responsible coverage of current events in the 
continuing struggle of the Nicaraguan people to rebuild their country and to defend 
their self-determination.” 138  
 
5. Conclusion 
In the early 1980s, many in Congress still held to the philosophy that human 
rights abuses turned people and countries against U.S. objectives and proved 
counterproductive, if not immoral. Nevertheless, Nicaraguans and Americans stood 
at odds over how they interpreted human rights and the Nicaraguan Revolution. 
Nicaraguans defined human rights based on their experiences under the Somoza 
regime and under U.S. domination of the political and economic system in a manner 
similar to what other Latin American nations experienced throughout the twentieth 
century. Sandinista officials and revolutionaries believed that Latin American 
dependency, if not subservience, to U.S. policy and financial interests undermined 
sovereignty and contradicted self-determination, thereby creating inequality and 
repression. U.S. legal culture in the 1980s followed the Democratic Human Rights 
discourse, and it was through this legal culture and the conservative political climate 
in the United States that Reagan and neoconservatives interpreted the Sandinista 
revolution. Furthermore, by the end of 1981, Reagan had persuaded enough 
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members of Congress on the intelligence committees to accept that the Sandinistas 
did present a threat to peace in Central America. However, NGOs advocating for 
peace in Nicaragua challenged the administration’s interpretation of human rights 
and the Nicaraguan government. Though each of the largest and most influential 
NGOs maintained different objectives and deployed human rights advocacy in 
different ways, human rights advocacy formed a core component of their efforts to 
influence foreign relations. In addition, the common goal of peace in Nicaragua 
would bring these organizations into collaborative effort. 
Human rights arguments continued to matter in the debate over Nicaragua 
policy. U.S. support for a paramilitary force in Central America raised more than just 
theoretical questions for Congress and the American public when details of the 
covert operation began to leak and after the U.S. media reported atrocities by the 
U.S.-backed Contras. As conditions in Nicaragua worsened, Reagan would adopt 
human rights language to soften the image of the Contras, further legitimize his 
policy of supporting counterrevolution, and undercut the credibility of the 
Sandinistas and the Contra opposition in the United States. Also, NGOs such as the 
Nicaragua Network continued to adapt their human rights arguments to reinterpret or 
sanitize the actions of the Sandinistas for a U.S. audience. Other, more neutral, 
NGOs would deploy entirely different human rights arguments condemning the 
Contras yet distancing themselves from the Sandinistas, providing evidence for both 
sides of the Contra War debate. NGOs and members of Congress advocating for 
peace would have to find a way to thread their arguments between the violent 
excesses of both governments, advocating for peace and a negotiated settlement 
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while at the same time denying the legitimacy of Reagan’s anti-communism and 





CHAPTER 2 – A LANGUAGE OF ADVOCACY AGAINST THE CONTRAS: 
ANTICOLONIAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA, 1982-1983 
 
The stakeholders of Nicaraguan politics not only interpreted events in human 
rights terms. They also operationalized human rights into a language of advocacy. 
Advocates addressed their arguments to the American electorate and the U.S. 
Congress because those groups determined the restrictions and survival of the Contra 
operation. Rights-based advocacy in Anticolonial Human Rights, particularly on an 
international scale, cut through the abstractions of ideology and political philosophy 
of the Cold War. It reframed the issues away from global communist takeovers to the 
more concrete concerns of preventing torture, of providing enough food to families, 
or of defending free speech. Human rights advocacy produced visceral reactions 
because it simplified international law to address injustice. Human rights could 
mobilize activists and stir emotions in voters in ways abstract arguments about 
international law could not.  
Since taking power, the Sandinistas had accused the United States of 
supporting opposition groups, and NGOs in the United States had their own 
suspicions of eventual U.S. intervention. Reporting throughout 1983 revealed that 
the CIA did support and advise counterrevolutionaries and indicated that Reagan 
hoped to undermine the Sandinistas and force the Nicaraguans to make dramatic 
reforms. With this information, human rights advocacy for peace in Nicaragua 
moved into a new phase of greater urgency and consequence as NGOs and the 
Nicaraguan government assailed the Reagan administration. Members of Congress 
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also expressed their frustration with U.S. foreign policy and their concern for the 
human rights implications of U.S. support of the Contras.  
The human rights rhetoric against the Contras reshaped the language through 
which the Reagan administration discussed the Contras and influenced the 
underlying premise for Nicaragua policy. The White House entered the human rights 
debate for fear of losing all support it needed from Congress and the American 
people. Reagan initially stayed silent as news reports began detailing the extent of 
the CIA’s support of guerrilla attacks in Nicaragua, reports that confirmed past 
accusations. White House officials understood that anti-communism alone would not 
gain the political support Reagan needed to continue with his Nicaragua policy. 
Officials reasoned that public diplomacy based on human rights would more 
effectively make the case for a covert Contra operation while undermining the 
human rights positions of the opposition. Although Contra funding opponents held 
the initiative, administration officials planned new tactics to communicate how the 
Contras fought for human rights and how democracy served the human rights of all 
Nicaraguans.  
 
1. A Secret No More 
In 1982, the narrative surrounding the covert operation in Nicaragua spun out 
of the administration’s control, leading to more criticism of Reagan’s policy and 
forcing White House officials to reassess how they presented the conflict to the 
American people and to Congress.  Through much of 1982, the country began 
learning that U.S. intelligence officials may have collaborated with guerrilla forces in 
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Central America to bring down the Nicaraguan government. NGOs had already 
identified U.S. involvement in the anti-Sandinista movement as a serious threat to 
human rights. The FSLN already considered the United States a threat to the 
government’s continued survival. Reporting by outlets such as The New York Times 
and The Washington Post only confirmed these fears. As reporting continued 
through early 1982, the White House unsuccessfully tried to shape the narrative 
through leaks to deliver its own interpretation of events. However, a stunning series 
of reports in Newsweek in November 1982 revealed the details about the size of the 
U.S. commitment to counterrevolution in Nicaragua and left the administration 
scrambling to answer to angry members of Congress. The administration declined to 
comment publicly on the covert operation until well into 1983, at which time 
officials recalibrated Nicaragua policy as a mission for peace and human rights. In 
the meantime, human rights NGOs and the press effectively defined the Contra force 
as a threat to human rights while the Sandinistas accused the Reagan administration 
of imperialism. 
In early 1982, reporters started uncovering counterrevolutionary activity in 
Central America with uncertain connections to the United States. In January, The 
New York Times first reported that anti-Castro Cubans and Nicaraguans had set up a 
camp in California to train for military operations against the Sandinista 
government.1 The Washington Post reported in March that Reagan had approved a 
secret mission to support foreign governments organizing paramilitary operations to 
undermine the Sandinista government and the Cuban presence in Central America. 
                                                 
1 “Around the Nation; Paramilitary Training Reported in California,” The New York Times, January 
12, 1982, sec. A, LexisNexis Academic. 
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The CIA received $19 million to carry out the operation.2 Less than a week later, 
Patrick E. Tyler and Bob Woodward of The Post alleged that Reagan authorized 
building a force of about 500 guerrilla fighters recruited from Nicaragua and 
Honduras to attack infrastructure points in Nicaragua such as power plants and 
bridges.3 Shortly after the Tyler and Woodward piece, sources offered a counter 
narrative, informing The Times that the administration did approve millions of 
dollars for Nicaragua but only as a part of a covert operation to strengthen moderate 
groups in Nicaragua under the direction of the CIA. The operation consisted only of 
financial support, according to officials within the administration, because Reagan 
had rejected proposals for supporting a paramilitary force in Central America.4   
The counter narrative quickly faded away. In mid-March, The Times’s Leslie 
H. Gelb reported that Reagan had approved a CIA plan for a covert operation for 
Nicaragua. Gelb’s sources confirmed that Reagan had approved $19 million for the 
CIA to fund or otherwise support paramilitary forces against the Nicaraguan 
government. He reported that the administration had briefed the intelligence 
committees of both chambers of Congress about the operation and that members of 
Congress did not raise any objections at the time.5 As the narrative of a CIA-
supported covert operation persisted, the president declined to comment on the 
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4 Philip Taubman, “U.S. Reportedly Sending Millions to Foster Moderates in Nicaragua,” The New 
York Times, March 11, 1982, sec. A, LexisNexis Academic. 
5 Leslie H. Gelb, “U.S. Said to Plan Covert Actions in Latin Region,” The New York Times, March 14, 
1982, Late City Final Edition edition, sec. Section 1, LexisNexis Academic. 
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matter, providing an opportunity for opponents to sow seeds of doubt in Congress by 
raising troubling human rights implications from a policy of spreading violence and 
destruction.  
Foremost among those critics of Reagan’s Nicaragua policy was CFNFP. As 
the conflicting reports began to surface about the CIA’s covert operation in 
Nicaragua, the organization mobilized, revealing the national reach and diversity of 
strategy that would characterize its activism against the Contra War throughout the 
decade. The Coalition gathered several national organizations in March 1982 to 
coordinate activism against U.S. Nicaragua policy. Attendees represented religious 
organizations such as Christic Institute, Jesuit Missions, and the U.S. Catholic 
Mission Association. Marta Tannenhaus and Diane Passmore from the Nicaragua 
Network attended, as did George Lister, a well-known advocate of human rights in 
the U.S. State Department. Heather Foote, Joe Eldridge, and Reggie Norton 
represented WOLA, and Juan E. Mendez of AW attended. Cindy Buhl and Phil 
Lloyd-Sidle represented CFNFP. The group agreed their organizations should serve 
as “messangers [sic] of peace” and that the response from the peace organizations to 
the apparent militarization of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua and the rest of Central 
America should be “overwhelming.” They believed that Reagan circumvented the 
process of public debate by using a covert operation. Therefore, the NGOs 
determined the peace and human rights movement needed to gather reliable votes in 
Congress to contain the president’s ability to perpetuate the guerrilla insurgency in 
Nicaragua.6  
                                                 
6 “Coalition/Campaign Meeting,” Minutes, March 18, 1982, 1–3, Acc. 91A-099, Box 8, Coalition for 
a New Foreign Policy Records (DG 138), Swarthmore College Peace Collection. 
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CFNFP subsequently mobilized its grassroots network into action. The 
Coalition urged friends and member organizations to call or write Congress to insist 
their representative and senator support legislation that prohibited any funding of 
paramilitary support in Nicaragua. The Coalition further proposed that concerned 
citizens participate in a march in Washington scheduled for March 27, 1982, to stand 
against U.S. intervention in Central America and follow up that demonstration with 
visits or phone calls to the offices of members of Congress on March 29. 
Furthermore, CFNFP called on organizations to form delegations of thirty to sixty 
people to visit the office of members of Congress during the Easter Recess in early 
April or to put together town hall meetings with members of Congress. An essential 
part of the town hall strategy was to ask for a public pledge to oppose U.S. covert 
activity in Nicaragua.7 This tactic forced elected officials to take a public stand on 
the issue and allowed organizations, such as CFNFP, to then position those officials 
as for or against human rights. 
The Coalition also wrote to members of Congress directly, arguing that the 
covert operation of the Reagan administration risked destabilizing Nicaragua and the 
rest of the region, leading to greater violence and repression. Gretchen Eick, of 
United Church of Christ and co-chair of CFNFP, and Donald L. Ranard, the other 
co-chair and the director for the Center for International Policy, wrote to senators 
stating that CFNFP spoke on behalf of forty-nine national organizations and their 
constituencies. Eick and Ranard urged the senators to oppose any intervention in 
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Nicaragua and to cut off funding for any paramilitary forces. They noted the irony of 
the administration strongly condemning terrorist organizations while supporting 
armed counterrevolutionaries and their operations of terrorism against the population 
of Nicaragua. They also emphasized the increasing danger of escalating violence in 
the region through a U.S.-trained paramilitary force and militarizing regional 
politics, all of which would only raise tensions among the Central American 
countries.8 Furthermore, the covert operation played into the hands of the Marxist 
and authoritarian hardliners in Managua by providing them justification for a 
national state of emergency that restricted the civil rights of Nicaraguans. Rather 
than bringing democracy and freedom to Nicaraguans, Reagan created circumstances 
that would further polarize a country trying to build an open pluralistic society. 
CFNFP then called into question the legitimacy of elected representatives allowing 
the operation to proceed, stating, “We urge you to oppose any form of covert 
aggression against Nicaragua. Nothing less than our own integrity is at stake.”9 
The Coalition wanted to make human rights a wedge issue to separate 
Republicans from the president. Raising the prospect of intervention served as an 
effective argument to illicit fears of a new Vietnam War and remind Americans of 
the horrors associated with that experience. Intervention also rekindled the shame of 
past U.S. involvement in Latin American that resulted in violence and terror. The 
threat of escalating violence and destabilizing the region would be a common refrain 
within Congress, as would warnings against policies that pushed the Sandinistas to 
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9 Gretchen Eick and Donald L. Ranard to Representative, Letter, March 29, 1982, 1–2, Acc. 91A-099, 
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acts of greater repression out of self-preservation. However, these arguments 
anticipated problems in Nicaragua, Central America, and U.S. policy, whereas 
arguments that cited abuse by the Contras would later prove more effective in the 
coming years in influencing the views of Contra policy in Congress. 
CFNFP also organized the drafting and distribution of a statement in 
opposition to the covert operation signed by 118 other organizations that connected 
U.S. actions in Nicaragua with the human rights violations of previous U.S. 
interventions.10 The “Statement in Opposition to Covert Intervention in Nicaragua” 
(the “Statement”) compared U.S. actions in Nicaragua in 1982 to the covert 
operations in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, the Dominican Republic in 1961, and 
Chile in 1973, all of which “served to suppress human rights, while increasing anti-
American sentiment around the globe.” CFNFP continued to push Nicaragua as a 
wedge issue, declaring that, in 1982, the United States again was helping unsavory 
characters violate human rights, which tainted the United States and painted U.S. 
elected officials as complicit in abuses. The Statement argued that Reagan’s policy 
of “covert intervention against a sovereign nation fundamentally violates 
international law….” U.S. actions would only increase tensions in the region and 
pressure Nicaragua to mobilize for war while implementing domestic policies out of 
fear and survival, increasing Nicaragua’s distrust of the United States. Organizations 
that signed the Statement included the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the 
Black American Law Students Association, the Church Coalition for Human Rights 
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in the Philippines, the Episcopal Peace Fellowship, the Maryknoll Sisters, the 
National Lawyers Guild, the Nicaragua Network, and WOLA.11 
Despite the engagement and activism of organizations such as CFNFP, 
Congress did not share their concern for Nicaragua yet, but that changed in 
November after the reporting by Newsweek. A series of articles provided detailed 
accounts of the Contra operation in Nicaragua and Honduras and the planning that 
took place among White House officials. Newsweek reported that Reagan authorized 
the CIA to expand its covert operations started under Carter, to contact opposition 
forces in exile, and to support operations to interdict the trade in weapons with 
Salvadoran insurgents. John Negroponte, serving as U.S. ambassador to Honduras, 
managed the covert operation supposedly to arm, train, and direct an army of exiles 
from Nicaragua to obstruct the flow of arms into El Salvador. However, Newsweek 
noted that the operation also furthered efforts to subvert the Nicaraguan government. 
The scale of the operation far surpassed the original intentions of the administration 
and what administration officials reported to the intelligence committees in 
Congress. The CIA placed at least fifty operatives in Honduras, and Contra forces 
consisted of about two thousand Miskitos and ten thousand anti-Sandinistas, in 
addition to former members of Somoza’s National Guard.12  
The involvement of Somoza’s National Guard created problems and 
undermined the appeal of the operation from the beginning. Originally, the plan did 
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not include direct dealing with the former National Guard members and other former 
Somoza supporters, but, according to Newsweek’s reporting, Negroponte felt 
pressure to produce some success, which led him to seek out the remnants of the 
National Guard. Bringing in the National Guard alienated people disillusioned with 
the Sandinistas, such as Alfonso Robelo, but who would never collaborate with the 
somocistas.13 
The Newsweek reporting stunned those in Congress and around the country 
hearing about the Contra operation for the first time while opponents of Reagan’s 
Contra policy jumped on the exposed vulnerability of the administration. An 
editorial in The Washington Post criticized the administration for its dangerous 
hypocrisy of pursuing “a ragged little war out of Honduras” while also professing a 
desire to negotiate a resolution to the rising tension.14 Individual members of 
Congress drafted a flurry of proposals to limit or shut down the Contra operation, 
and committees called CIA Director William Casey and other top intelligence 
officials to testify and explain themselves. The president refused to comment on the 
matter.15  
CFNFP added fuel to the fire of discontent with Reagan by continuing to 
frame the covert operation as a violation of Nicaragua’s sovereignty and self-
determination. Building on its work from earlier in the year, CFNFP wrote to 
members of Congress seeking their support for an amendment proposed by 
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Representatives Harkin and Jim Oberstar (D-MN) to prohibit funding for forces 
fighting against the Nicaraguan government. CFNFP’s letter cited how the covert 
operation was antithetical to U.S. values and relations with other countries. It 
emphasized the great damage the covert operation would do to the legitimacy of 
opposition parties in Nicaragua and their chances to reconcile with the government. 
The organization rejected as irresponsible and dangerous the use of violence to 
achieve foreign policy objectives because it created insecurity along the border with 
Honduras, escalated the threat of a regional conflict, and violated U.S. law and treaty 
obligations, specifically obligations under the OAS Charter and the UN Charter. 
With the letter, CFNFP included the “Statement in Opposition to Covert Intervention 
in Nicaragua.”16 
Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) wrote to his colleagues in December 1982, 
calling on Congress to prohibit any further funding of paramilitary groups in Central 
America until January 20, 1985, inauguration day. Dodd’s position on Nicaragua 
emphasized CFNFP’s argument regarding sovereignty and self-determination. He 
argued that Reagan’s policy of supporting paramilitary forces in Nicaragua “belies 
any fundamental understanding of the social, economic and political forces at work 
in the region” and “signals our interest in promoting military solutions to political 
problems” in other countries. Reagan’s actions risked demonstrating to the world 
that Washington would refuse to abide by international law and treaty obligations 
that prohibited interfering in the domestic politics of other nations in the Western 
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Hemisphere, in addition to putting the United States at odds with other democracies 
in Latin America, such as Mexico and Venezuela. Sovereignty and national self-
determination represented a fundamental right, a human right, to people and nations 
accustomed to a history of intervention.17  
That same day, Rep. Harkin proposed an amendment to the 1983 Defense 
Appropriation bill that restricted the use of funds by preventing aid from going to 
any group fighting against the Nicaraguan government. Harkin’s amendment would 
have cut funding to the Contras. Writing to Diane Passmore at the CAWG, Harkin 
said he wanted to bring the operation against Nicaragua to an end.18 His proposal 
received support from a substantial number of Democrats.19 However, the 
amendment likely did not have enough votes for the House to pass the measure 
because it went further than members were ready to go, restricting the president’s 
ability to conduct foreign policy in Nicaragua. However, lawmakers still shared 
Dodd’s and Harkin’s concern that the White House may attempt to overthrow the 
Sandinista government. 
During the floor debate, Ed Boland (D-MA) informed Harkin and the rest of 
the House that, as chair of the House Intelligence Committee, Boland had already 
attached a secret amendment to the spending bill with language similar, but less 
restrictive, to Harkin’s proposal that addressed classified appropriations for the CIA. 
Boland’s amendment to the appropriations bill prohibited U.S. assistance to any 
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group for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government or provoking a 
war between Nicaragua and Honduras.20 When Boland made his amendment public, 
Harkin accepted the language in place of his own. As a result, the House never voted 
on Harkin’s proposal. Boland intended for his amendment to preserve the 
sovereignty and self-determination of the Nicaraguan people while preventing the 
administration from again circumventing Congress.21 The Boland Amendment 
passed in the House 411 to 0.22 The Senate also approved the language from Boland 
on December 21, 1982.23  
With the Boland Amendment in place, Harkin expressed relief and optimism 
to Passmore about the future of relations with Nicaragua. Though Boland’s 
amendment left open the possibility of U.S. support for military or paramilitary 
action in Nicaragua, Harkin argued that the language made clear that the American 
people opposed operations intended to violate Nicaraguan sovereignty. Harkin 
credited the success of the Boland Amendment to organizations such as the CAWG 
for their determined opposition to Reagan’s covert paramilitary. “This is a step in the 
right direction and it is due, to a great extent, to people such as yourself, who have 
spoken out and protested the policies of the Reagan Administration in Central 
America.” He also hoped that the determined opposition demonstrated political risks 
for administration officials should they continue down the same path of intervention 
in Nicaragua.24  
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Despite Harkin’s optimism, the Boland Amendment contained crucial 
deficiencies that rendered the restrictions nearly meaningless. The Nicaragua 
Network explained the problems to its members in early 1983 to let them know that 
the struggle against the Contras lived on. The Boland Amendment only prohibited 
funding for military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua to overthrow the 
Nicaraguan government or start a war between Nicaragua and Honduras. The 
restriction depended on intent. The administration could, and did, easily sidestep this 
language and argue that the United States did not fund the Contras to overthrow the 
Nicaraguan government. However, the amendment did not address the intentions of 
the Contras, and Congress could not control how the Contras used the funding, 
advice, or training once received from the United States.25 The Boland Amendment 
did establish a legal and political precedent for challenging Reagan’s support of the 
guerrilla forces in Nicaragua, but it also forced the administration to articulate other 
reasons for supporting the Contras.  
 
2. Early Human Rights Opposition to the Contras 
NGOs dominated the conversation over Nicaragua policy and used human 
rights arguments to contest Reagan’s Contra operation while encouraging Congress 
to do the same. In the early part of 1982 through 1983, NGOs strengthened 
organizational structures and strategies of advocacy for human rights and peace 
while encouraging Congress to rein in Reagan’s ability to wage covert war. Much of 
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Congress agreed with the president that the Sandinistas posed a potential threat to 
democracy and regional stability, but lawmakers also grew concerned about the 
efficacy of supporting a counterrevolutionary force to undermine the Nicaraguan 
government. This concern over the consequences of U.S. policy related back to the 
anti-Contra arguments of NGOs and those of Senator Dodd, to the effect that U.S. 
funding of a paramilitary force represented a new form of U.S. intervention in Latin 
America and would only increase the violence and terror waged against civilian 
populations. Intervention also violated the collective right of national sovereignty 
and self-determination as the Sandinistas implemented policies to protect the rights 
of their citizens. 
The Nicaragua Network explained that the Sandinistas’ handling of 
indigenous groups on the Atlantic Coast came from the intention to improve life in 
Nicaragua for all. The Nicaragua Network turned the Miskito relocation issue on its 
head and presented the Sandinista policies as serving human rights.26 In the summer 
of 1983, when it brought a delegation of Miskito Indians to the United States, the 
Nicaragua Network referred to the relocation as “[t]he most creative project designed 
to aid the economic reconstruction of the region, as well as provide for health and 
social programs, and, to provide for the security and protection of the Miskitus….”27 
The Sandinistas implemented economic reforms in the Atlantic Coast region as part 
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of the larger initiative of the revolution to bring economic opportunity and social 
equality to the country. 
The organization claimed that the Sandinistas undertook economic programs 
in the Atlantic Coast region after the victory over Somoza to address poverty, 
malnutrition, and unemployment. The Nicaragua Network found that decades of 
exploitation at the hands of the Somoza government and foreign corporations left the 
region in desperate shape. The Sandinista government initiated programs to create 
growth in industry and programs for land redistribution to stimulate more farming 
and expand the cattle industry. The Sandinistas also carried out the literacy campaign 
immediately after the victory over Somoza in three languages of the Atlantic Coast 
region (English, Miskitu, and Sumu) to address the needs of a wide swath of people. 
The government also established primary health care services and began building a 
hospital.28 
CFNFP, meanwhile, contrasted life in Nicaragua with that in El Salvador and 
Guatemala, nations the United States considered allies in the region and provided 
with economic and military aid. The Coalition produced a talking points memo to 
distribute to grassroots activists and coalition organizations that responded to 
Reagan’s statements about Central America. CFNFP disputed Reagan’s claim that 
Nicaragua had the worst record on human rights in Central America. Nicaragua 
committed twenty extrajudicial killings in the previous three years, comparatively 
little next to the 2,630 executions by the military in El Salvador in 1982 and the 
Guatemalan Justice and Peace Committee killing 8,576 of its citizens. CFNFP also 
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cited an AW report that found that the torture so prevalent under Somoza had 
virtually disappeared under the Sandinistas.29 
The Coalition also addressed the economic and social rights of Nicaraguans 
as recognized under the Sandinista regime. CFNFP found that the Nicaraguan 
government implemented agrarian reform to redistribute the land so as to grant more 
Nicaraguans the ability and opportunity to provide for themselves and their families, 
what individuals in developing nations considered a fundamental right. The 
government also made credit more available for both large land owners and poor 
peasants, which further addressed the issues of equality and economic opportunity. 
The Coalition refuted claims of a Marxist-Leninist takeover of the Nicaraguan state, 
arguing that 75 percent of Nicaraguan industry and agriculture remained privately 
owned. CFNFP also cited advances in health care, as evidenced by the selection of 
Nicaragua in April 1983 by the World Health Organization and the Pan-American 
Health Organization as a “model health program” to receive additional funding for 
new projects in health care.30 
CFNFP cited reports from 1982 by AW and the OAS that criticized the 
Sandinistas for the treatment of indigenous groups along the Atlantic Coast, 
particularly the relocation of the Miskitos, which resulted in isolated killings by state 
forces. However, these reports rejected charges by the Reagan administration that 
genocide took place or that the government implemented a policy of terror against 
the Miskitos. These actions differed from those in Guatemala, where AI found that 
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the military killed some two thousand six hundred indigenous people in 1982 alone. 
CFNFP also cited criticism from the Nicaraguan Catholic Bishops against the policy 
of relocation for the hardships it caused and lack of notice given to those moved, but 
the Bishops “did not question that the relocations were a military necessity given the 
dangers of the border conflict.”31 
AW formed in 1982 out of the human rights-focused NGO Helsinki Watch, 
to promote human rights in Latin America, but it limited its focus to political and 
civil rights. The organization credited Jeane Kirkpatrick with prompting its 
formation when she argued that U.S. policy should distinguish between totalitarian 
nations and friendly authoritarian ones, vowing to monitor and report on the human 
rights violations committed by authoritarian regimes. AW put great emphasis on 
balanced reporting, claiming that human rights abuse should be reported and 
addressed without distinction for friend or foe, or based on the form of government, 
a stance that would lend its reports a high level of credibility throughout the Contra 
War.32 
Similarly, AI took great caution in maintaining a reputation for balanced and 
impartial human rights reporting, which earned the respect of progressive NGOs and 
government officials in the White House and Congress. Elliott Abrams, assistant 
secretary of state for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, acknowledged before 
Congress that he relied on AI’s reports for accurate information about torture and 
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that his agency met with its representatives to discuss the reports.33 AI referred to 
itself as an international organization independent of any government. It maintained 
strict rules for working with other NGOs so that it could maintain its reputation for 
independence and impartiality.34 AI also declined to comment on personnel matters 
with respect to human rights agencies or officials and did not take positions on issues 
related to governmental or inter-governmental agencies defending human rights and 
standards used for determining human rights abuses.35 AI concluded that its 
effectiveness as an advocate for human rights came from its credibility, which it 
maintained through “accurate research, working methods, financial independence, 
public statements, publicity campaigns and so forth.”36 AI focused on the release of 
men and women wrongfully held in prisons and on fair and timely trials of political 
prisoners held by governments. It advocated against torture and the cruel or 
inhumane punishment of all prisoners. Finally, AI claimed, in furtherance of its work 
on behalf of prisoners, to work more broadly for the defense of human rights “in the 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural spheres.”37 
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Many members of Congress from both parties expressed frustration over 
Reagan’s policy toward Nicaragua for exacerbating conditions destructive to human 
rights, and they adapted the language of human rights advocacy to their principled 
opposition. In an address on the floor of the House in May 1983, Rep. Bill Alexander 
(D-AR) noted that Reagan seemed to misunderstand the purpose of his own policy 
and conflate communism with the true sources of instability and revolution in the 
region. One day, Reagan would deliver a thoughtful speech declaring that his 
Nicaragua policy stopped the flow of arms to El Salvador. On another day, he would 
proclaim the righteous cause of the freedom fighters who sought to overthrow the 
Sandinista government. Alexander further argued that Reagan failed to understand 
the real issues in Nicaragua, which did not stem from communism. Nicaragua’s 
problems were “economic, social, and political – in that order of importance. 
Nobody but us Gringos appears to believe in the strategy of suppressing discontent 
by force of arms. Nobody, that is, but the regimes which have demonstrated an 
incapacity to maintain order in their own countries without foreign assistance and 
weapons at the ready.” Alexander explained that in the absence of equal social and 
economic opportunity, equal access to resources and land, and critical social goods 
such as access to health care, the resulting instability and discontent in the eyes of 
Nicaraguans rendered voting rights and free speech meaningless.38 
Elected officials wanted the United States to stand strong against communism 
while upholding high moral ideals in domestic and foreign policy. Supporting the 
Contras risked sacrificing the latter for the former. In that regard, the Contra War 
                                                 




threatened human rights through the conduct of Contra forces led by the former 
National Guard, but officials also feared that the counterrevolutionary forces would 
push the Sandinistas toward greater levels of repression against the Nicaraguan 
people. In a hearing over the appropriate direction of U.S. foreign policy for Central 
America, Gerald Solomon (R-NY) followed the typical line of Cold Warriors in 
Washington. Solomon declared that “the spread of international communism through 
Soviet imperialism represents the single gravest and most systematic threat to human 
rights imaginable, not only in Central America, but around the globe.”39 Chairman of 
the Human Rights and International Organizations Committee Gus Yatron (D-PA) 
would not disagree with his colleague and reminded those present that he was no 
friend of the Sandinista government. However, Yatron also rejected the policies of 
Reagan in supporting guerrillas in Nicaragua that would lead to further repression by 
the Sandinistas. Yatron argued that “U.S. national interests are paramount, yet these 
interests have been, and will always be, founded on our Nation’s commitment to 
uphold the human rights of all peoples.”40 Yatron would not sacrifice core U.S. 
principles of upholding peace, seeking democracy, and protecting human rights 
simply to undermine an authoritarian government, albeit one trending toward 
communism. 
Ranking Republican member of the Human Rights Committee Jim Leach (R-
IA) agreed with Yatron that the United States should not purposefully pursue 
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policies that would result in more violations of human rights. Leach argued that the 
United States held some blame for human rights violations in Nicaragua because the 
Sandinista government responded to the counterrevolutionary forces and their 
actions through greater levels of repression in the interest of self-preservation.41 “The 
only reason I raise this,” stated Leach, “is to put it into perspective and to make it 
very clear that from a human rights perspective we play a very dangerous role and 
we play by the same rules as the other side.”42 The consequences of U.S. support for 
the Contras seemed certain to lead to terrible results for the people of Nicaragua, 
whether at the hands of the Contras or the Nicaraguan government. Yet, the 
administration planned for those results, as earlier intelligence assessments revealed, 
and those results made up the human rights strategy of the administration. 
The Nicaragua Network, WOLA, and CFNFP supported efforts by members 
of Congress to legislate limits on Reagan’s covert action. A proposal by 
Representative Michael D. Barnes (D-MD) to cut off all aid to the Contras or other 
groups engaged in attacks on the Nicaraguan government received strong, 
coordinated support from anti-Contra organizations. The House Intelligence 
Committee, responsible for the CIA’s budget, heard the proposal jointly with the 
Western Hemisphere Affairs subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
so NGOs turned their lobbying efforts on members of those committees. The 
Nicaragua Network urged its members to contact lawmakers and ask them to oppose 
Contra aid and the U.S. mission to destabilize the Nicaragua government, to co-
sponsor the Barnes legislation, to contact Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill (D-MA) 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 4. 
42 Ibid., 5. 
108 
 
and Ed Boland and voice their opposition to the Contras, and to speak out on the 
record against Contra aid. And the organization wanted the same treatment given to 
the Senate.43 The subcommittee did pass the measure, but more as symbolism since it 
had little chance of passing the full House, much less the Republican-controlled 
Senate.44 The Barnes proposal did not find its way into law but did give voice to the 
growing dissent from lawmakers and NGOs opposed to Contra support. 
Defeat of the Barnes proposal notwithstanding, members of Congress wanted 
assurances that the Reagan administration abided by domestic and international law 
with regard to its Nicaragua policy. Sixty-five members of the House wrote to 
Boland to express their “support for efforts to guarantee that the United States does 
not violate the law by providing assistance to military and para-military groups 
seeking to initiate armed action against the people and territory of Nicaragua.” They 
appreciated Boland’s previous efforts to reign in the administration’s covert 
operations in Nicaragua, and they called for even stronger efforts to limit U.S. 
involvement with the Contras. Lawmakers cited statements by the Nicaraguan 
opposition groups stating their intention to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. 
They argued that the administration’s association with the Contras violated the letter 
and the spirit of the Boland Amendment in addition to the United Nations Charter 
and treaty obligations with the OAS. Moreover, undermining the Nicaraguan 
government produced real, dangerous consequences for the people of Nicaragua by 
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hardening Nicaraguan animosity towards the United States and escalating a civil 
war. The Reagan administration risked igniting a war that would kill thousands in 
Nicaragua and possibly elsewhere in Central America. The groups of lawmakers 
requested that Boland lead an effort to bring Nicaragua policy to a full debate on the 
House floor and to draft legislation to again prevent U.S. support for groups seeking 
to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.45 Boland would follow through on this 
request and lead an effort for the next two years that eventually strengthened his 
amendment to prevent Reagan from carrying out his Contra operation to the extent 
the administration desired. 
 
3. Human Rights and the Contra War in Nicaraguan Rhetoric 
A history of intervention by the United States influenced how Nicaraguans 
responded to the counterrevolutionary guerrilla forces and the reports of 
Washington’s involvement. Sandinista officials and Nicaraguan religious leaders 
pointed to Reagan’s support of the Contras as one more example of a century of U.S. 
imperialism and exploitation and exposed Washington’s ignorance of the reforms 
instituted by the Sandinistas. However, other groups within Nicaragua rejected both 
extremes of the Contra War. They spurned the presence of guerrilla forces funded by 
the United States as a violation of self-determination, yet they also believed the 
Sandinistas stood in the way of human rights and democracy. 
The Nicaraguan people suffered from attacks by the Contras well before 
Newsweek broke the story for readers in the United States. The Nicaraguan 
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government had alerted the world to U.S. involvement with the guerrillas through 
public pleas to support peace. The Sandinista government teamed up with religious 
groups to communicate the plight faced by Nicaraguans and the extent to which the 
Nicaragua government defended the rights and safety of the Nicaragua people. The 
Permanent Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations issued a letter from Bishop 
John Wilson of the Moravian Church, one of the larger religious denominations of 
indigenous groups along the Atlantic Coast, and Sixto Ulloa, director of international 
relations of the Evangelical Committee for Development Assistance (CEPAD), in 
which they responded to charges of abuse by the Sandinista government. They 
disputed the characterizations of the Nicaraguan government as forcing the Miskitos 
to relocate from the Coco River and burning villages for punitive reasons. Wilson 
and Ulloa claimed that the state effected the relocation out a concern for the safety of 
those living in the region after the recent cross-border attacks by the Contras. The 
Nicaraguan military burned the villages as part of a scorched earth strategy to reduce 
resources available to the insurgent forces. The Nicaraguan government admitted it 
made mistakes and worked with community and church leaders to resolve the 
problems to make a better Nicaragua going forward. The specter of a U.S. invasion 
made it even more difficult to resolve the conflicts in Nicaragua peacefully, they 
argued.46 
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In March 1982, CEPAD issued another statement appealing directly to the 
people of the United States as moral Christians. CEPAD spoke to those in “the 
church of God which is in the United States, to all who are called to be God’s Holy 
People, who belong to him in union with Jesus, together with all people everywhere 
who worship our Lord Jesus Christ….” CEPAD explained that the suspension of 
economic and material aid from the United States left Nicaragua with limited food. 
The U.S. government prevented Nicaragua from obtaining loans from the World 
Bank for infrastructure projects to rebuild the country after the devastation of war 
with the Somoza government. CEPAD also claimed that Somoza drained the 
country’s treasury and ruined its economy, leaving the Nicaraguan people poor and 
in need of basic necessities. The Sandinistas implemented programs to provide food 
and water, housing, and health care.47 As it formed a government and established its 
operating principles, the Junta wrote of these same social services as human rights 
that the state had an obligation to ensure for its people. 
CEPAD expressed anguish that the U.S. government would support groups 
waging war against the Nicaraguan government as it tried to provide life-saving 
services and resources to the people. It also expressed concern with the 
administration’s apparent reliance on advice from the militant, neoconservative 
group the Santa Fe Committee that declared war, not peace, was the normal state of 
international relations. CEPAD appealed to the United States as a Christian people, 
who sought peace in Christ, to stop the war and end the suffering. “We are sure that a 
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Nation where a high percentage of the people are committed to Christ and which 
maintains that it has been breed [sic] upon Christian principals [sic] will want to 
conduct its actions according to [the] Lord’s designs and in the promotion of life, 
justice and peace.” The letter was signed by representatives of the Moravian Church, 
the Association of Baptist Pentecostal Churches, the Episcopal Church, the 
Nicaraguan Baptist Convention, and the Central American Evangelical Churches 
Convention.48 
Also writing to the people of the United States, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs for the Nicaraguan government called on Americans to reject the actions of 
the Reagan administration as antithetical to U.S. values. The open letter referenced a 
March 14, 1983, terrorist attack that blew up a bridge over the Negro River close to 
the Nicaragua-Honduras border. The Ministry connected the bombing with the secret 
Contra operation, as reported by The Washington Post and The New York Times, and 
pleaded with the people of the United States to stand against the Reagan 
administration’s policies. Reagan’s actions contradicted “the desires for peace of the 
American people who conscientiously oppose the participation of the Government in 
such criminal and covert actions.” The Sandinistas ominously warned that actions of 
sabotage and violence such as these would force legal measures to protect the 
security of the Nicaraguan government and its people.49 These measures would 
include declaring national states of emergency that empowered the government to 
restrict civil liberties.  
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Sandinista officials also addressed the threat U.S. policy posed to the safety 
and stability of the country and region, making arguments like those of U.S. NGOs 
and Democrats in Congress. Officials accused the United States of fomenting civil 
war and regional conflict, of reengaging the hated National Guard in operations of 
violence and destruction against the Nicaraguan people, and of fighting an 
undeclared war of imperialism.50 The Nicaraguan legislature appealed to the 
international community for help finding a peaceful resolution to the escalating 
conflict. The Council of State declared on March 28, 1983, that “[i]t is no longer a 
secret to anyone that the United States Government finances, arms and trains 
somocista ex-national guards who, supported by sectors of the army and Government 
of Honduras, have increased their actions of terror and death against our people.”51 
The Nicaraguan legislature warned that the situation created by the United States 
risked enflaming military conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras or creating a 
regional conflagration. It urged leaders and governments throughout the world to 
assist the Nicaraguan people in pushing forward a peaceful resolution for Central 
America. The Council of State spoke directly to the U.S. Congress in explicit human 
rights terms, stating that, with the international community “committed to the… right 
of people to their self-determination, we call on the Congress of the United States to 
join these efforts for peace in Central America.” The Nicaraguans requested that 
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Congress support the forces for peace and reject the forces of war in Central 
America.52 
Managua legitimized its own actions during the conflict as necessary 
responses to the Contra threat and a defense of human rights for Nicaraguans. The 
state used violence only in self-defense and sought a diplomatic resolution to the 
conflicts, but the Sandinistas would only agree to peace terms that included the 
withdrawal of the Contras. They claimed the United States attacked 
 
because we have made a revolution, because we are fighting successfully 
against poverty and backwardness, because we are distributing free land to 
peasants, because we have regained control over our natural resources, 
because we have successfully fought illiteracy, because we stand in solidarity 
with our brother peoples of Latin America and the world…. They attack us 
because we have won a prestigious place in the world due to our respect for 
human rights. The United States is attacking because they were always 
accustomed to having faithful servants as rulers in Nicaragua and because the 
leaders of today's revolutionary fully uphold the Nicaraguan people’s heroic 
anti-imperialist spirit.53 
 
It further addressed the need to mobilize all the resources of the country in defense 
against the United States, “even if this involves greater difficulties in carrying out 
our economic programs and greater limitations in terms of the availability of material 
resources for distribution in the country.” Yet, the Sandinistas assured the 
Nicaraguan people and the world that Nicaraguans would find a way to prevail while 
bearing what hardships came their way.  
According to the Sandinistas, the primary obstacle to Nicaraguan prosperity 
and freedom had always been “imperialismo yanqui” (Yankee imperialism), through 
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which the Nicaraguan people had their most basic rights taken and liberty denied. 
Throughout the country’s history, the Nicaraguan people suffered from corruption, 
terrorism, repression, and foreign domination by the United States.54 Bayardo Arce 
Castaño, vice-coordinator in the Executive Committee of the FSLN’s National 
Directorate, argued that the conflict then facing Nicaragua symbolized a larger 
international crisis created by Washington’s most recent global drive for political and 
economic dominance. Arce declared not the Soviet Union or Cuba but the United 
States the threat to international peace and human rights.55 Developing nations 
throughout the world, including Nicaragua, suffered from economic and social 
injustice created from exploitation by the few “industrialized countries.”56 Genuine 
or not, the Sandinistas framed the conflict within the Anticolonial Human Rights 
discourse. 
The National Directorate called the Contras “genocidal forces” conducting an 
invasion funded and encouraged by the United States. Furthermore, the FSLN called 
the war a “criminal” plan against both the Nicaraguan people and any other 
government that showed respect toward the Nicaraguan state. Managua pledged that 
it would devote all available resources to defeating the Contras while equitably 
managing the distribution of resources. Even in the face of an existential threat, the 
Sandinistas assured Nicaragua that they would continue pursuing a foreign policy of 
non-alignment, a message to the world that the Sandinistas did not consider 
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themselves part of the Soviet sphere and a necessary component of Nicaraguan 
sovereignty and self-determination. Furthermore, the FSLN pledged to continue 
policies of a mixed economy and political pluralism and to hold elections in 1985.57 
The Sandinistas stressed the importance of continuing to consolidate power 
and strengthen Nicaraguan society. The Contras attacked to spread terror, confusion, 
and instability among the Nicaraguan people because the Contras could not defeat 
the Nicaraguan military in battle. According to Ortega, the real danger came from the 
disunion and fear among the Nicaraguan people and dissent toward their 
government. Ortega used teachers as an example. He accused the 
counterrevolutionary forces of targeting teachers for assassination to defeat the 
literacy campaign, but the teachers returned and continued fulfilling the objectives of 
the revolution and defending the Nicaraguan state. Ortega declared that Nicaraguans 
could defeat U.S. aggression by constructing a strong, stable society and national 
defense that demonstrated to U.S. officials the futility and danger of further 
intervention.58 
The measures taken by the Sandinistas to restrict civil liberties and to prepare 
the Nicaraguan people for war disturbed even liberal members of Congress who 
typically opposed Reagan’s support of the Contras. Twelve members of the House, 
including Michael D. Barnes, Jim Wright (D-TX), Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI), 
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chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY), 
Bill Alexander, Jim Leach, and Gus Yatron, expressed their “alarm” over human 
rights conditions in Nicaragua. In a letter to Daniel Ortega, the U.S. lawmakers 
placed the blame on the Sandinistas for the fighting, warning that Nicaragua risked 
expanding the conflict into a region-wide war. The lawmakers also noted the 
“conspicuous Cuban presence” in Nicaragua. They accused the Sandinistas of 
“serious human rights violations…” and an “absence of democratic rights and of 
movement toward the institutions of a truly democratic system.” They called on the 
Sandinistas to pursue negotiations with the “democratic opposition both inside and 
outside of Nicaragua with a view to seeking a political solution which would arrest 
the trend toward civil war, repression, and Cuban domination.”59 
Nicaraguan officials denied the allegations in this letter and other accusations 
of human rights violations and totalitarianism from the Reagan administration. 
Nicaraguan ambassador Antonio Jarquín reminded Congress that Ortega had agreed 
to engage in multilateral negotiations. Ortega had proposed that all nations end arms 
transfers to El Salvador, sought an end to aggression between Nicaragua and 
Honduras, and called for a termination of foreign military assistance to Central 
America. He also proposed that no foreign military bases be built in Central 
American nations. Jarquín reminded Americans that Nicaragua had already suffered 
extreme destruction and loss of life. His country would rather resolve the conflict 
peacefully, but the Reagan administration refused to negotiate.60  
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In his own letter to the twelve members of Congress, Ortega pointed out that 
numerous human rights organizations, such as AI, the International Commission on 
Jurists, AW, the International Red Cross, and the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights of the OAS had visited and affirmed that the policies of the 
Nicaraguan government protected the human rights of the Nicaraguan people. He 
also argued that the FSLN supported democracy. The Junta declared that elections 
would be held in 1985, and eleven political parties were active in Nicaraguan 
politics, all of which had the right to express opposition to the government.61 The 
Nicaraguan government remained open to dialogue through lawful channels with any 
opposition party inside or outside Nicaragua.  
The democratic opposition groups referred to in the letter from Barnes, 
Leach, and others likely included the Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (ARDE), 
which accused the Sandinistas of abandoning the promises of the revolution and 
establishing a totalitarian state. ARDE also rejected Reagan’s funding of the Contras 
on human rights grounds. It consisted of the Frente Revolucionario Sandino under 
the leadership of Edén Pastora; Unidad Sandinista de Miskitos, the indigenous 
coalition organization MISURASATA, led by Brooklyn Rivera; Movimiento 
Democrático Nicaragüense, led by Alfonso Robelo; and Frente Solidaridad 
Demócrata Cristiano, led by José Dávila.62 This coalition of opposition groups 
claimed that it formed ARDE to promote pluralism sought through the revolution, 
which included implementing a mixed economy, adopting agrarian reform, holding 
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free elections, and defending human rights.63 They stood for the Anticolonial Human 
Rights discourse, as the Sandinistas claimed to, but ARDE disputed whether the 
Sandinistas genuinely pursued human rights. ARDE wanted to guarantee free 
elections, but the Sandinistas had been reluctant to move to elections so quickly.64 
While it opposed the Sandinistas, ARDE accused the Contra group and 
principal recipient of U.S. funds, the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN), of 
violating human rights. In July 1983, ARDE publicly denounced FDN as a successor 
to the hated National Guard, which ARDE condemned as an enemy of the state for 
its corruption and crimes against the Nicaraguan people. ARDE argued that FDN did 
not represent the interests of the Nicaraguan people, did not seek to establish a 
democracy, and only sought to reinstitute a government by military rule.65 ARDE 
leadership further accused FDN of operating as an arm of a foreign power to bring 
back a pro-U.S. military government similar to that of the Somoza regime. The 
organization declared that the presence of either U.S. or Soviet military personnel 
undermined efforts to achieve peace through democratic and diplomatic means.66 In 
1984, ARDE issued its own proposal for peace, calling for an alliance against 
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Sandinista totalitarianism. ARDE declared that it sought to apply true pluralism, as 
promised by the FSLN.67 
 
4. A Human Rights Defense for the Contras  
The administration was on its heels in early 1983 as it tried to maintain 
support for its Contra operation. Information about the supposedly secret plan to 
fund paramilitary forces leaked to the public. Human rights-based advocacy from 
Congress and NGOs in the United States and from the Sandinistas and anti-
Sandinista groups in Nicaragua challenged the legitimacy of U.S. support for the 
Contras. Congress started holding hearings and asking more questions about CIA 
actions in Central America, about the relationship between the United States and the 
Contras, and about what the administration hoped to accomplish in Nicaragua. The 
intensity of human rights arguments, coupled with the restrictions of the Boland 
Amendment, left the administration looking for more palatable language, other than 
anti-communism, to make its case on Nicaragua policy. The administration saw 
public opinion siding against its Nicaragua policy. In July 1983, only 33 percent of 
the American people approved of Reagan’s handling of Nicaragua.68 He believed 
that, if only the administration could properly educate the public on his goals, the 
people would support him.69 
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The president initially did not want to comment on the matter of covert 
support of counterrevolutionaries in Nicaragua. His go-to line when questioned about 
the Contras was to declare intelligence matters off limits for public comment while 
deflecting attention to the conduct of the Sandinistas. Reagan would rather discuss 
how the Sandinistas supported the guerrilla insurgents in El Salvador, and he 
dismissed questions about U.S. support of guerrillas in Nicaragua.70 In April 1983, 
when pressed by reporters, Reagan declared that the administration complied with 
the Boland Amendment, but he still would not confirm whether the United States 
armed the Contras. On this occasion, Reagan referred the press to the Sandinistas 
pushing out their revolutionary partners after taking power from Somoza. He added 
that “anything that we’re doing in that area is simply trying to interdict the supply 
lines which are supplying the guerrillas in El Salvador.”71 Reagan dismissed 
suggestions from a reporter that the administration violated the Boland Amendment 
and minimized Boland’s accusations that he had evidence of the administration 
violating the Boland Amendment. Reagan referred to the assurances of Senator 
Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
who declared himself in a Senate floor debate “absolutely positive that there is no 
violation of the law whatsoever” with regard to Reagan’s Nicaragua policy and the 
Contras. The president explained that, once Boland and other members of Congress 
studied the matter more closely, they would agree that the administration followed 
the law. Reagan also confirmed that the United States did not do anything to 
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overthrow the government of Nicaragua.72 However, two weeks later, he 
acknowledged that the Contras could still declare their intention to overthrow the 
Nicaraguan government and that the administration would do nothing to change 
that.73 
By May 4, 1983, a day after a House committee voted to cut off all covert 
funding to counterrevolutionary groups in Nicaragua, Reagan did acknowledge that 
those groups received covert aid from the United States because they fought for the 
rights of Nicaraguans. The president explained that the Contras received covert aid 
because overt aid went to governments. He also first referred to the Contras as 
“freedom fighters,” which led to questions about whether the intention of the 
administration was really weapons interdiction or overthrowing the Nicaraguan 
government. Reagan quickly backtracked on his use of the “freedom fighters” term, 
simply wanting to use a term other than guerrillas, but he argued that these groups 
did fight for freedom and for the promises and principles of human rights betrayed 
by the Sandinistas.74 As reports of CIA involvement with the Nicaraguan guerrilla 
forces continued to surface throughout 1983, Reagan also began speaking of the 
Contras and Nicaragua policy in more specific human rights terms.75 Furthermore, 
the administration created the White House Outreach Group and the Office of Public 
Diplomacy in 1983 to mold the message. The White House wanted to turn the 
                                                 
72 “Remarks in an Interview with Six Journalists. March 29, 1983,” 540. 
73 “Interview with USA Today. April 26, 1983,” in Compilation of Presidential Documents (1983), 
Monday, May 2, 1983, Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1983), 536. 
74 “Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues. May 4, 
1983,” in Public Papers of the Presidents, Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1983 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 638-642. 
75 Arnson, Crossroads, 105; David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress 
Reconsidered (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1988), 92. 
123 
 
media’s focus away from the covert and paramilitary nature of the Contra War and 
toward the threat communism posed to human rights.76 
Engaging in a Central America peace process gave the administration another 
opportunity to respond to attacks on its Nicaragua policy with human rights 
arguments. To ease the anger in Congress and placate public outcry over the secret 
paramilitary operation, the administration professed a desire for a diplomatic 
resolution to the conflict with the Sandinistas. The White House also communicated 
its intention to deescalate regional tensions made worse by the U.S.-Nicaragua row 
and the Salvadoran civil war. Demands for the administration to seriously pursue 
peace served as a common rallying cry among NGOs to muster support from 
progressive members of Congress.77 By showing enthusiasm for the peace process, 
the administration could co-opt the peace and human rights issues to improve the 
appearance of its foreign policy while undercutting opposition arguments that U.S. 
policy did not serve human rights or that Reagan was just out for war with 
Nicaragua. As was often the case with human rights arguments and the Contra War, 
perception was everything. The administration negotiated peace not with the intent 
of achieving an agreement, but as part of a strategy to achieve other objectives. A 
diplomatic resolution might have cut short efforts by the United States to pursue its 
larger strategic objectives of reducing the influence of Soviet communism.78 
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In January 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz first proposed opening 
peace negotiations with Managua. Shultz argued that U.S. participation in the peace 
process could address several issues. First, it could start leveraging the pressure 
created by the Contras to obtain concessions from Managua. Second, engaging in the 
peace process built goodwill with Congress and the American people. Shultz 
recognized that Reagan’s objectives made it likely that the U.S. was in for a 
prolonged struggle in Nicaragua. The administration would need that goodwill going 
forward as it made its case for a sustained military and diplomatic operation. Shultz 
believed the Contra operation prevented the spread of communism, but he remained 
concerned that Congress could pull the funding as early as that year.79 
Shultz acknowledged that supporting the Contras created a political liability 
for the administration. The White House needed to better manage the public 
diplomacy aspect of the operation. Shultz wrote to the president that he 
“recognize[d]… that a growing anti-Sandinista force raises questions about program 
objectives on the Hill…. Clearly we should avoid steps that invite excesses which 
would materially assist Congressional efforts to defeat our policy.” The “excesses,” 
also referred to as human rights violations, risked pushback from a Congress in 
which many of its members did not feel comfortable supporting guerrilla warfare in 
Central America. Shultz predicted that a successful guerrilla war effort would take 
several years. Opening negotiations with Managua, according to Shultz, opened 
space for the administration to continue its efforts in Central America, making 
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“pressure on the ‘secret war’ and human rights issues easier to contain. It positions 
us to gather any concessions that may be induced. And by engaging regional powers 
it can preempt unhelpful initiatives.”80 Shultz wanted the administration to exert 
greater control over the narrative at home and over any multilateral talks that would 
take place over Central America. Losing control of peace talks risked undermining 
the whole operation. Negotiation served only to improve the image of the war and 
did not carve a path to a resolution. 
Administration officials and intelligence analysts found that human rights 
could deflect attention and public discourse regarding Nicaragua away from the 
Contras. The CIA saw human rights in public diplomacy as an important political 
weapon for both sides of the Contra War. Intelligence analysts found that the FSLN 
tried to discredit the resistance groups by alleging they committed human rights 
violations. The CIA also claimed that Sandinista security forces made up stories of 
human rights violations by the Contras and blamed the Contras for abuses committed 
by the government forces.81 The State Department found that support for efforts in 
Central America declined when the media started emphasizing the covert nature of 
military action against Nicaragua. White House public diplomacy could counter 
Sandinista and U.S. media issue-framing and opposition voices in Congress by 
turning attention to the president’s goals of creating and maintaining democracies in 
Central America, of promoting economic development, of protecting national 
security, and of engaging in multilateral peace negotiations. Officials believed that 
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“vigorously” promoting advances in human rights conditions that came from 
pressure on the FSLN, such as the release of political prisoners, movement toward 
free elections, and progress on a regional peace process would affect the debate over 
Nicaragua in the administration’s favor. The White House would have to contend 
with what officials interpreted as the media’s undue emphasis on human rights 
abuses by the Contras, but strong evidence of positive developments in the region 
would neutralize the criticism. Also, State Department officials advised the 
administration to highlight how creating democracy served as the best method for 
defending human rights.82 
In an address before a joint session of Congress in April 1983, the president 
did just that, drawing the nation’s attention to the human rights violations of the 
Nicaraguan government and the natural consequence of an emerging armed 
opposition to stand against the repression. Reagan accused the Sandinistas of 
creating a dictatorship to replace a dictatorship despite promising democracy and 
free and fair elections. The Sandinistas controlled or censored all media. They 
forcibly removed the Miskito Indians and burned their villages and crops. They even 
encouraged mob violence against independent human rights organizations in 
Nicaragua. In the face of such repression, Reagan questioned how an armed rebellion 
could not emerge. He classified the opposition not as former members of Somoza’s 
forces, but as former members of the anti-Somoza revolutionary coalition that fought 
with the Sandinistas. These forces turned to fight the Sandinistas after the 
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government rejected the path to democracy. The president also compared the 
Nicaraguan case to El Salvador, as other members of his administration would do. 
Reagan found that the Salvadoran government made “every effort to guarantee 
democracy, free labor unions, freedom of religion, and a free press,” but those efforts 
were under attack by guerrilla insurgents. He blamed Nicaragua for supporting the 
violence from guerrilla attacks plaguing El Salvador, but, to be clear to all watching 
and listening to his address, declared that the United States did not seek to overthrow 
the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The Reagan administration only wanted to 
prevent the Nicaraguans from spreading violence and instability throughout the 
region. 83 El Salvador made progress toward the goals of democracy and human 
rights, which could only be accomplished by determined commitment by leaders 
such as President Álvaro Alfredo Magaña Borja of El Salvador.84 
“Nicaragua today is a nation abusing its own people and its neighbors.” In 
July at the International Longshoremen’s Association in Florida, the president again 
addressed what he saw as Nicaraguan totalitarianism resisted only by the Contras. 
“The guerrilla bands fighting in Nicaragua are trying to restore the true revolution 
and keep the promises to the OAS. Isn’t it time that all of us in the Americas worked 
together to hold Nicaragua accountable for the promises made and broken 4 years 
ago?”85 He appealed to the audience and to Congress to stand up to the Nicaraguan 
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advance on Central America and provide the resources to do it. “Human rights 
means working at problems, not walking away from them. Without the necessary 
funds, there’s no way for us to prevent the light of freedom from being extinguished 
in Central America, and then it will move on from there.” The president appealed to 
Congress for sufficient funds to defend human rights.86 
Congressional testimony by Elliott Abrams, then assistant secretary of state 
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, demonstrated how administration 
officials operationalized human rights to support the Contra operation. While 
testifying before the House Human Rights and International Organizations 
subcommittee, Abrams stated that the administration developed a preventative 
approach to human rights by promoting democracy. Building democracy was the 
ultimate, long-range objective of U.S. policy because human rights naturally flowed 
from democracy. He argued that “[d]emocracies have the best human rights records, 
for an obvious reason: When people can choose their government and dismiss it, that 
government is less likely to abuse their human rights and will be held to account by 
the people for any abuses it may commit.” Democracy promotion involved 
encouraging and aiding institutions that strengthen free societies, such as 
universities, a free press, and trade unions.87 Promoting democracy, as articulated by 
Abrams, involved establishing conditions and institutions that, over time, would 
create noticeable change in human rights conditions.  
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In another hearing, Abrams stated that Nicaraguan human rights violations 
required the United States to act because the Sandinistas transported violence and 
repression to El Salvador by arming the insurgents. Abrams agreed that the 
Sandinistas committed less violence than the government of El Salvador, but the 
Nicaraguan government worked against democracy while the Salvadoran 
government tried to establish democratic institutions. Testifying with Abrams, 
Langhorne Motley, assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, argued 
that the administration wanted a democratically elected government in Nicaragua to 
ensure a peaceful and more stable political environment in Central America. The 
Contras helped achieve this objective because the Contras forced the Nicaraguan 
government to focus inward and maintain domestic security rather than looking 
outward to exporting revolution.88 Abrams went a step further with this line of 
reasoning, stating that pressuring the Sandinistas “to have an election is part of a 
human rights policy.”89 For administration purposes, the Contras served human 
rights.  
A surprised Gus Yatron asked Abrams to clarify his statement. Did Abrams 
mean to say that violence and sabotage by a paramilitary force served human rights? 
Abrams reaffirmed his position and stated the United States applied pressure to 
Nicaragua, like other nations, to move it in the direction of democracy. Yatron 
continued to push the question, asking Abrams to “stand by the statement that the 
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kind of pressure we are bringing against Nicaragua is part of our human rights 
policy.” Abrams did not retreat, but, instead, argued that the United States and the 
whole “Western World” brought that pressure against Nicaragua. Yatron disagreed 
that the Western World engaged in the kind of pressure put on Nicaragua by the 
United States and asked if the Office of Human Rights concurred that the appropriate 
method to defend human rights came from covert military aid. Abrams declined to 
get into specifics in the open hearing.90 
 
5. Conclusion 
NGOs achieved a significant, though limited, victory in shaping the rhetoric 
used by the president and his administration when explaining U.S. support of the 
Contras. An administration that had been reluctant to acknowledge the importance of 
human rights in its foreign policy objectives transitioned, at least rhetorically, to 
promoting its human rights bona fides in Nicaragua. Yet, human rights for Reagan 
were tied to the Cold War. Combating communism and containing the threat of 
totalitarianism served human rights. The use of violence and sabotage to stop 
communism served human rights. 
NGOs found this line of reasoning paradoxical. The Nicaragua Network 
pointed to the reforms of the Sandinistas as the new government engaged in state 
building projects to provide health care, education, and improved infrastructure to 
the Nicaraguan people. WOLA reported on the reduction of human rights violations 
by the new Nicaraguan government and the comparative social stability in Nicaragua 
as El Salvador and Guatemala plunged ever deeper into violence. CFNFP rejected 
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the Cold War construct and questioned how American values could accept U.S. 
policy that sought the overthrow of a legally constituted government by supporting 
individuals known for their history of torture, arbitrary violence, and extrajudicial 
killing while serving Somoza. 
Cold War politics still ruled Washington, and Reagan enjoyed popular 
support in the country and in Congress. During the final months of 1983 and first 
half of 1984, the president’s approval numbers were consistently over 50 percent.91 
In the final week of 1983, Congress approved military funding of $24 million for the 
Contras for fiscal year 1984.92 Presented as a question of supporting freedom fighters 
against communism, Congress, however reluctantly, would support the Contras. The 
question did not remain one of freedom versus communism. Events would continue 
to alter the question facing lawmakers, thereby altering the influence of human rights 
and the way Americans interpreted human rights as applied to situations such as the 
Contra War. The tactics of the Contras and the CIA, the conduct and politics of 
Sandinista leadership, and the actions of the Reagan administration would all 
influence how Americans interpreted human rights and how human rights framed 
circumstances in Nicaragua. 
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CHAPTER 3 – ALTERED PERCEPTIONS: NEGOTIATING PEACE AND THE MINING OF 
NICARAGUAN PORTS, 1984-1985 
 
Reagan’s embracing of human rights and the peace process while 
condemning the Nicaraguan government as a puppet of the Soviets and Cubans fit 
with most Americans’ perception of human rights in the early 1980s. However, those 
perceptions changed as circumstances in Nicaragua changed. The focus of the human 
rights discussion moved away from the policies and ideology of the Sandinistas to 
more closely consider the conduct of the Contras and the CIA. The Reagan 
administration and the CIA received international condemnation for sabotage 
missions, particularly the operation in which CIA operatives laid naval mines in 
Nicaraguan ports. Despite the public façade of Reagan pursuing peace for Central 
America through a negotiated settlement, in 1984, evidence seemed to prove 
otherwise. 
Advocates for an end to the Contra operation seized the opportunity to 
emphasize the threat U.S. support for the Contras posed to human rights in 
Nicaragua. NGOs exposed the contradictions between Reagan’s words in seeking 
human rights and peace and his actions of maintaining violence. Evidence of U.S. 
involvement in the mining of Nicaraguan ports provided NGOs and the Sandinista 
officials demonstrable evidence that the Contras and U.S. officials violated human 
rights and international law. The administration moved to even shakier political 
ground by limiting U.S. consent to jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in 
anticipation of a claim filed against it by the Nicaraguan government arising from the 
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CIA operations. Though legally defensible, the move added another layer of 
objection to the administration’s Nicaragua policy. 
In early 1984, most Americans did not agree with Reagan’s support of the 
Contras and wanted Washington to help bring peace to Nicaragua. The Harris Survey 
found that 60 percent of Americans did not want the government to provide covert 
aid to the Contras to overthrow the Sandinista government, and a majority of those 
surveyed had serious concerns that funding the insurgents in Nicaragua would drag 
the United States into the conflict.1 News of the mining did even more damage to the 
popularity of the Contra program. However, in early 1984, the president enjoyed a 
job approval rating of well over 50 percent.2 Americans may not have liked the 
Contras, but they liked him. That made it difficult for NGOs to persuade Congress to 
stand against Reagan on Nicaragua, but activists used human rights arguments to 
rally the public and empower members of Congress to do just that. 
 
1. Contadora and the Beginning of Peace Talks 
The Reagan administration may not have had strong interest in a negotiated 
settlement in 1983, but Latin American governments demonstrated a firm 
commitment to resolve the conflict in Nicaragua and further their own interests in 
peace and stability in Central America. The president did not oppose peace, but he 
first required the Sandinistas to accept a dramatic restructuring of the government or 
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their relinquishing of power. Short of such concessions, the administration would 
continue supporting the Contras until the United States could negotiate from a 
position of strength and impose democratic reforms. Leaders among the Latin 
American nations brought the Central American governments together and pursued 
more pragmatic terms.  
Central American peace talks took place through much of the 1980s, 
beginning with the Contadora Initiative. In 1982, Mexican president José López 
Portillo y Pacheco visited Managua and announced the Declaration of Managua. The 
Declaration served as a framework to pursue a mediation involving the Central 
American nations as the main participants and the United States and Cuba as the 
principal outside parties.3 Over one hundred members of Congress signed a letter 
requesting the administration pursue the proposal for mediation initiated by Mexico 
and later backed by Venezuela. U.S. lawmakers urged the president to “respond 
positively to the Mexican-Venezuelan initiative and to encourage all parties in the 
region to end the military confrontation and to begin the process of political 
dialogue.”4 Under pressure to support the peace process, Reagan agreed and gave 
López Portillo his endorsement to try to bring the Nicaraguans and Cubans to the 
negotiating table.5 Out of these plans came the Contadora Initiative. The foreign 
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ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama met in 1983 on Contadora 
Island off the coast of Panama to plan out a Central America mediation.6 
The “Contadora Initiative could open a new chapter in Latin American 
politics…,” Rep. Bill Alexander declared, signifying “a new emphasis on dialog and 
negotiation, rather than on war and confrontation, as tools of diplomacy.”7 A Latin 
American-led peace process offered hope that Contadora could be a model for 
achieving regional peace agreements. Alexander saw Contadora as a way for the 
United States to listen to and understand the people of Central America rather than 
continue with unilateralism.8 If U.S. relations with Latin America suffered from a 
history of intervention, Contadora-like initiatives, with the support of the United 
States, could build trust and stronger ties between Latin America and the United 
States and lead to more stability within the Western Hemisphere.  
Fortunately for the organizing states, the Nicaraguan government also 
publicly embraced, albeit haltingly, the Contadora Initiative. The Council of State 
expressed skepticism that Reagan would eagerly and openly engage in peace talks. 
Trying to pressure Reagan into participating in good faith, the Council referenced the 
enthusiasm among members of Congress.9 This followed a pattern among Sandinista 
officials of reaching or anticipating stalemate with the president and then appealing 
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directly to the U.S. Congress and to the American people with messages of human 
rights and peace.  
The Anticolonial Human Rights discourse served as the ideological basis on 
which participating nations found common ground and began negotiations. In 
September 1983, the Contadora countries (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and 
Panama) began mediation with the five Central American nations (Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras). They had the ambitious goal of 
producing a comprehensive settlement to resolve the sources of tension and violence 
in the region.10 Discussions among the Central American countries and the 
Contadora Group led to an agreement in September called the “Document of 
Objectives.” The Document of Objectives identified twenty-one goals for the 
negotiation process and stated principles upon which the Contadora nations based 
those objectives.11 The objectives included ending the armed conflict among and 
within nations; respecting and ensuring “the exercise of human, political, civil, 
economic, social, religious and cultural rights”; promoting the democratic process 
and free expression; ending the arms race in Central America; and terminating arms 
trafficking or other support to groups intent on destabilizing Central American 
nations. The first two principles were “The self-determination of peoples” and “Non-
intervention.” 12 Nicaragua agreed to carry out the twenty-one objectives, and each of 
the Central American nations supported the document.13 Subsequent efforts focused 
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on implementing the twenty-one goals.14 Nicaragua proposed the countries fulfill the 
objectives through methods such as bilateral and regional non-aggression pacts, arms 
control, and democratization. Negotiations continued among the Contadora 
participants for the next year to implement an agreement based on the shared goals.15 
Hoping that Contadora would progress further, members of Congress offered 
their encouragement for the process. In April 1984, the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs took up House Concurrent Resolution 261, which offered support to the 
Contadora Group for its work in trying to resolve the Nicaragua war. Michael Barnes 
argued that Congress should again go on record and express its approval of the 
Contadora nations in their work and any agreements they reached. Rep. Stephen 
Solarz believed that, if the Contadora effort failed, the fighting would escalate in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, possibly drawing in the other Central American countries. 
Peaceful negotiation through this process offered the best and only way to effectively 
resolve the conflict. Solarz noted that the Reagan administration had expressed its 
support for the peace process, and he argued that Congress needed to express its 
bipartisan support for the negotiations.16 
There appeared a real chance for a breakthrough during the summer of 1984, 
but clashing human rights interpretations stood in the way. The administration 
agreed to meet with the Sandinistas for peace talks in Manzanillo, Mexico. Both 
sides believed the other to be ready to discuss peace. However, hard-liners in 
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Washington wanted to torpedo the negotiations from the beginning. Negotiators 
received instructions to demand the Sandinistas put in place an immediate path 
toward democracy in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguans would never agree to terms over 
restructuring the government because they saw that as an attempt at U.S. intervention 
in domestic matters, and these were not open for discussion. Furthermore, high 
ranking hard-liners within the Reagan administration such as Jeane Kirkpatrick and 
CIA Director William Casey had no interest in pursuing a peace agreement and 
would not allow a compromise.17 
Conflicting human rights discourses continued to influence the peace process 
through Contadora. After the Manzanillo talks went nowhere, the Contadora Group 
put together a peace agreement in the fall of 1984 that the Nicaraguan government 
agreed to sign. Work among the Contadora participants led to a draft agreement on 
September 7, 1984, that included provisions for the withdrawal of all foreign military 
advisers, prohibited foreign military exercises, and required periodic free elections.18 
U.S. officials balked, but the process had taken on a life of its own and produced an 
agreement without the approval of the president. Not only did the agreement leave 
the Sandinistas in place, it eliminated the possibility for the United States to provide 
future aid to the Contras or El Salvador, terms the administration could not accept. 
Caught off guard, the Reagan administration convinced its allies in El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Costa Rica to voice new objections to the agreement and withdraw 
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their approval.19 The Sandinista government declared it would agree to this draft 
with no material changes.20 According to historian Hal Brands, Daniel Ortega 
accepted this agreement knowing the United States would reject it. Ortega used the 
opportunity to portray the Reagan administration as insincere in pursuing peace.21 
The Reagan administration would not allow a peace agreement to go forward 
until the long-term strategy behind the Contra insurgency bore fruit. The demands of 
El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica for revisions to the treaty blocked progress 
because the Nicaraguans would not agree to any revisions.22 Reagan needed the 
Contras to continue terrorizing the population and drain domestic support and 
resources from the government while the United States crippled the Nicaraguan state 
through trade and financial restrictions.23 Secretary of State Shultz let the president 
know that achieving concessions from the Nicaraguans would take time and a 
serious commitment from the administration and the American people.24 The 
agreement reached in September 1984 potentially stood in the way of these plans. In 
the meantime, the administration would nominally engage in the peace process, 
staying involved just enough to claim it stood for peace and human rights while 
accusing the Nicaraguans of delay tactics.25 
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2. Naval Mines and the Shifting Politics of the Contra War 
As the administration slow-played the peace process, Reagan confirmed for 
his critics the danger of his Nicaragua policy. Newspaper reports revealed that the 
CIA orchestrated the mining of two Nicaraguan ports on the Pacific Ocean, Corinto 
and Puerto Sandino. Armed with this new evidence and able to play on the anger of 
Congress, NGOs refocused the human rights debate on the Contras and their 
benefactors in the White House.26 The mining of the Nicaraguan ports, followed up 
with the Reagan administration’s quick avoidance of accountability in the 
International Court of Justice over matters involving Central America, led to 
international condemnation and contributed to a temporary undoing of Reagan’s 
Contra program. Contra opponents received another boost to their cause when Latin 
American leaders accused the United States of obstructing the Contadora peace 
process.27 
The mining of Nicaraguan ports came as part of a larger effort by the CIA to 
extend its mission beyond training and advising to help the Contras in the field. By 
early 1983, the Contras succeeded in spreading violence and fear throughout rural 
areas of Nicaragua, mostly in the northern areas close to Honduras. However, these 
attacks did not cause any significant damage, financially or politically, to the 
Sandinista regime. To help speed up the destabilization process, the CIA launched its 
own campaign of sabotage, attacking port facilities, oil production facilities, power 
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plants, bridges, and other infrastructure and utility facilities. In early 1984, in several 
operations, CIA-trained agents even used U.S. planes and helicopters to bomb 
military and civilian targets.28 
In December 1983, the White House authorized the CIA to place mines in 
Nicaraguan ports.29 Mines, whether land or naval, caused indiscriminate damage and 
injury. They could kill civilians of any nationality. They also could continue killing 
after a conflict ended. Consequently, international law and custom had condemned 
the use of naval mines since the early twentieth century.30 During February and 
March 1984 the mines damaged or sank at least two fishing boats, a Dutch dredging 
ship, and a Soviet oil tanker.31 
When information about the mining of the Nicaraguan ports inevitably leaked 
to the press, Reagan received swift and severe condemnation from the Soviets, from 
U.S. allies, and from members of both parties in Congress, some of whom asserted 
that Reagan’s actions violated international law.32 Most of Congress did not know 
anything about the mining until The Wall Street Journal broke the story on April 6, 
1984.33 More reporting on the mining came out in the following days. Barry 
Goldwater (R-AZ), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and an 
advocate for Reagan’s foreign policy, was irate. Goldwater sent a scathing private 
letter to CIA Director Casey accusing him and his agency of not being forthright 
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with Goldwater or the committee about the mining operation. Just days earlier, the 
Senate approved an appropriation of $21 million for the Contras after Goldwater 
assured his colleagues that Reagan had not approved the then-rumored mining. 
When Goldwater learned the truth with the rest of the country, he declared that the 
mining was “an act violating international law…, an act of war. For the life of me, I 
don’t see how we are going to explain it.”34 A majority of the Senate agreed, and, by 
a vote of 84-12, the senators condemned the mining. The House followed with its 
own condemnation of the mining in a 281-11 vote and had yet to approve the 
additional $21 million for the Contras.35 The president considered this a “rebellion” 
by Congress and worried that lawmakers would soon cut off Contra funding.36 
Days after The Wall Street Journal story, Managua filed a complaint against 
the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging human rights 
violations stemming from the sabotage operations, including the mining, and the 
CIA’s other actions in Nicaragua in coordination with the Contras. The Nicaraguan 
government claimed that, in early 1984, the CIA and the Contras, working with 
Honduran forces, greatly increased the number and size of attacks on Nicaraguan 
military facilities and personnel, civilians, and infrastructure, such as fuel storage 
and transportation, as part of an effort to destabilize and overthrow the Nicaraguan 
government.37 Anticipating these claims, the White House issued a revised consent 
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to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, removing from the ICJ’s jurisdiction claims against the 
United States related to Central America.38 The White House called the filing of the 
complaint by Managua a tactic of delay in the peace process and a way to find 
sympathetic ears for the Sandinista position. Kenneth W. Dam, deputy secretary of 
state, referred to it as “forum shopping.” After agreeing to participate in the 
Contadora process, Dam argued that the Nicaraguans tried to move the venue to the 
UN and avoid Contadora. The Sandinistas then tried to move the negotiations to the 
UN Security Council.39 The move to alter jurisdiction served as a defense of the 
supposed nefarious methods of the Nicaraguan government.40 
At a hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Michael Barnes 
gave voice to the shared anger among members of Congress toward the 
administration’s handling of Nicaraguan policy and relations with the Sandinista 
government. Barnes noted the international condemnation of Reagan’s actions, citing 
the British Prime Minister denouncing U.S. actions as dangerous to international 
shipping and to the principles long held by the United States. Each non-U.S. member 
of the U.N. Security Council voted to condemn U.S. actions in Nicaragua. Barnes 
noted that “[n]ot one nation, not even our closest allies, voted with us.” He also 
reminded his House colleagues that not even the Republican-controlled Senate could 
support the administration’s actions. Barnes agreed with those senators who believed 
                                                 
38 “Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility),” 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), (International Court of Justice, August 17, 1984), 74-86. 
39 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Mining of 
Nicaraguan Ports and Harbors: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 1984, 4. 
40 “Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President. April 10, 1984,” in Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents (1984), Monday, April 16, 1984, Administration of Ronald 
Reagan, 1984 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 518. 
144 
 
Reagan committed an act of war against Nicaragua without first informing the 
Congress or American people.41 
The ICJ case also troubled Barnes and demonstrated to him Reagan’s 
disregard for peaceful negotiations to end the conflict in Central America. He stated 
that Reagan “has compounded our national embarrassment by asserting the right to 
remove this aggression from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
after the aggression has already been perpetrated.” Barnes argued that all participants 
in the Contadora process would say that the U.S. represented the biggest obstacle to 
a final settlement of the conflicts in Central America. In addition, Barnes claimed 
that the Contadora nations saw the continued and increased presence of foreign 
military forces as only escalating the tension in the region, undermining the peace 
process.42  
The CIA's role in the mining did significant damage to Reagan’s relationship 
with Congress with respect to his Nicaragua policy, especially when it took two 
months for the administration to inform the Senate Intelligence Committee of the 
operation.43 Consequently, funding for the Contras ran into trouble. The Senate had 
already approved additional funding without restrictions.44 In the House, after 
members learned of the mining operation, debate turned against Reagan’s request 
and the funding stalled in conference with the House in a supplemental 
appropriations bill (H.J. Res. 492). House leadership, namely Speaker Tip O’Neill, 
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intended to block passage of the $21 million and end all aid for the Contras when the 
previously appropriated $24 million funding ran out in May 1984.45 The 
administration sought additional Contra aid as part of a $1.896 billion military and 
economic aid proposal that would supplement spending for fiscal year 1984 and 
authorize spending for fiscal year 1985. The House Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, chaired by Barnes, cut out Contra aid and added many 
conditions and prohibitions on the U.S. military’s involvement in Central America. 
When the proposal made it to the full House Foreign Affairs Committee for debate, 
liberals prevented any funding from going back into the aid package and kept in the 
restrictions on the military’s activity in the region.46  
Democrats in the House then agreed with Republicans to postpone debate 
over the Central America aid package by removing it from the foreign aid bill. 
However, rather than waiting for a full debate, Democrats on the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee presented their position to the House Rules Committee to have 
their language added to the foreign aid authorizations bill. With little resistance from 
the committee’s Republicans, the Democrats gained approval to add two 
amendments, including a provision that encouraged the Contadora peace process by 
offering $250 million for bilateral and regional economic aid for Central American 
countries once they reached a comprehensive agreement. The Democrats also 
prohibited additional training exercises with Honduran forces, which had enflamed 
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tensions with Nicaragua, and the removal of all U.S. forces from Honduras except 
military advisors.47 
Seizing on discontent on Capitol Hill, NGOs wanted to further drive 
Congress and the White House apart on Nicaragua by exposing the Contras and 
Reagan’s policy of supporting violence as threats to human rights. Debbie Reuben, 
interim coordinator of the Nicaragua Network, wrote to organization members and 
allies to push for greater commitment to make something happen that summer in the 
anti-Contra movement. Reuben reminded friends and members that “the Nicaraguans 
tell us over and over, to stop the murderous policies of the Reagan administration the 
U.S. people must protest loud and clear.” Reuben called on all to “inundate every 
[Congressional] office with communications of opposition to U.S. policy in Central 
America and particularly CIA Contra support against Nicaragua.” She emphasized 
the need for “activities on a national scale through a strong and viable [Nicaragua 
Network].” 48 
The Nicaragua Network also wanted to raise its national profile to further 
drive anti-Contra opinion, which meant greater cooperation with other large 
organizations, whether religious organizations, labor organizations, or women’s 
groups. Reuben argued that the Nicaragua Network needed to contribute to a more 
expansive movement against U.S. intervention. The Coordinating Committee 
resolved to open the organization’s membership to groups not previously invited to 
join because their mission did not line up perfectly with a solidarity organization.49 
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“The [Nicaragua Network] recognizes that the powerful potential represented by 
current anti-intervention sentiment in this country will only be realized if the broad 
representative sectors of U.S. society join in the movement to stop U.S. intervention 
in Central America.”50 NGOs, hoping to ride the wave of outrage over administration 
actions in Central America to expand the organization and grow the anti-Contra 
movement, helped secure a defeat of U.S. Contra funding. 
Representative George Miller (D-CA) wrote to Cindy Buhl, human rights 
coordinator of CFNFP, stating that “[o]n covert operations in Nicaragua, I think it is 
fair to say that we could never have succeeded the way we did if it were not for the 
education and coalition-building carried out by organizations such as your own.” 
There was, in fact, a building momentum against Contra aid around the country and 
in Congress fueled by the human rights activism of NGOs. In May 1984, the House 
voted down, for the third time, a request from Reagan for Contra funding, thanks in 
large part to the organizing and lobbying of NGOs opposed to Reagan’s policy.51 
Miller further thanked Buhl for her effort by commending her “perseverance and for 
[her] efforts on behalf of a more humane policy in Central America.”52 WOLA 
assessed that the external events strengthened the resolve in the House and created an 
opportunity to flip the votes of at least thirty-four former Contra supporters.53  
The Coalition continued mobilizing its grass roots activism during the 
summer of 1984. In June, Buhl wrote to rally her organization’s members to continue 
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lobbying for an expected vote on Contra aid in the fall of 1984. She told supporters 
they needed another ten senators to secure a majority in the Senate to defeat Contra 
aid. Groups working in Washington put together a list of nineteen swing votes in the 
Senate, and Buhl called on each member organization to contact their constituents 
regularly and have them contact these senators through letters and phone calls in 
their home states.54 CFNFP also distributed materials around the country to 
grassroots organizations for their local activism and provided them opportunities to 
participate in national awareness and protest campaigns. The Coalition sent a letter 
for organizations to sign to send to the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations 
regarding the fiscal year 1985 Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill that contained a 
provision for $1.262 billion in aid for Central America.55  
In addition to devising a national strategy, CFNFP provided written materials 
and hands-on support to advise local organizations. Buhl sent materials to contacts in 
key districts and states to facilitate grassroots activism toward targeted senators. For 
example, activists in Iowa targeted Republican Chuck Grassley, and Buhl sent 
materials to help local groups organize public demonstrations, contact local media, 
and rally supporters.56 She also provided materials and ideas for activism and 
strategy for sixteen targeted states that summer.57 Buhl traveled onsite to assist in 
building a functioning structure for human rights organizations. In one instance, Buhl 
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traveled to Seattle to help the Church Council of Greater Seattle and Central America 
Peace Campaign to organize a strategy meeting regarding Senators Daniel J. Evans 
(R-WA) and Slade Gorton III (R-WA). Buhl then provided a list of contacts for the 
state of Washington as a beginning point for calling the meeting and asked the local 
organizations to add to the list the contacts they developed through local organizing. 
According to Buhl, “[w]e count on the local convener knowing the actors better than 
anyone else.” Buhl also enclosed summaries of recent delegation visits to the D.C. 
offices of the two senators when activists met with senate staffers. Cooperation 
between the local and national organizations would be key for CFNFP to build 
nation-wide influence.58  
In Iowa, meanwhile, activists with the Catholic Peace Ministry and Stop the 
Arms Race Committee of Iowa, along with other anti-Contra organizations, held a 
meeting based on the information and tactics communicated through CFNFP 
mailing. On August 28, 1984, they discussed lobbying Iowa’s senators to vote 
against funding the Contras. The group told Buhl they followed the strategy 
developed by CFNFP of targeting vulnerable swing votes in the Senate. Grassley had 
twice voted for amendments that prevented funding terrorism and overthrowing the 
Nicaraguan government. The group reasoned those were the arguments to continue 
pressing with Grassley.59  
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CFNFP’s newsletter regarding Contra aid urged local organizations to keep 
up the pressure on the nineteen senators targeted as potentially turning against 
Contra aid.60 Focusing on the nineteen conserved resources to allow maximum effort 
from the local organizations within constituencies and the national organizations in 
coordinating activities and message.61 National organizations could not call and send 
out letters to all members of Congress, but CFNFP reduced the list to key members 
of Congress.62 Carla Pedersen wrote to Buhl from Tucson, AZ, letting Buhl know 
they were “breathing down his [Senator Dennis DeConcini] neck.” She concluded 
her short, hand-written letter stating “[k]eep up your concise, methodically [sic] 
efforts – you’re great.”63 Notes of thanks for Buhl’s efforts came from all around the 
country. 
 
3. Democracy in Nicaragua Through Freedom Fighters and Elections 
Reagan’s administration continued to repackage the Contras for the American 
people as defenders of freedom and human rights, while also branding Sandinista 
Nicaragua as a dangerous totalitarian state. Though Reagan would not admit to U.S. 
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funding of the Contras, he came to embrace the title of “freedom fighters” in the 
summer of 1984 and more closely associated his administration with the cause of the 
Contras. The label “freedom fighters” underscored Reagan’s argument that the 
Contras fought for democracy and human rights. In that regard, the president 
compared the Contras to the “freedom fighters who led the American 
Revolution….”64 “Freedom fighters” also helped mask the reality that the Contras 
wanted to overthrow a legally constituted government and that the United States 
supported an insurgency. According to the president, the Contras engaged in a 
“courageous struggle for democracy, for freedom of the press, and for freedom of 
assembly and worship in their homeland.” Reagan crafted a narrative for the Contras 
in which they fought for the fundamental rights that people in the United States took 
for granted. He urged the American people to “ponder long and hard, to reflect on 
the fatal consequences of complacency and isolationism, and, above all, to 
understand that freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction.” 
Reagan argued that the United States had an obligation to itself and to the rest of the 
world to engage threats to freedom.65 Using equally visceral terms, Reagan claimed 
that “[t]he Nicaragua people are trapped in a totalitarian dungeon…,” and he 
demanded that the Sandinistas allow free elections to take place as the Contras 
fought to release the people from their “dungeon” of repression.66 
                                                 
64 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 477. 
65 Ronald W. Reagan, “Remarks on Signing Proclamation 5223. July 16, 1984,” in Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents (1984), Monday, July 23, 1984, Administration of Ronald 
Reagan, 1984 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 1032. 
66 Ronald W. Reagan, “Remarks to Participants in a White House Outreach Working Group. July 18, 
1984,” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (1984), Monday, July 23, 1984, 




The president also continued dismissing the idea that he wanted the Contras 
to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. “[I]t is a less an overthrow that they’re 
fighting for as it is a demand that they be allowed to participate in the government 
and that the government keep its promises as to what it had intended for the 
people.”67 The Boland Amendment made clear that the American people and 
Congress would not stand for a covert operation intended to overthrow a 
government. Therefore, Reagan’s administration claimed that the Sandinistas did not 
constitute a legitimate governing authority. The Sandinistas represented a break from 
what should have taken place pursuant to the revolution of 1979. They were 
usurpers. The Contras consisted mostly of individuals who participated in the 
revolution and fought with the Sandinistas, but the Contras “had that revolution 
stolen from them by Communist Sandinistas.”68 Reagan claimed that his 
administration wanted to restore to Nicaraguans “the revolution that was promised 
them…,” a revolution for human rights. The president also wanted to ensure that 
Nicaraguans had a revolution that created democracy.69 He relied on the Contras to 
reestablish, not overthrow, a legitimate government. Reagan’s framing of the Contra 
mission within Democratic Human Rights infused his Nicaragua policy with a legal 
and moral legitimacy. 
The Sandinistas made a “contract during the revolution,” he said, in exchange 
for the OAS helping convince Somoza to step aside, according to Reagan. The 
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Nicaraguans denied such a quid pro quo arrangement, but Reagan repeatedly claimed 
that the Sandinistas violated it.70 Not only that, he added the Sandinistas also 
betrayed those who fought with them, befriending the Soviets and Cubans.71 The 
president wanted to see free elections in Nicaragua because he saw “elections as the 
best way to guarantee peace, human freedom, and responsive government.”72 Reagan 
argued that “[o]nly democracy can guarantee that a government will not turn against 
its own people, because in a democracy, people are the masters of government, not 
the servant.”73 
Reagan linked democracy in Nicaragua to the broader mission of the Reagan 
Doctrine. He referenced the Declaration of Independence and the principle that 
governments derived their authority and power from the consent of the governed. 
“Well, those words reveal the meaning of human rights and our philosophy of liberty 
that is the essence of America.”74 He vowed that the United States would continue to 
combat “adversaries of freedom” by promoting democracy throughout the world.75 
In May 1984, the president reminded the country of President Harry Truman’s 
assurance that the United States would support free peoples everywhere in their fight 
against communism. Reagan sought the same kind of unity around democracy and 
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human rights for Nicaragua and the rest of Central America. He stated that “where 
democracy flourishes, human rights and peace are more secure…,” again connecting 
democracy with human rights. The American people only needed the will to get it 
done, and, at whatever the cost, they could ensure freedom.76  
Reagan took his case to the United Nations in September 1984 and offered a 
reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that was a full-throated 
endorsement of the Democratic Human Rights discourse as an inspiration for his 
foreign policy. The president highlighted the clauses of the UDHR that stated the 
will of the people of each nation shall be expressed through periodic and legitimate 
national elections. He also recalled that the UDHR mandated labor union organizing, 
private property ownership, freedom of movement, and freedom of expression. 
These were the political and civil rights fundamental to a vibrant democracy, which 
Reagan sought to install in communist nations.77 
In his most direct jab at the Sandinistas’ core belief, Reagan also incorporated 
the right of self-determination as a political right associated with democracy. In his 
remarks at a December 1984 signing ceremony on International Human Rights Day, 
the president noted the strong desire for self-determination within Latin American 
nations. However, instead of understanding self-determination as a right of a 
collective people to be free from foreign intervention and determine their own 
political and social destiny, Reagan interpreted it as a right to elections. The 
                                                 
76 Reagan, “Address to the Nation. May 9, 1984,” 681. 
77 Ronald W. Reagan, “Address Before the 39th Session of the General Assembly. September 24, 
1984,” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (1984), Monday, October 1, 1984, 




president celebrated how so many people of Latin America lived in a democracy.78 
“Today, all who cherish human rights and individual freedom salute the people of 
the Americas for their great achievements.” Reagan continued, stating that “regard 
for human rights and the steady expansion of human freedom have defined the 
American experience. And they remain today the real moral core of our foreign 
policy.”79 
The president’s constant call for elections in Nicaragua left him little room to 
maneuver once the Sandinistas announced they would hold elections. The 
Sandinistas scheduled elections for November 4, 1984, for the offices of president 
and vice-president and for seats on the national assembly that would draft a new 
constitution. Reagan dismissed the effort, questioning if the elections amounted to 
anything other than “the kind of rubber-stamp that we see in any totalitarian 
government.” He argued that no opposing candidates could exist, no opposition 
parties got involved, and the Sandinistas did not allow campaigning or access to a 
free press.80 No election run by the Sandinista government in its existing form in 
1984 could be legitimate. According to the State Department, “the Sandinistas 
ensured that the electoral process could not result in a peaceful transfer of power. 
Acting under a State of Emergency which imposed strict censorship and stifled the 
activities of other parties, the FSLN enacted laws which guaranteed its control over 
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every aspect of the electoral process.”81 This election did not meet the standards of 
democracy promoted by Reagan. In a radio address to the American people, the 
president wondered whether the elections would even happen. Reagan also looked 
for neutral international observers to record any electoral irregularities.82 
Similarly, the primary opposition parties in Nicaragua refused to participate, 
citing decidedly undemocratic conditions that would prevent free elections. 
Opposition parties claimed mobs interrupted party meetings and that party members 
were subjected to violence and intimidation. The Sandinistas also controlled all 
media and limited opposition party access. Parties also had limited ability to 
purchase and use campaign materials because of rationing mandated by the 
government. The FSLN did not have the same rationing restrictions.83 These groups 
claimed the elections would be unwinnable for anyone but the Sandinistas.84 The 
opposition called on the Sandinistas to implement protections for a free electoral 
process, but the FSLN refused to engage in serious discussions with the opposition 
parties regarding the electoral process.85 In addition, the groups denouncing the 
elections claimed, and rightfully so, that their participation in the elections would 
only legitimize the Sandinistas as the ruling party in Nicaragua and contribute to the 
Sandinistas consolidating their power.86 The Nicaraguan opposition claimed that, 
behind the façade of democracy in Nicaragua, there remained a totalitarian state, and 
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it looked to the United States and the Contras to reshuffle the power structure. 87 The 
Reagan administration supported, even encouraged, the opposition parties to refuse 
to participate and to challenge the legitimacy of the elections, alleging the elections 
failed to offer real choice. Seven parties did register and participate in the election, 
including the FSLN.88 
Elections certainly served Sandinista political interests domestically and 
internationally. The Sandinistas forced the Reagan administration to take a position 
that seemed to contradict his public statements not just favoring but demanding 
elections in Nicaragua. The elections offered the Sandinistas the opportunity to 
legitimize their power and show popular support to the people of Nicaragua and to 
an international audience. A good showing would reenergize support in Latin 
America and Europe. The Nicaraguan government claimed to make efforts to 
increase participation, particularly through rolling back restrictions from the State of 
Emergency laws.89 The government had declared a State of Emergency in 1982, 
paving the way for strict laws governing speech and organizing, and other laws 
enacted repressive censorship of media and prevented many activities of political 
parties. The Sandinistas also changed the laws surrounding political parties, speech, 
and association to prepare for a campaign and electoral process. The Political Parties 
Law of September 1983 created the National Assembly of Political Parties and the 
National Council of Political Parties, which oversaw the activities of Nicaragua’s 
political parties. The Political Parties Law required all parties to be anti-imperialist 
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and to support the revolution. The Electoral Law of 1984 then set the rules for the 
1984 elections.90 The Nicaraguan government also restrained itself from interfering 
in opposition organizing during the campaign process.91 The Reagan administration 
dismissed all of this as merely theater to cover up an electoral process allegedly 
stifled by the repression by the Sandinista regime that ensured victory for Daniel 
Ortega and the Sandinistas.  
The Sandinistas won 67 percent of the vote in the November elections with 
75 percent of the electorate turning out. International observers recorded an orderly 
and well executed process.92 The observers declared the elections to be real and 
competitive. Ortega won the presidency and Sergio Ramírez won the vice-
presidency. Sixty-one of the ninety-six seats in the National Assembly went to the 
FSLN.93 The electoral victory of the Sandinistas revealed the wide-spread popularity 
that the revolution still enjoyed.94  
WOLA observed the elections with the International Human Rights Law 
Group (“Law Group”) and reported back to Congress and the American people, 
largely refuting the administration’s arguments. WOLA and Law Group observers 
critically analyzed the political process to inform the debate in the United States and 
the rest of the world with respect to Nicaragua’s political process and, as they wrote, 
to provide greater “understanding of both the significance and limitations of an 
electoral process in an underdeveloped country in the aftermath of a profound social 
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revolution.” The report noted that the Sandinistas intended for these elections to 
demonstrate to the world their commitment to political pluralism. The campaign 
marked the first time that political parties could openly criticize the sitting 
government. After decades of repressive rule by the Somoza regime, the elections 
represented “an important step in the country’s political evolution.” The WOLA-Law 
Group report held the Contras responsible for preventing voter registration and 
voting in certain areas of the country, and it claimed that Contras assassinated two 
election officials and kidnapped a candidate for office.95 
The two organizations found that Nicaragua’s election law “was well 
conceived and compared favorably with electoral laws in other countries,” and the 
commission tasked with carrying out the election did so responsibly and independent 
of the ruling Sandinista party. Yet, even with the new election law, the FSLN 
candidates held an advantage because the FSLN was the party associated with the 
Nicaraguan state. Sandinista candidates also enjoyed a stronger party organization 
than did their opponents. Even so, the report found that all political parties had the 
opportunity to transmit their messages to voters, even in the face of several incidents 
of harassment and intimidation and press censorship by FSLN party members. The 
delegation disagreed with the decision of political parties withdrawing from the 
election process, arguing that such decisions were “short-sighted and were based on 
political considerations, in addition to the existing conditions in Nicaragua.” WOLA 
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and the Law Group found no evidence of voter fraud or improper vote counting and 
reporting.96 
The report noted that conducting elections during a war presented a difficult 
task, and the war prevented certain areas of Nicaragua from participating. The report 
held the United States and other governments supporting the war responsible for 
obstructing the development of the democratic process and political pluralism in 
Nicaragua and called on the United States to end all such support. Furthermore, the 
WOLA-Law Group report held the United States responsible for the greatest defects 
in the political process by encouraging parties and voters to withdraw from the 
election and working to delegitimize the Nicaraguan democracy.97 The turnout was 
lower than expected, in part due to skepticism fueled by Reagan’s criticism.  
The WOLA-Law Group report predicted that the experience of the campaign 
and election in 1984 would encourage those skeptics to turn out for the next election. 
However, the defiance by some voters and parties toward the electoral process also 
reflected a desire to undermine the ruling party, which was not going to go away.98 
 
4. A Human Rights Victory Over Contra Funding 
By late 1984, NGOs opposing the Contra program had forced human rights 
into the national debate over Nicaragua and flipped the discussion to brand the 
Contras and their U.S. backers as the ones violating human rights. Congress did 
openly appropriate funds for the Contras for fiscal year 1984, rather than doing so 
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through classified legislation as had been done for 1982 and 1983, but Congress 
imposed restrictions on the president’s ability to use those funds. A majority in 
Congress had, for the time being, turned against the Contras but was not ready to 
intervene in the president’s foreign policy role to fully cut off the Contras. Congress 
appropriated $14 million that would not be released until February 28, 1985, and 
only after the passage of a joint resolution approving such an action. The House later 
voted against releasing any of the money. The House also passed a second Boland 
Amendment with more restrictions on use of funds, prohibiting the CIA, the 
Department of Defense, and any other intelligence agency from supporting military 
or paramilitary activities in Nicaragua.99 
Ed Boland led the fight against Contra aid during the debate over a year-end 
omnibus spending bill. During negotiations among House and Senate conferees 
reconciling conflicting bills, Boland rejected any compromise that would have 
maintained some form of funding to the Contras while pressure mounted on 
members of Congress to pass a spending bill before the end of the fiscal year and to 
return to districts to campaign for re-election.100 Advocates for the Contras accepted 
that a compromise spending bill would pass both chambers only by taking out all 
Contra aid.101 
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The legislation represented a major triumph for Contra aid opponents. 
According to CFNFP’s “Update” newsletter, Congress “approved the most 
substantial legislative victory yet achieved by critics of U.S.-Central America 
policy” when it prohibited any further funding for U.S. covert aid to Nicaragua. The 
enhanced Boland Amendment dramatically reduced what the administration could do 
with money it did receive from Congress. To overturn this determination, the 
president would have to wait until after February 28, 1985, and then submit a report 
to the Congress requesting a joint resolution justifying why U.S. policy goals would 
be met only by reinstating funding for covert operation. According to CFNFP, “[a]ll 
observers concur that it would take a massive electoral disaster for Democratic 
House incumbents, coupled with a deteriorating political situation inside Nicaragua, 
to compel the U.S. House of Representatives to reverse its decision to end the covert 
war.” The Coalition called the second Boland Amendment victory a culmination of 
two and half years of work by anti-Contra aid activists and organizations lobbying 
Congress and appealing to public opinion.102 
CFNFP leadership remained supremely confident about the job human rights 
activists performed and about the future. The Coalition declared that “the war against 
covert aid was won this week…” and referred to the vote to release funds coming the 
following year as “just a mop-up battle.” The organization credited the victory to 
lobbying efforts against three swing senators, Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), Mark 
Andrews (R-ND), and Bob Packwood (R-OR).103 The Coalition told its members to 
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celebrate a job well done.104 Buhl credited organizations like those in Iowa with 
serving “President Reagan a clear and substantive foreign policy defeat.” Grassroots 
work “directly contributed to creating an atmosphere of pressure which led to 
[CFNFP] success in halting the convert financing of the ‘secret war.’” In Buhl’s 
letter to the Iowa organizations, she also noted that members of Congress recognized 
and thanked them.105 
WOLA and Eldridge also celebrated the victory in Congress defeating Contra 
aid funding. Eldridge credited Boland as the difference maker, one who “would 
simply not be moved.” He asked WOLA board members and advisory council 
members to send a thank you note to Boland.106 Patricia M. Derian, former assistant 
secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in Carter’s Department of 
State, wrote directly to Boland, thanking him for having “saved a lot of non-
combatants’ lives – not many people get to do something so concretely good in life – 
and many who have the opportunity don’t take it.”107 
Congressional opposition to Contra aid in October 1984, emboldened by 
NGOs’ human rights advocacy, reflected a broader movement within the Democrat-
controlled House to restrain Reagan’s Nicaraguan policy and left an uncertain future 
for the Contras. The defeats in Congress did not deter the administration on the 
righteousness of their cause but did persuade officials to seek money from other 
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sources. Under the direction of Lt. Col. Oliver North, the administration created a 
network of intermediaries to channel funding from other nations to the Contras for 
supplies and training in the event Congress no longer provided the needed resources. 
The administration would use this network of funding to circumvent the Boland 
Amendment and Congressional opposition to Contra aid.108 
Also, right wing groups opened up their checkbooks to support the Contras 
directly. The Christian Broadcasting Corporation, the Unification Church, Veterans 
of Foreign Wars, Citizens for a Better America, Refugee Relief International, the 
U.S. Council for World Freedom, and the Nicaraguan Freedom Fund among others 
raised money and provided food, clothing, and medical and other supplies.109 The 
National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL) proposed to sponsor 
“ongoing public education and information programs focusing on timely issues 
which relate to the expansion of freedom. As such, the foundation has focused on the 
struggles of freedom fighters.”110 Through the private fundraising efforts, the 
Contras received over $50 million when Congress refused further funding. The 
extralegal fundraising grew more elaborate with a scheme to funnel to the Contras 
proceeds of U.S. arms sales to Iran without the knowledge of Congress. By 1986, 
$10 million to $30 million was added through the secret Iran-Contra deal. The secret 
operation involved air drops of munitions and supplies to the Contras, and on 
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October 5, 1986, the Sandinistas shot down one of the cargo planes, bringing 
everything to a stop and embroiling Washington in scandal.111 
Activists felt positive about their performance opposing Nicaragua policy 
through 1984 and about the future of human rights in Nicaragua even before Iran-
Contra broke. Cindy Buhl hosted a gathering of anti-Contra activists at her house in 
Washington to evaluate their success in defeating Reagan’s Contra program in late 
1984 and look critically at the future of human rights advocacy against the Contras. 
The group included William LeoGrande of American University, Holly Burkhalter 
of Americas Watch, Cindy Aronson, then a foreign policy aide in the House of 
Representatives, Betsy Cohen of the Central American Institute, Jack Malinowsky of 
American Friends Service Committee, Cheryl Morden of Lutheran World Relief and 
Christian World Service, Margie Swedish of the Inter-Religious Task Force, 
Amanda Spake of the Caribbean Basin Project, Gretchen Eick of the United Church 
of Christ, and Reggie Norton of WOLA. The participants agreed that their 
organizations succeeded in preventing additional Contra aid by exposing to the 
nation the human rights abuses in Nicaragua. However, they recognized the 
challenges that lay in front of them and considered how best to adapt to the new 
strategies of the Reagan administration that emerged over the past year. The 
administration’s rhetorical focus on the Contras as agents of democracy promotion 
fighting against communist Sandinistas posed a tremendous challenge to the NGOs’ 
human rights cause.112 
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The activist leaders knew they would need effective ways to respond to the 
argument because democracy promotion trained the focus on the conduct of the 
Sandinistas while creating an image of the Contras saving democracy, albeit an 
image that would not hold up to scrutiny. Malinowsky argued that the 
administration’s use of “democracy” as a defining issue of Nicaragua often 
overshadowed the arguments made by his and other organizations. He worried that 
NGOs presented overly complicated and nuanced arguments based on international 
law or Nicaraguan politics and social conditions. Those arguments did not resonate 
with the American people while Reagan could simplify the conflict in Nicaragua into 
a question of democracy versus Soviet communism or terrorism. Also, Malinowsky 
did not believe that the American people accepted self-determination as a right for 
Nicaraguans yet, which tended to undermine the more expansive interpretation of 
human rights for which NGOs and the Nicaraguan government advocated. Even 
more troubling, Malinowsky believed that the “reality of the wars hasn’t come home 
to people.” He argued that the NGOs needed to do a better job of making the simple 
argument that support of the Contras created human rights violations and that 
support of the Contras was itself a human rights violation. NGOs needed to 
emphasize the contradiction between Reagan’s words and reality in policy and 
conditions in Nicaragua.113  
The fact that human rights influenced the debate did represent a success for 
the organizations. LeoGrande reminded the group that Reagan had intended on 
replacing human rights in U.S. foreign policy with a focus on international terrorism. 
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The president did not follow through with his plans because of the importance given 
to human rights by human rights-conscious NGOs and members of Congress.114 
Opposition by the public and Congress to that explicit shift away from human rights 
caused the administration to pivot back to human rights and to even express support 
for agrarian reform in El Salvador. The trend toward considering human rights in 
foreign policy influenced the administration’s approach to Nicaragua because of the 
work of activists. Amanda Spake stated that her contacts within the American press 
found that peace activism gained a lot of influence when exposing human rights 
violations and provided an effective counterargument to the administration’s 
portrayal of Nicaragua. 
Success needed to be turned into momentum, and the activists determined 
that NGOs needed to control the conversation with continued reference to Reagan’s 
contradictions. Margie Swedish reported that grassroots organizations expressed 
disillusionment and frustration when Reagan and the Republicans could claim the 
moral high ground. Swedish argued that the organizations had to establish their 
authority on moral grounds through human rights when advocating for a change in 
U.S. Nicaragua policy. Betsy Cohen added that, while claiming the position of moral 
authority, their organizations necessarily needed to expose the lies told by 
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administration officials regarding Nicaragua policy and Reagan’s duplicity in 
claiming he sought a diplomatic solution in Central America.115  
Exposing Americans to the reality of the war would also be critical going 
forward. Swedish and Buhl agreed with Malinowsky’s point that the American 
people did not comprehend the scale or horror of the Contra War. Swedish suggested 
showing the American people the real brutality of the war and that focusing attention 
on human rights would be key. By drawing attention to the human consequences of 
the war, on both sides, peace NGOs should “reclaim” democracy from the 
administration and demonstrate that the Contra War did not and could not represent a 
fight for democracy. Gretchen Eick argued that NGOs could further demonstrate the 
hypocrisy of democracy promotion by emphasizing the contradictions from an 
administration that supported a rights-violating regime in El Salvador while it 
opposed the Sandinistas on human rights terms.116 
The underlying premise of discussion at Buhl’s house was that the Contra 
War would continue. Activists would keep facing Reagan’s determination to seek his 
desired form of democracy in Nicaragua while he armed and supported the Contras. 
In addition, the results of the 1984 election demonstrated that no peaceful 
reconciliation could occur until the FSLN reached an agreement with the United 
States. When Sandinista opponents inside Nicaragua believed the United States 
would eventually force the Sandinistas out of power, the opposition had no incentive 
to deal with the government. The Sandinistas had no incentive either if they believed 
those groups worked with the United States and the Contras. In 1984, the prospect of 
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a Sandinista-U.S. reconciliation seemed remote, especially as the Nicaraguan 
government continued to purchase arms and equipment from Soviet-bloc countries 
and build the size of its military while the United States denied the legitimacy of 
democratic elections in Nicaragua and declared the Nicaraguan military a security 
threat.117 
In his inauguration speech on January 10, 1985, Daniel Ortega offered a 
message of strength, optimism, and resolve in the face of the existential threat from 
the United States. He reiterated the position of the Nicaraguan government in 
relation to U.S. policy and declared his commitment to human rights in Nicaragua. 
Ortega declared that the Nicaraguan government did not believe in spreading 
revolution and that it only supported peaceful methods for achieving change. He also 
reaffirmed his support for the Contadora initiative and his endorsement of the 
September 7 draft of the agreement reached through Contadora. Like NGOs in the 
United States, Ortega was attempting to further brand the Contras, the CIA, and the 
Reagan administration as the threat to human rights while the Nicaraguan 
government simply defended itself and sought peace. Ortega claimed that the war 
promoted and perpetuated by the United States had cost some 3,200 lives of 
individuals under the age of twenty-one.118 Ortega warned that, unless the war could 
be brought to an end, the Nicaraguan government could not effectively plan for the 
country’s future. He claimed to have no interest in Cold War politics or alliances. He 
called on other Central American nations not to believe the lies that Nicaragua 
                                                 
117 Gilbert, “Nicaragua,” 115. 




supported “a revolution without borders, an armaments race, and repression. Such 
falsehoods were part of a policy of domination, aggression, genocide, and 
suppression of dignity and independence.”119  
Ortega also warned the United States of the resolve of the Nicaragua people 
to defend human rights.120 “The G[overnment] O[f] N[icaragua] would be a 
government of national unity and would defend national interests on the constitution 
on pluralism, the mixed economy, human and religious rights, and on a role for all 
sectors in the construction and defense of society.” He reiterated the difficulties the 
country would face in the coming years due to its economic problems. However, 
Ortega declared that only through beating back U.S. aggression could the country 




By 1985, NGOs had pushed human rights to the forefront of the debate over 
Nicaragua. 
Human rights did not only influence perceptions of events and conflict in Nicaragua, 
but by the mid-1980s, they had a significant part in influencing policy. The president 
referenced human rights with nearly every mention of Nicaragua. Reagan also took a 
stronger stance of support for the Contras and associated his administration with the 
freedom fighters as they stood for liberty and democracy against a totalitarian 
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regime. Activists called the Contras the human rights violators and advocated cutting 
their funding to end what looked like U.S.-sponsored terrorism throughout rural 
Nicaragua. 
Cold War doctrine no longer made sense in light of new facts in Nicaragua. 
While lawmakers supported a U.S. foreign policy that countered communist threats 
and promoted peace and democracy, NGOs and like-minded members of Congress 
used human rights to reinterpret the Contras outside of the Cold War construct. The 
question over funding the Contras did not consider Cold War implications, but, 
rather, dealt with naval mines and violence against civilians and violating 
international law. The new question led to a new response from Congress, that being 
shutting off Contra aid, and it looked like that interpretation of the Contra War would 
prevail in the future. 
Yet, as both Reagan and activists well knew, American perceptions of 
Nicaragua remained superficial and fleeting. As NGOs and other anti-Contra 
advocates cautiously celebrated and planned for future activism, Nicaraguans 
remained ready for prolonged conflict. Circumstances then turned the momentum 
back to Cold War orthodoxy. An effective public diplomacy campaign, bolstered by 
Daniel Ortega’s visit to Moscow, swung perceptions of human rights in Nicaragua 




CHAPTER 4 – THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS: DEMOCRATIC HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
NICARAGUA, 1985-1986 
 
Evidence gathered by NGOs seemed to support the Sandinista claims that the 
United States and its proxy fighting force created a serious threat to Nicaraguan 
human rights. As activists continued to mobilize against President Reagan’s Contra 
policy, organizations such AW and WOLA published reports of Contra atrocities 
based on the testimony of witnesses, victims, and government officials. The 
investigations and reporting stood in stark contrast to blanket denials of human rights 
violations by Contra advocates, but the reports made no headway against the 
influence in Washington of Cold War geopolitics. Furthermore, the Reagan 
administration and private Contra support organizations engaged in a campaign to 
delegitimize not only the human rights arguments against the Contras but also the 
organizations doing the reporting. 
By neutralizing dissent, Reagan and Contra boosters sold the Contra 
operation to Congress in 1985 and 1986 as a choice between supporting individuals 
fighting for freedom and democracy or abandoning Nicaragua and maybe the whole 
of Central America to the communists. Administration officials controlled the terms 
of the debate and raised enough doubt about the organizations and their human rights 
advocacy that the human rights violations of the Contras mattered less than domestic 
Cold War politics. No one in Washington wanted to look soft on communism, and 
the voters had not yet given their representative or senator reason to deviate from this 
position. NGOs suffered significant setbacks as they learned to fully harness the 
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power of their numbers and identify arguments that could withstand Reagan’s 
attacks. Nevertheless, the movement was bruised, and Congress bowed to Reagan 
with $100 million for the Contras. 
 
1. The Case Against the Contras 
NGOs looked to build upon their success and growing influence as human 
rights remained a troublesome matter for Reagan’s Nicaragua policy. Congressional 
aides and members of the House and Senate all let CFNFP representatives know that 
Contra human rights violations would “make it harder to renew the covert aid.” 
CFNFP found that “[o]utrage and disgust still runs high in Capitol Hill” after the 
discovery of a CIA training manual teaching the Contras methods for terror, torture, 
and assassinations.1 The anger in Congress had been building since the disclosure of 
the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors and the administration’s behavior with the ICJ. 
Experience also left many lawmakers and aides skeptical about the administration’s 
honesty. Human rights advocates were optimistic they could mobilize against what 
remained an unpopular covert operation of insurgent paramilitary forces.2 
CFNFP staff determined that activists needed to exploit the plain facts—that 
the Contra operation had grown larger than what Congress had approved, that the 
CIA installed mines in the Nicaraguan harbors and produced and distributed manuals 
                                                 
1 “What Are Some of the Strengths & Weaknesses of the Debate That Will Work to Our Advantage or 
Disadvantage as Regards Permanently Stopping the Covert Aid?,” Memorandum, 1985, 11, Acc. 
91A-099, Box 4, Coalition for a New Foreign Policy Records (DG 138), Swarthmore College Peace 
Collection. 
2 A Gallup/Newsweek poll found that 58 percent of Americans disagreed with the United States 
providing the Contras assistance against the Nicaraguan government. Yet, over 60 percent of 
Americans approved of the overall job the president was doing. “Gallup/Newsweek Poll” August 
1985, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research; “Presidential Job Approval: Ronald Reagan.” 
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teaching torture, and that the Contras killed hundreds of civilians.3 NGOs anticipated 
that Reagan would request the release of $14 million for covert aid in March or April 
of 1985. The $14 million came from the previous year’s funding bill that required a 
joint resolution of Congress for its release.4 To oppose this request, Contra aid 
opponents needed to defend their majority in the House. CFNFP identified eleven 
Democrats and seventeen Republicans who previously voted to limit funding, but 
who also might be swayed back to support the president’s policy. Activists targeted 
those members with intense lobbying. Activists also wanted to keep Speaker Tip 
O’Neill, Majority Leader Jim Wright, Majority Whip Tom Foley (D-WA), Lee 
Hamilton (D-FL), and Ed Boland in their corner.5 
The Coalition urged its members and organizations to undertake a massive 
public relations and media effort and do so relying on the human rights reporting by 
fellow NGOs. The Coalition asked activists to meet with, call, or write to those 
identified swing members of Congress and to call in to talk shows and write to 
newspapers to argue against additional Contra aid, emphasizing the threat to human 
rights posed by Reagan and the Contras. CFNFP instructed activists to bring up two 
recently-released human rights reports. WOLA and the Law Group collaborated 
again on a report published in March 1985. Their investigation found extensive 
human rights violations by the Contras and willful ignorance of the violations by 
U.S. officials. Also, AW published Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in 
                                                 
3 “What Are Some of the Strengths & Weaknesses of the Debate That Will Work to Our Advantage or 
Disadvantage as Regards Permanently Stopping the Covert Aid?,” 11. 
4 Sanchez, “Contra Aid: A Brief Chronology and Table Showing U.S. Assistance to the Anti-
Sandinista Guerrillas (Contras) Fiscal Years 1982-1988,” 2. 
5 “Areas of Focus for Congressional Work” (Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, 
February 1985), 1-2, Acc. 99A-006, Box 4, Coalition for a New Foreign Policy Records (DG 138), 
Swarthmore College Peace Collection. 
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Nicaragua 1981-1985, which found that the Sandinista government reduced its 
incidents of human rights violations while Contra abuses continued at a consistent 
rate. The Coalition wanted activists to promote these reports, distribute them to local 
newspapers, and request that members of Congress read them, preferably into the 
record.6 
For their report, WOLA and the Law Group sent a delegation to Nicaragua in 
February 1985 to investigate allegations of human rights violations by both the 
Contras and the Nicaraguan government. However, investigators focused on the 
human rights violations by the Contras because abuses by the Sandinistas had been 
well documented, even by WOLA and the Law Group. 7 Also, the Contras received 
funds from the U.S. taxpayer. The individuals leading the investigation and writing 
the report, Donald T. Fox and Michael J. Glennon, reasoned that “[b]ecause the 
United States supported the Contras in the past and is considering supporting them 
again, we believe that our attention was properly focused on the Contras.”8 Fox was 
a senior partner at the New York law firm of Fox, Glynn and Melamed, had served 
as a member of the Executive Committee of the American Association for the 
International Commission of Jurists, and participated in a previous human rights 
fact-finding mission to Guatemala. Glennon taught law at the University of 
Cincinnati and had been legal counsel for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
                                                 
6 “Suggested Actions for Covert Aid Debate” (Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, 
January 23, 1985), 1, Acc. 91A-099, Box 4, Coalition for a New Foreign Policy Records (DG 138), 
Swarthmore College Peace Collection. 
7 Donald T. Fox and Michael J. Glennon, “Report of Donald T. Fox, Esq. and Prof. Michael J. 
Glennon to the International Human Rights Law Groups and the Washington Office on Latin America 
Concerning Abuses Against Civilians by Counterrevolutionaries Operating in Nicaragua” 
(Washington, D.C.: International Human Rights Law Group and the Washington Office on Latin 
America, April 1985), 1, 8. 
8 Ibid., 9. 
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The report confirmed the findings of an investigation performed by another U.S. 
attorney, Reed Brody, who used 145 affidavits from witnesses in Nicaragua to report 
on pervasive human rights violations of the Contras.9 
The Brody Report raised serious concerns about U.S. involvement with the 
Contras, and WOLA and the Law Group believed that Congress needed to consider 
the Brody Report before approving any more funding. However, officers of both 
organizations acknowledged the legitimate questions about the report’s credibility 
because of Brody’s alleged connections to the Nicaraguan government. Brody did 
work with and received assistance from Paul Reichler, an attorney who represented 
the Nicaraguan government in the ICJ case against the United States, and Reichler’s 
firm helped Brody produce the final report. Neither WOLA nor the Law Group had 
any familiarity with Brody, and they were reluctant to rely blindly on the report with 
their credibility at stake. Consequently, WOLA and the Law Group chose to conduct 
their own investigation.10 
Fox and Glennon spent a week in Nicaragua seeking out and meeting with 
victims of alleged Contra abuses and with Nicaraguan opposition leaders. Fox and 
Glennon also met with U.S. State Department officials in Managua and 
Washington.11 The investigation verified the claims made by Brody and uncovered 
“considerable evidence of abuses against civilians committed by Contra forces.”12 
The investigation found the Contras attacked government and economic targets to 
                                                 
9 Ibid., v. 
10 Ibid., i-v. 
11 Ibid., iii–v. 
12 Fox and Glennon, “Report of Donald T. Fox, Esq. and Prof. Michael J. Glennon to the International 
Human Rights Law Groups and the Washington Office on Latin America Concerning Abuses Against 
Civilians by Counterrevolutionaries Operating in Nicaragua,” vi. 
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undermine the viability of the Nicaraguan state and economy, a strategy already 
widely reported in the United States and acknowledged by the president. However, 
these attacks often hurt or killed civilians in the process. In addition, the guerrillas 
conducted even more indiscriminate violence against teachers, farmers, and others 
with no ties to the nation’s economic, political, or military well-being. These were 
tactics of terror and intimidation. Fox and Glennon concluded that the opposition 
forces acted in contravention of international law and military doctrine by 
committing other atrocities such as torture, kidnappings, and rape.13 
The report also served as an indictment of U.S. officials in Nicaragua. Fox 
and Glennon found that State Department officials remained unaware of the abuses 
committed by the Contras because officials protected their ignorance and depended 
on others to hold information back. U.S. intelligence officers made no effort to 
collect data regarding the human rights violations of the Contras. State department 
officials also disregarded information about Contra violations.14 The investigators 
were incredulous, stating in their report that, “[i]f two individuals, with no 
governmental connections or support, during a limited visit to Nicaragua, can obtain 
credible evidence regarding torture and other atrocities committed by the Contras, 
one would hope that the Department of State and the intelligence community can do 
likewise.”15 Fox and Glennon recommended a Congressional investigation of the 
atrocities. They also called on Congress to refuse the administration’s request for 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 14–17. 
14 Ibid., vi, 20. 
15 Ibid., 21. 
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Contra aid and called for investigations into whether administration officials 
remained purposefully ignorant regarding the behavior of the Contras in the field.16 
AW also investigated the Contras as a product of U.S. foreign policy and 
funding, publishing a study in 1985 titled Violations of the Laws of War by Both 
Sides in Nicaragua, 1981-1985. The organization asserted its traditional disclaimer 
that AW took no political position, and, in this case, took no position on whether the 
United States should fund the Contras generally. However, AW did state that the 
Contras engaged in systematic human rights violations, which led AW to conclude 
that the United States government should cease any support of the Contras until such 
time as those violations stop. AW confirmed that the Sandinista government did 
commit human rights violations, but mostly in 1981-1982. After 1982, AW noted a 
sharp reduction in human rights abuses by the government. In contrast, the Contras 
persisted in human rights abuse unabated, and AW considered the U.S. government 
an accomplice in the abuse because of its funding, training, and suppling of the 
guerrilla forces.17 
In light of the Fox and Glennon and AW reports, not only did NGOs such as 
CFNFP want Congress to consider them, but members of Congress also wanted to 
take them up. Rep. George Miller (D-CA) wrote to members of the House asking 
that they “examine carefully the human rights aspects of the covert war against 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 24-25. 
17 Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua 1981-1985, An Americas Watch Report 
(New York: The Americas Watch Committee, 1985). 
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Nicaragua,” and he enclosed with his Dear Colleague letter the AW report. Miller 
highlighted the disparity in abuses between the Sandinistas and Contras.18 
In April 1985, the House Foreign Affairs Committee considered the 
administration’s request to release the $14 million for Contra aid, and the issue of 
human rights in Nicaragua loomed large during the proceedings. Michael DeWine 
(R-OH) explained that “one of the most emotional and possibly politically telling or 
persuasive – or let’s say, politically damaging argument [sic] that is made against the 
United States giving aid to the Contras is the argument that the Contras are engaged 
in terrorist activities. They are engaged in atrocities….”19 Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) 
stated that “no human rights groups, no legitimate organization, no Nicaraguan 
organizations, nor any international human rights groups, have made any substantial 
allegations of human rights abuses by the Sandinista Government in recent years.” 
Gejdenson rejected the defense of FDN by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs Langhorne A. Motley when Motley argued that FDN’s possible 
human rights violations may have occurred, if at all, in the fog of war. Both the 
Sandinistas and Contras may have violated human rights, but Gejdenson argued that 
the American taxpayer should not finance the abuses.20 
John McCain (R-AZ) came to the Contras’ defense and distinguished 
organized, calculated human rights violations from the isolated incidents that 
happened during a war. McCain then directed the committee’s attention away from 
                                                 
18 George Miller to Colleague, Letter, April 18, 1985, Box 739, Jim Wright Papers. Special 
Collections, Mary Couts Burnett Library, Texas Christian University. 
19 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Support for the Contras: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1985, 227. 
20 Ibid., 236. 
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incidents of war to ideology and anti-communism. He argued that the Sandinistas 
were “a committed band of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries who have stated time 
after time, not only their intentions for their own nation, but that for their 
neighbors.”21 For lawmakers such as McCain and like-minded anti-communists, the 
ideology of the Sandinistas presented more of a threat to human rights than did the 
actions of the Contras. The anti-communists believed the Contras violated human 
rights, if ever, as strategy, or a justified means to a legitimate end, and that end 
served the long-term objective of the United States to spread democracy and 
freedom. Contra advocates viewed Sandinista human rights violations as systemic 
and part of the reason that the Contras should remain in the field. 
The ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Robert J. 
Lagomarsino (R-CA), cast doubt on the reliability of the NGOs reporting on human 
rights violations. He argued that one-sided human rights claims, such as those 
allegations of Contra human rights abuses, diminished the credibility of the NGOs 
investigating and reporting on human rights violations, explicitly naming Americas 
Watch. Lagomarsino claimed not to want to minimize the importance of 
investigating human rights violations, but he cautioned that learning the truth 
regarding the abuses presented problems. He hoped that, when evidence of 
Sandinista violations arose, it would not be ignored.22 The tactic of dismissing the 
Contra violations because there could be Sandinista violations turned into a favorite 
of the administration and Contra advocates. 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 237. 
22 Ibid., 248-49. 
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Aryeh Neier, vice chairman of AW, also testified and reminded the 
committee that AW not only did not ignore Sandinista violations but often published 
reports about those violations.23 AW reported on two episodes of mass killings by 
the government, one in 1981 and another in 1982, and Neier reminded the committee 
that AW reported on these events before anyone else. AW also investigated 
violations of the laws of war by both sides with its most recent report, but Neier said 
AW prioritized studying the Contras after the discovery of the disturbing CIA 
manual drafted as a code of conduct for the Contras because “we [AW] wanted to 
see whether the Contras had in fact been carrying out the practices that were solicited 
by the United States through the CIA manual.”24 Much like WOLA and the Law 
Group, AW’s report addressed the primary concern that the United States funded 
groups committing human rights violations. 
After publishing Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides, AW sent 
representatives to Honduras to examine allegations from FDN of abuses by the 
Nicaraguan government and to investigate conditions and practices in Honduras by 
FDN. This new investigation revealed that both the Nicaraguan government and the 
Contras continued to violate the human rights of the Nicaraguan people. The forced 
relocations of Indians remained a continuing violation by the government. 
Relocation still included burning houses by the government and restrictions on 
locations for settlement in the relocations. People also did not have opportunity to 
                                                 
23 For example, see On Human Rights in Nicaragua, An Americas Watch Report (New York: The 
Americas Watch Committee, 1982); Human Rights in Central America: El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, An Americas Watch Report (New York: The Americas Watch Committee, 
1983). 
24 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee, U.S. Support for the Contras: Hearings 




challenge the legitimacy or necessity of the relocation policy.25 AW reported that the 
Contras “had attacked civilians both selectively and indiscriminately, that they have 
tortured and mutilated prisoners, that they have murdered those placed hors de 
combat by their wounds, they have taken hostages and committed outrages against 
personal dignity.” The conduct of the Contras most troubled AW because of the 
political, financial, and logistical support received from the United States. Neier 
testified that:   
  
[W]e believe that the role of the United States in acting as the vigorous public 
relations advocate of the Contras coming on top of the earlier role in 
organizing, supplying, training, financing the Contras and publishing the CIA 
manual soliciting such abuses by the Contras makes the United States 
significantly responsible for the systematic abuses that were committed by 
the Contras.26 
  
Neier called on Congress to ensure that U.S. funds and influence did not continue to 
aid those engaged in human rights violations. 27 
Donald T. Fox and Reed Brody also testified regarding their respective 
reports. Fox reiterated his report’s conclusion that Contra forces engaged in 
extensive human rights abuse that U.S. officials either disregarded or purposefully 
ignored. Brody, a former assistant attorney general in New York, stated that he led a 
fact-finding mission in Nicaragua from September 1984 to January 1985 to 
investigate human rights abuses by the Contras. Brody based his report on 
eyewitness affidavits, and the evidence revealed that the Contras “engaged in a 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 256.  
26 Ibid., 256. 
27 Ibid., 257-65. 
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pattern of attacks and atrocities against civilian targets. Brody and his team probed 
the witnesses’ accounts and excluded any questionable testimony.28 
Human rights investigations and reporting by organizations such as AW and 
WOLA provided hard evidence of widespread Contra violations. The testimony 
further confirmed the skepticism of many in Congress regarding Reagan’s policy of 
working with a guerrilla force in Nicaragua to undermine a sitting government. Yet, 
the issue remained how lawmakers in Congress and policymakers in the White 
House interpreted circumstances in Nicaragua as a human rights problem. The 
administration worked to convince lawmakers to see the presence of the FSLN as the 
greater threat. 
 
2. A Campaign of Disinformation 
Even with the human rights reporting and the testimony before Congress, the 
prevailing human rights narrative in Congress cast the Sandinistas on the side of 
totalitarianism and repression, leaving the armed opposition, the Contras, fighting for 
freedom and democracy, and, therefore, standing for human rights. Though the 
House would reject the president’s request in April 1985 to release the $14 million 
appropriated the previous year for military aid to the Contras, it reversed course in 
June 1985 and approved $27 million in non-military aid. The House also rejected a 
new Boland Amendment for prohibiting additional aid to the Contras. The Senate 
                                                 
28 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Support for the Contras: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 




then agreed to the House plan.29 CFNFP staff called the June vote a “stunning 
reversal” by Congress on the Contras.30 
The president acquired the political capital from his election victory in 1984 
that enabled him to push through a legislative agenda, but he prevailed on the Contra 
issue because of the way his administration framed the question. The White House 
defended the conduct of the Contras, but it wanted to make the Sandinistas’ 
connection to communism the issue. Reagan interpreted human rights as flowing 
from democracy, so the Sandinistas posed the most serious threat to human rights in 
Nicaragua and the Western Hemisphere. The Contras, regardless of their tactics, 
stood for human rights by virtue of fighting the Sandinistas. Reagan and Contra 
supporters bolstered their argument by accusing Contra opponents of disinformation 
and complicity with communists.31 By May 1985, 73 percent of the American people 
did not support the president’s plan for funding the Contras through military aid and 
58 percent opposed sending aid even if it was non-military.32 Reagan attributed the 
poor public opinion to the “drumbeat of propaganda” by Contra opponents.33 By 
creating the perception that the Sandinistas aligned Nicaragua with the Soviets, that 
the Contras stood for democracy and human rights, and that those criticizing the 
                                                 
29 “Hill-Reagan Contra Tug-of-War: A Chronology,” in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, CQ 
Almanac Online Edition, 1988, https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal88-
1142371#H2_1. 
30 “Congress Backs Contra Aid,” Legislative Update, Campaign Against U.S. Intervention 
(Washington, D.C.: Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, June 20, 1985), 1, Acc. 95A-
074, Box 4, Latin America Working Group Records (DG 184), Swarthmore College Peace Collection. 
31 Arnson, Crossroads, 182. 
32 Louis Harris, “The Harris Survey: Almost Three-Fourth of Public Opposed Military Aid to 
Nicaragua,” May 23, 1985, 1–3, Box 788, Jim Wright Papers. Special Collections, Mary Couts 
Burnett Library, Texas Christian University. 
33 Ronald Reagan, “Monday, April 22, 1985,” in The Reagan Diaries, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 231. 
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Contras advanced the cause of the communists, the administration won back 
members of Congress swayed by domestic and international Cold War politics. 
The administration and its proponents published their own reports that 
branded the anti-Contra positions as fabrications aligned with a Sandinista-created 
narrative. The president believed that the Sandinistas manipulated the press and the 
American people and that once the Americans received the truth about the 
Sandinistas, they would support the Contra War effort.34 In one report, appropriately 
titled Sandinista Disinformation, the State Department rejected Sandinista claims 
that the government did not engage in torture or widespread executions of dissidents, 
instead reporting that the Sandinistas learned to hide their human rights violations 
and mask their radical long-term planning. The Nicaraguan government engaged in 
summary executions of former National Guard members, and “more than eight 
thousand prisoners, amongst them men and women-several pregnant, were tortured 
and killed in the jails” of the new regime. The State Department found that Miskitos 
reported similar experiences. The report noted the existence of clandestine jails 
where government forces took people without trial and held them without the ability 
to communicate with anyone on the outside for weeks to months. As early as 1979, 
the Sandinista government planned to eliminate religious, political, and labor 
organizations not directly co-opted into the state and Sandinista party.35 
Sandinista Disinformation also disputed claims that the Nicaraguan 
government created the material and social improvements enjoyed by Nicaraguans, 
                                                 
34 Reagan, An American Life, 479-80. 
35 Sandinista Disinformation (U.S. Department of State, Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 1984), 3–16. 
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undercutting the argument that the Sandinistas stood for social and economic rights 
for Nicaraguans. Rather, any gains in social services or the standard of living came 
with the fall of Somoza when a coalition of groups worked together in governing. 
The administration argued that programs eroded as the coalition broke apart in 1980 
and 1981. The new health system, touted as a success by FSLN proponents and part 
of the expansive bundle of human rights guaranteed by the Nicaraguan state, had 
widely failed, according to the Reagan administration. Sandinista Disinformation 
also disputed the success of the literacy program, in large part because the 
Nicaraguan government used an inexact and subjective method to measure the ability 
to read and write for determining success in reducing literacy. The number of people 
attending schools fluctuated wildly and education turned into more of a political 
indoctrination by the FSLN. The report also refuted the Sandinista claim that 
economic problems came from the “counter-revolution, the reactionary bourgeoisie, 
and US imperialism” by countering that financial problems came from poor 
administration of the Sandinista government. The State Department asserted that the 
Sandinistas abandoned the national reconstruction programs that a diverse number of 
organizations had supported and that the party alienated its supporters in the United 
States and other countries through its policies.36 
The Heritage Foundation, an NGO and ally of the administration, published a 
report in October 1984 to undercut the credibility of WOLA, accusing WOLA of 
participating in a “cottage industry” that dominated the discussion on foreign policy 
with Central America. The Heritage Foundation also found WOLA “openly hostile” 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 19–24. 
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to U.S. objectives and actions in the region.37 The report claimed that “the leftist 
information brokers on Latin America seem interested exclusively in exposing rights 
violations in countries backed by the U.S. [such as El Salvador] while neglecting 
violations in leftist regimes [such as Nicaragua].”38 The Heritage Foundation argued 
that WOLA held a special place among the hierarchy of groups practicing hypocrisy 
in human rights advocacy.  
 
WOLA is probably viewed as the Latin American information broker closest 
to the Washington political mainstream. Yet WOLA coordinates much of its 
efforts with such openly radical leftist groups as the Institute for Policy 
Studies; it shares their tendency to ignore or minimize abuses in socialist 
countries, while attacking the rights violations in U.S.- backed countries. 
 
 
The report noted WOLA’s objective to influence lawmakers through publications, 
human rights reporting, and testimony before Congress.39 
The Heritage Foundation also claimed obvious bias in the organizational 
structure of WOLA through its funding sources. The United Methodist board of 
Global Ministries paid the salary of Joe Eldridge, but the United Methodist Board 
also provided funding to the Nicaragua Network, an organization that only supported 
the FSLN.40 The report argued that Eldridge did not criticize the Cuban government 
because the Cubans did not receive support from the U.S. government. WOLA 
claimed to take action only against those who received U.S. support while 
committing human rights violations. However, the Heritage Foundation found that 
                                                 
37 Joan Frawley, “The Left’s Latin American Lobby,” The Institution Analysis (Washington, D.C.: 
The Heritage Foundation, October 11, 1984), 1, Folder Attacks (’80s), Box 25, Washington Office on 
Latin America Records, David M. Rubenstein Rare Books & Manuscript Library, Duke University. 
38 Ibid., 2. 
39 Ibid., 5. 
40 Ibid., 5–6. 
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Eldridge’s reasoning for WOLA’s actions “fails to answer why WOLA is such a 
sharp critic of authoritarian governments and so lenient toward socialist regimes.”41 
WOLA’s selective criticism and view of human rights seemed to indicate, according 
to the Heritage Foundation, a pro-socialist agenda within the progressive NGOs 
opposing the Contras. The Heritage Foundation rejected the premise that Contra 
human rights violations could be an issue. The real issue was WOLA’s politics. 
The administration went so far as to deny or ignore human rights violations by 
the Contras. In a hearing before the House Western Hemisphere Affairs 
Subcommittee, Rep. C. W. Bill Young (R-FL) wanted to discuss with administration 
officials the allegations contained in the WOLA-Law Group and AW reports. Young 
wanted to know from the witness, Langhorne A. Motley, whether the NGOs raised 
legitimate claims against the Contras given the extent of their evidence. Motley 
brushed the concerns aside, arguing that measuring the abuses by either side proved 
difficult, but he also said of human rights violations by the Contras, “I think candidly 
it is a sidebar issue.” Clair E. George, deputy director for operations at CIA, 
expressed a similar ambivalence and just denied the claims of Contra human rights 
violations. George found that those allegations came from a propaganda campaign 
organized by the Sandinistas and the insurgent forces in El Salvador and facilitated by 
the communication channels of the Soviets and Cubans in a campaign that had 
deceived the media in the United States.42 
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The denial and misdirection by Motley and George represented a new strategy 
of the Reagan administration. In a unique publication, AW focused on the language 
and use of human rights by the administration to build support for the Contras. AW 
examined human rights violations by both the Sandinista government and the Contras 
while comparing Reagan’s rhetoric against the evidence. From its work investigating 
human rights in Nicaragua, AW rejected claims that the Sandinistas adopted a 
“systematic practice of forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings or torture.” The 
report also disputed the characterization of claims the Sandinistas limited political 
speech, arguing that “debate on major social and political questions is robust, 
outspoken, even often strident.” Contrary to Reagan’s claim that the Sandinistas 
failed to hold free elections in 1984, AW argued that the 1984 election represented a 
major step forward for democracy in Nicaragua and compared closely with elections 
held in Mexico, Panama, and Guatemala.43 
AW agreed with the Reagan administration that the Sandinistas had 
committed human rights violations and that the United States should act with other 
nations to hold the Nicaraguan regime accountable for those actions. However, AW 
argued that “unless those abuses are fairly described, the debate on Nicaragua ceases 
to have meaning.”44 In addition to objecting to the inflammatory language used by 
Reagan against the Nicaraguan government and Daniel Ortega, AW strongly opposed 
the administration’s use of the word “totalitarian” in reference to the Nicaraguan 
government, calling it “a misuse of the term” that “misrepresents the situation in 
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Nicaragua.” Independent institutions continued to exist in Nicaragua, as did voices of 
vigorous dissent, none of which would exist in a totalitarian state.45 
With respect to the Contras, the report affirmed that, during the previous two 
years, the Contras committed “the most violent abuses of human rights in Nicaragua,” 
while the United States, through the Reagan administration, abdicated its moral 
leadership. “[W]e find that contra combatants systematically murder the unarmed, 
including medical personnel; rarely take prisoners; and force civilians into 
collaboration. These abuses have become a rallying point inside Nicaragua.” The 
Reagan administration gave a “distorted” picture of human rights in Nicaragua 
through State Department reports and other administration publications, press 
releases, speeches, and the president’s own public statements. “Such a misuse of 
human rights to justify military interference in U.S.-Latin American relations” 
represented “an unprecedented debasement of the human rights cause.”46 While the 
Contras continued to commit human rights violations, the administration chose “not 
to pressure contra leaders to enforce international codes of conduct, but to drown U.S. 
public opinion with praise for the ‘freedom fighters,’ and to attempt to discredit all 
reports of their violations as inspired by communist or Sandinista propaganda.” The 
administration would also reject critics of its Nicaragua policies as incapable of 
understanding the circumstances of Nicaragua.47 Officials would also make efforts to 
delegitimize the Contra critics by accusing them of a disinformation campaign meant 
to smear the reputation of the freedom fighters and deceive the American people. 
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Under the weight of human rights arguments and distrust for the 
administration’s approach to Nicaragua, the president’s proposal for $14 million in 
aid failed to win support in Congress. Democrats in the House voted against the bill 
in April 1985 believing they could provide aid through an alternative measure that 
would help refugees in the region while eliminating military funding for the Contras. 
Republicans sought more military aid for the Contras, and liberal Democrats, 
persuaded by the human rights arguments against the violence and violations of 
Nicaraguan sovereignty from U.S. intervention, voted against any aid to the Contras. 
It looked like another victory for NGOs and Contra opponents until Daniel 
Ortega brought Cold War geopolitics back to the foreground. In April 1985, Ortega 
landed in Moscow looking for financial support from the Soviets. His trip 
embarrassed the Democrats and seemed to confirm the president’s warnings that 
Nicaragua had allied with the Soviets. Reagan claimed that the Democrats had fallen 
victim to the Sandinista disinformation campaign.48 The mood in the House changed, 
creating a new opening for securing at least non-lethal aid for the Contras.49 
Representative Dave McCurdy (D-OK), chair of the House Intelligence Committee, 
wanted to build a unified coalition behind a Nicaragua policy that consisted of clear 
objectives the American people could support, not what he considered the ill-defined 
and secretive plan of the administration. McCurdy could not accept Washington 
abandoning “the brave men and women of the democratic center in Nicaragua… 
struggling, both from within and from exile, for the freedoms for which they waged a 
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valiant revolution in 1979.” His objectives included producing a ceasefire, ending the 
trade embargo and provocative military maneuvers, renewing the bilateral talks with 
the Nicaraguans, and supporting the Contadora peace process.50 
McCurdy’s funding proposal provided $27 million in humanitarian aid to the 
Contras that the CIA would not distribute, and the president had to submit to the 
intelligence committees a report detailing the human rights violations by the 
Nicaraguan government and the Contras. The Boland Amendment would remain in 
place to limit the use of the money.51 McCurdy assured his colleagues that the 
funding proposal’s language “specifically prohibits furnishing weapons, weapons 
systems, ammunition, or other lethal equipment, vehicles or material.”52 McCurdy 
argued that this proposal put the United States and the Nicaraguans on a path toward 
a peaceful resolution of the conflict rather than having the United States walk away 
from the turmoil and the struggle of the Contras and the Nicaraguan people.53 
Reagan wrote to McCurdy to offer his “strongest support” for the bipartisan 
proposal. The president assured McCurdy that he intended to pursue a political 
solution to the conflict rather than a military end and that his administration would 
support those groups seeking democracy in Nicaragua and the rest of Central 
America. The president also affirmed that his administration did not want to 
overthrow the Nicaraguan government or return to power any remnants of the 
Somoza regime, namely the National Guard. Reagan sought a national reconciliation 
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in Nicaragua through the democratic process and argued that the United States 
needed to continue supporting democratic forces within Nicaragua to push the 
Sandinistas to accept a democratically based national reconciliation.54 Congress and 
the president now looked to be moving in the same direction on a clearly defined 
Nicaragua policy based on the Democratic Human Rights discourse and anti-
communism. The Contras were the vehicle to carry out a key part of that policy. 
The president addressed the nation’s specific concerns about human rights, 
declaring that the “U.S. condemns, in the strongest possible terms, atrocities by either 
side.”55 He stated that the administration would help the democratic resistance apply 
rules of engagement in war and rules for the treatment of prisoners and civilians, and 
the administration would push the Contras to investigate allegations of human rights 
violations. The president also promised to consult with the Central American nations 
and Contadora participants to determine the best way for resuming bilateral talks with 
the Nicaraguan government.56  
Reagan’s letter to McCurdy bolstered the confidence of Southern Democrats, 
an important bloc of votes to pass the proposal.57 WOLA determined that the 
concessions from Reagan regarding non-military use and cutting out the CIA 
mattered less to representatives than the fear of critics labeling Democrats as soft on 
communism. Members of Congress also shared McCurdy’s view that they did not 
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want to abandon the effort and the Contras in Nicaragua.58 As James R. Jones (R-OK) 
argued on the floor of the House, lawmakers considered renewed funding to the 
Contras as fulfilling the moral obligation of the United States to provide aid to 
refugees and to stem the tide of human rights abuses. He argued that the Contras 
stood for freedom and democracy.59 
NGOs assessed the approval of Contra aid in June 1985 as a reinterpretation 
of human rights through the prism of Cold War geopolitics without regard for 
conditions on the ground in Nicaragua. Conservatives and moderates in Congress felt 
anxious about the lack of clear direction over Nicaragua policy after the first rejection 
of funding bills in the spring.  Also, just as Contra opponents did the previous year in 
the wake of the mining incident, the administration took advantage of changing 
circumstances in Nicaragua to discredit the Sandinistas and build support for the 
Contras. Ortega’s trip to Moscow in late April was a symbolic moment that 
dramatically undermined the anti-Contra position by confirming for many in 
Washington their fears of Managua-Moscow-Havana collaboration.60 WOLA 
determined that Ortega’s Moscow trip swung the “pendulum in the House” back 
toward Contra funding.61 Many Democrats who voted against Contra aid in past votes 
felt insulted by the Ortega trip and voted for the Contras in summer 1985. Others who 
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believed in supporting the Contras used the Ortega trip as the excuse to justify to 
constituents why they flipped their vote and supported an unpopular policy.62  
The human rights argument now tilted in Reagan’s favor as Congress 
reinterpreted human rights to fit changing circumstances and perceived threats. The 
arguments of AW notwithstanding, lawmakers in Washington saw a totalitarian 
regime and its systemic violations of human rights lurking in Nicaragua, which 
presented a greater threat than did the troublesome Contras. The complex arguments 
of human rights NGOs refuting the allegations of disinformation, debunking the 
charges of human rights violations against the Sandinistas, and illuminating the 
administration’s imprecise use of terms failed to hold up to a simplifying Cold War 
narrative. Cindy Buhl of CFNFP reasoned that human rights activists lost “the 
debate” because they could not stop the administration from framing the question 
around fears over communism spreading and fears over standing against Reagan with 
1986 mid-term elections looming. She also noted that many members of Congress did 
believe that supporting the Contras pressured the Sandinistas to negotiate in good 
faith through Contadora. Going forward, she hoped to “recapture the debate” and 
address those fears that motivated the votes of summer 1985.63 
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3. A Foundation of Doubt in Human Rights 
Like WOLA and AW, the Nicaraguan Network and CFNFP also worked 
toward correcting the human rights record but did so through grassroots activism and 
lobbying delegations. National human rights organizations supplied their 
membership with information and techniques to combat what they determined was a 
false narrative put forward by the White House. NGOs cited what they believed was 
ample evidence of Contra atrocities and the moral authority of peace in their efforts 
to win over the American people and members of Congress. Yet, Contra proponents 
continued their assault on the credibility of any individual or organization 
questioning the mission of anti-Sandinista forces, sowing seeds of doubt regarding 
the truth and purpose of human rights reports. Furthermore, allegations of Contra 
misconduct received not just denials but also prompted accusations of hypocrisy 
against those who would accuse the Contras of abuse while failing to do the same 
against the Sandinistas. 
The Sandinistas did not help their own case in Washington with Ortega’s trip 
to the Soviet Union in April and then adopting new restrictions on Nicaraguans’ 
freedom in October. Ortega announced a new State of Emergency and suspended 
civil liberties, such as the right to a fair and speedy trial, freedom of movement, free 
press, free expression, right of assembly, right to form associations and unions, right 
to strike, and right of habeas corpus.64 The law also maintained previously enacted 
restrictions on civil liberties.65 State police informed opposition leader Mario 
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Rappaccioli that his party must stop printing and distributing its monthly newsletter. 
In addition, Vice President Sergio Ramirez announced that all civic organizations 
had to obtain government approval before organizing or the government would 
categorize the non-complying organizations as illegal.66 
Ramirez claimed that the new State of Emergency measures prevented “the 
‘enemy’ from turning to sabotage, terrorism, and demoralization and confusion of 
the public” and he condemned “open, cynical and insolent political activity.”67 
Security forces took political opposition leaders to interrogation centers and warned 
other Nicaraguans to stop all political activities or they would also be detained and 
interrogated.68 Lino Hernández, the head of the Comisión Permanente de Derechos 
Humanos (CPDH), an independent Nicaraguan human rights commission, informed 
the U.S. embassy that the Ministry of the Interior had summoned him to bring all 
communications to its office for censorship. “The unquestionable effect of the 
requirement, Hernandez emphasized, would be that no [Nicaraguan government] 
abuses of human rights would be publicized, since CPDH is the only office [based in 
Nicaragua] that prepares human rights reports.” The embassy requested that the State 
Department contact other organizations concerned about human rights, such as 
Americas Watch, and tell them about the Ministry’s request of CPDH.69 
The new State of Emergency bolstered White House arguments that 
Sandinistas constructed a totalitarian state, but the Nicaragua Network moved to 
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counter these arguments and turn the accusations back on Reagan. The Nicaragua 
Network acknowledged that the State of Emergency did take away “fundamental 
rights” from individuals and organizations. Yet the 1985 law followed two previous 
State of Emergency laws, one in 1979 and another that lasted from 1982 to 1984, and 
the Nicaraguan government had relaxed the restrictions of the second State of 
Emergency in 1984 to facilitate national elections. The Nicaragua Network argued 
that this new State of Emergency did not include the same level of restrictions as the 
1982-1984 law. Furthermore, the 1985 State of Emergency law did not come from a 
Sandinista plan to pursue greater repression or some alliance with the Soviets.70 
The Nicaragua Network advised that the new law arose as a consequence of 
the destabilization efforts by the United States. Actions such as the CIA-directed 
missions of sabotage, mining the harbors, training and arming the Contras, engaging 
in an economic blockade and undermining attempts by the state to obtain credit from 
international lending institutions, obstruction in the International Court of Justice, 
undermining free election process, and attempts to obstruct the Contadora peace 
process all created circumstances in which the Nicaraguan officials moved to defend 
the state and would continue to do so.71 The organization downplayed the 
significance of the law, claiming that “[s]tate of emergency restrictions have always 
been used responsibly in Nicaragua, as a legal and juridical means of dealing with 
criminal sabotage activities. There is no reason to believe application of the latest 
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measures will vary.” The organization also downplayed the degree of influence these 
measures would have on everyday life in Nicaragua.72 
A talking points memo for activists, drafted by David Reed of the Nicaragua 
Network and Reggie Norton of WOLA, further clarified arguments to counter 
common accusations against the Sandinista regime. Instead of the State of 
Emergency representing another step toward totalitarianism in Nicaragua, for 
instance, the Sandinista government still offered more freedom to Nicaraguans than 
did the Somoza regime, and many fundamental civil liberties remained untouched. 
Reed and Norton also called the emergency measures “normal to expect from a small 
country at war. 11,000 Nicaraguans have died due to the U.S.-sponsored war.” 
Nicaraguan officials feared that the CIA would penetrate the country’s social and 
political structure and create subversion from the inside, which was what the 
Sandinistas believed the CIA did against Salvador Allende in Chile. The emergency 
measures came in response to recent Contra attacks that targeted economic 
infrastructure, a particularly troubling development for Nicaragua when the country 
already suffered economic isolation by the United States. Furthermore, Reed and 
Norton explained that the Sandinistas believed additional funding for the Contras 
would lead to a new wave of attacks and sabotage activities to obstruct the coffee 
harvest and oil and industrial production along the Pacific and in Managua.73 
Even as the Nicaraguan government seemed to some to shut down freedom 
for its people, Reed and Norton argued that the country moved in the right direction. 
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The Nicaraguan government remained committed to political pluralism, non-
alignment, and a mixed economy, despite the poor economic conditions facing the 
nation and the violence and political subversion instigated by the United States. 
“Nicaragua’s Constitutional Development process and Atlantic Coast Autonomy 
projects continue unchanged complete with widespread grassroots consultations.”74 
Evidence did not point to the Sandinistas as the human rights problem in Nicaragua 
but part of the solution. 
As the Nicaragua Network and WOLA supplied its activist memberships 
with rhetorical tools, the Nicaragua Network also coordinated with other 
organizations to strengthen its effort to counteract the hesitation in Congress. “We, 
as the solidarity movement, working together with other progressive forces, can 
bolster our allies and try to exacerbate the split among policy makers over U.S. 
policy toward Nicaragua.” Several strategies began taking shape in 1985 and grew 
stronger and more influential over several years, to the point that members of 
Congress appealed to the NGOs for support. The Nicaragua Network would engage 
in close collaboration with organizations such as WOLA and CFNFP. NGOs would 
conduct informational seminars to educate Congressional staff members, visit the 
offices of swing voters, and work to establish good relationships with liberal 
members of Congress. NGOs hoped to serve as important sources of information 
regarding conditions and politics in Nicaragua.75 
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One such collaboration was the Stop Contra Aid Campaign. Debbie Reuben 
of the Nicaraguan Network announced that the organization expected that Reagan 
would request $100 million in military aid for the Contras, and the issue would be 
before Congress by March or April 1986. Consequently, NGOs formed the 1986 
Stop Contra Aid Campaign to coordinate grassroots activism throughout the nation 
and to organize regional and local committees for lobbying members of Congress.76 
CFNFP sent out information and organizing packets to approximately five hundred 
grassroots contacts. CFNFP helped organize phone banks for ten swing 
Congressional districts and sent mailings to contacts within those districts. Twenty 
states held events as part of the campaign called Central America Week. Field 
organizers in CFNFP targeted Democratic states in the South that NGOs believed 
held key districts for a Contra aid vote.77 A plaque still sits on a wall close to the 
University of Oklahoma in Norman commemorating Central America Week on 
March 17-24. 
By the end of 1985, CFNFP understood that grassroots organizing and 
lobbying could have a significant impact on the human rights and anti-Contra 
movement. CFNFP leadership looked to take a larger role in coordinating national 
grassroots activism while continuing to develop an effective lobbying presence in 
Washington. To carry out its move, CFNFP transitioned to HRWG the 
organization’s planning and execution of human rights advocacy and the role of 
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analyzing trends in human rights policy. Leadership wanted to focus the human 
rights operations within such a working group to provide more consistent, long-term 
direction for Contra opposition and mobilization.78 Fact-based analysis and 
testimony in Washington seemed to matter less than the red-baiting and claims of 
disinformation by the president and Contra supporters. NGOs anticipated mass 
mobilization would counter that. They did not yet have the organizational 
infrastructure, and the administration and Contra supporters continued the attacks 
that not only branded NGOs as complicit in a communist takeover of Central 
America but also tried to undermine human rights reporting and human rights-based 
dissent. 
The attack on the legitimacy of human rights arguments of NGOs continued 
in early 1986 in anticipation of Reagan’s $100 million funding request, turning more 
aggressive and spreading among conservative media outlets. Rep. Vin Weber (R-
MN) sent to members of Congress an article from The New Republic that falsely 
reported that human rights groups, such as AW and WOLA, operated as part of a 
Sandinista-coordinated lobbying effort.79 In “The Sandinista Lobby,” Fred Barnes 
accused WOLA and AW of disregarding the human rights violations of the 
Nicaraguan government and focusing on the Contras, which revealed the 
organizational bias. “This indifference to… evidence of systematic abuses of human 
rights was not a lapse,” Barnes alleged. “On the contrary, it reflects the selective 
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moral indignation of a phalanx of organizations in Washington that regularly 
criticizes the Reagan administration’s policy toward Central America and, in 
particular, Nicaragua.”80 Barnes also hammered away at NGOs for their hypocrisy in 
attacking Guatemala, El Salvador, and the Contras, yet seeming to have no interest in 
reporting on the Nicaraguan government’s human rights violations. Barnes falsely 
charged CFNFP as one of the most “forgiving” of NGOs and the “umbrella group” 
of the human rights organizations devoted to defending the Sandinista government. 
The article identified the Contras as no longer a small band of former National Guard 
members, as portrayed by NGOs, but a force of at least fifteen thousand led by anti-
Somoza statesmen such as Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo.81 A week later, an 
editorial in the Tampa Tribune followed the lead of Barnes and called WOLA “a 
member of an umbrella group of Sandinista apologists organized as the Coalition for 
a New Foreign and Military Policy, known as ‘the community’.”82 
The assault on the work by human rights organizations disturbed activists 
because it risked destabilizing institutions that held governments around the world 
accountable for their conduct, and it possibly endangered those investigating human 
rights conditions. Holly Burkhalter of AW testified in early 1986 before the House 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs about the danger of the administration misrepresenting and 
undermining human rights reporting. Burkhalter criticized the administration for the 
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language in its own report referring to human rights groups as “leftists” or 
“subversive” because they reported on governments friendly to the United States. 
She argued that this language against well-respected organizations “not only 
undermines their efforts but can threaten their lives” in nations pursuing polices of 
violence against leftist groups or facing insurgencies. “I might also say that the 
Reagan administration’s recent statements about a disinformation campaign on 
Nicaragua are really a low point, in terms of rhetoric about human rights groups, or 
peace groups.” She argued that that conduct by the administration undermined 
dissent and efforts of legitimate human rights organizations. Furthermore, she took 
issue with Elliott Abrams writing an op-ed in The New York Times on February 22, 
1985, in which he called a columnist, Anthony Lewis, un-American for his criticism 
of US policy in Central America. Burkhalter argued that disagreeing with Reagan’s 
policies did not equate to subversion or anti-American activities, that the human 
rights organizations “are not engaged in disinformation. They are trying to do a job, 
and in some cases they are trying to do a job at the risk of their own lives.”83 
Even Amnesty International increasingly found itself on the receiving end of 
attempts to delegitimize its reporting, which led AI to take a confrontational 
approach with the Reagan administration and support the work of other NGOs in the 
United States. AI had long publicly stated that it took no position on politics or 
leadership decisions within governments or international organizations and remained 
neutral on non-governmental military forces because AI considered its mission as 
                                                 
83 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International 
Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Human Rights Policy: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, 23-24. 
205 
 
pressuring governments to make changes.84 A memo circulated among the board of 
directors by Ann Blyberg that discussed strategy in addressing attacks leveled 
against AI from the Reagan administration, while also mentioning that AI had not 
received the volume of attacks received by other NGOs. Blyberg suggested that AI’s 
reputation, established through an emphasis on balance and impartiality, helped AI 
avoid the kinds of attacks suffered by other organizations, but she expected problems 
in the future from President Reagan. She anticipated that AI, in addition to 
“Americas Watch, WOLA, and others,” would be targets of an increasing number of 
attacks from administration officials, supporters, or surrogates, and she wanted to 
start addressing the situation rather than allow the threats to take down other NGOs 
before the administration fully set its sights on AI.85 Blyberg argued that AI needed 
to “meet this challenge… aggressively” by asserting “that which is the basis of our 
own identity - international human rights law.”86 
Blyberg explained that Reagan had redefined human rights as opposition to 
communism and the Soviet Union. The administration then shaped the human rights 
debate and analysis within this framework, rejecting interpretations of human rights 
formed outside of Cold War geopolitical considerations and U.S. strategic objectives. 
She argued that, if the Reagan administration successfully reshaped conceptions of 
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human rights, “AI’s ability, or the ability of any international human rights 
organization, to affect the behavior of governments will then be seriously eroded, as 
our effectiveness depends very much on the existence of this consensus to shame 
governments into treating their citizens fairly and decently.” Blyberg suggested that 
the administration tried to redefine the public’s conception of human rights and to 
undermine those organizations, such as AI, that did not follow the Democratic 
Human Rights discourse.87  
The administration delegitimized human rights organizations, such as AI, that 
brought human rights violations to light by claiming that such organizations 
undermined democracy. Blyberg found that NGOs reporting on human rights abuses 
in Central America, including WOLA, Americas Watch, and now AI, received the 
strongest attacks and attempts to publicly discredit them. No right took supremacy 
over others. Nor did the international community or the human rights consensus built 
up since World War II agree that combatting terrorism or communism justified 
human rights abuses.88 
Blyberg added that AI needed the contributions of other human rights 
organizations because AI’s work focused on certain rights and purposefully 
remained limited in its work. Other NGOs, such as WOLA, engaged in other human 
rights work just as necessary as the work of AI. Attacking the legitimacy of human 
rights work by NGOs undermined the mission of all human rights NGOs. Blyberg 
proposed that AI should take stronger positions on issues of international human 
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rights law and do more to defend other NGOs.89 AI typically tried to maintain a 
separation from other NGOs, except in certain circumstances when interests 
aligned.90 
Activists among the various NGOs saw serious threats not only to human 
rights but the continued existence of the organizations and the ability to create 
change. NGOs organized with greater urgency against the challenges as the 
administration cashed in on its successful strategy. The work done between 1984 and 
early 1986 to delegitimize human rights-based dissent laid the foundation for the 
administration’s ultimate legislative achievement of the Contra War. Reagan secured 
an appropriation for $100 million for the Contras. This achievement represented the 
height of Reagan’s power as president and influence in shaping impressions of 
human rights in the United States with respect to Nicaragua.  
 
4. A Defeat of Anticolonial Human Rights 
President Reagan’s success in gaining $100 million dollars in Contra funding 
demonstrated the influence of the Democratic Human Rights discourse on U.S. 
Nicaragua policy. Regardless of the investigations, testimony, and evidence 
presented by NGOs as respected as AW and AI, opposition to the president’s 
Nicaragua policy did not stand up to this Cold War view of human rights. Nor did 
the reports and testimony about the Contras move the human rights focus away from 
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the Sandinistas, thanks in large part to the campaign to undermine those NGOs 
publishing negative assessments of the Contras. When Ortega visited the Soviet 
Union and then implemented restrictive State of Emergency laws, even if done in 
self-defense, the administration had an even easier time undercutting opponents of 
Contra funding. According the president, “you can’t be against the Contras without 
being for the Communist government of Nicaragua.”91 The choice should have been 
easy. 
In February 1986, the administration delivered to Congress its request for 
Contra funding. Reagan declared that the peace negotiations in Central America had 
failed and, should Washington do nothing, the Soviet-backed Sandinistas would 
strengthen their position and wipe out opposition forces, “spreading subversion and 
terrorism in our hemisphere.”92 Pursuant to the proposal, the president could use 
most of the funds in any way he saw appropriate, military or otherwise. Should the 
Sandinistas and Contras reach a peaceful resolution, the administration would 
transition the money to relief and reconstruction missions. The request eliminated all 
restrictions on the use, purpose, and distribution of the funds and gave the CIA and 
Department of Defense the ability to administer funds and carry out missions in 
furtherance of Reagan’s policies. 93  
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White House officials did believe human rights still influenced how members 
of Congress assessed relations with Nicaragua and remained a key issue for 
promoting the new funding request. The White House built into the proposal an 
allocation of $30 million for humanitarian assistance that included strengthening the 
observance and defense of human rights in Nicaragua. Furthermore, the president 
claimed that additional funding for the “Nicaraguan democratic resistance” enabled 
them to continue fighting for democracy in Nicaragua and the Western Hemisphere. 
The Contras fought for the United States and if the United States failed to continue 
providing the resources to continue that fight, according to Reagan, it risked 
undermining human rights and creating a potential for greater sacrifice in the future 
to protect freedom.94 
When Senator Jim Sasser (R-TN) formally proposed the $100 million 
funding bill to the Senate in March 1986, he referenced his conversations with 
Central American leaders who hoped the United States could take “bold new steps.” 
Sasser acknowledged that the Contras did not instill confidence in lawmakers, but he 
argued that “[a]s unpalatable as the Contras are, they are the only source of external 
pressure that is appropriate at this time in the region. And, although it has, thus far, 
failed to produce results, Contadora remains the best forum for achieving lasting 
peace.” Sasser proposed $30 million in nonlethal aid for the Contras and $70 million 
in military aid, but the military aid would be kept in escrow to be released after 6 
months while the administration continued to pursue a negotiated settlement. 95 
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Representatives Peter H. Kostmayer (D-PA), James M. Jeffords (R-VT), and 
Edward F. Feighan (D-OH) still did not accept this argument and quickly called on 
the president to withdraw his proposal in light of the damaging reports from 
organizations such as WOLA. They requested a full investigation into the 
allegations, and they wanted the funding proposal withdrawn until that investigation 
could be completed, arguing that, absent a full inquiry into the conduct of the 
guerrillas in Nicaragua, “the American people and the Congress cannot make an 
informed decision about the direction of U.S. policy in Nicaragua.” “Regardless of 
our efforts to encourage greater freedom and full democracy in Nicaragua,” they 
added, “the thrust of American policy and the use of American taxpayers’ dollars 
must never be used to support heinous and vicious human rights abuses.”96 
Kostmayer, Jeffords, and Feighan separated the issue of whether the Sandinistas 
allied themselves with the Soviets from that of the United States funding 
indiscriminate violence and terrorism in Nicaragua.  
Administration allies in Congress went in the opposite direction, arguing that 
only the Contras stood for human rights in Nicaragua. Robert H. Michel (R-IL) 
wrote to fellow Republicans claiming that “aid to the Contras is the only position 
that offers a chance for improved human rights” because the Sandinistas had such an 
abysmal record on that front. Michel framed the issue as a question of whether 
Congress would give in to communists. A vote against the aid proposal acquiesced to 
“total domination of Nicaragua by an avowed Marxist-Leninist Sandinista group 
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whose policy… has been openly and proudly Communist.” Michel also dismissed 
allegations of Contra human rights violations as “ridiculous” and a story cooked up 
by Contra opponents.97 
Many in both chambers of Congress remained skeptical about the Contra 
operation and did not allow the White House to distract them from the opposition 
forces in Nicaragua. During a committee hearing over the aid proposal, Rep. Ron 
Dellums (D-CA) referred to the investigations of NGOs into Contras abuses.98 He 
urged the administration to pursue peace negotiations while calling its Nicaragua 
policy a violation of international law and of “our own traditions of freedom and 
democracy and negotiation and peaceful settlement of complex problems.” Dellums 
argued that no support for the administration’s approach to Nicaragua existed outside 
the United States and Central America. “Our link to the Contras is illegal, it is 
immoral, it is insane, it cannot be defended.” He agreed with NGO assessments and 
argued that the United States should offer an example to other nations and not spend 
$100 million dollars on guerrilla warfare to destabilize a government in one of the 
poorest nations in the hemisphere.99 
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Claiborne Pell (D-RI) 
expressed his concerns about the human rights implications of U.S. support for the 
Contras. He noted the disturbing similarities between the violence used by the 
Somoza regime and its National Guard and the violence used by the same individuals 
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who operated as counterrevolutionaries against the Sandinistas. “Contras are still 
brutally committing human rights violations, according to Amnesty International and 
other respectable organizations that have taken testimony from witnesses.” He went 
further, arguing that “[i]f the definition of terrorism is the seeking by violent, 
indiscriminate action to affect the policy of or to overturn a government, then, in 
effect, the Contras are our terrorists carrying out such a strategy.” Pell questioned 
whether a victory by the Contras served Nicaragua’s best interest because it likely 
would result in a regime as repressive and violent as that of Somoza.100  
“This effort remains futile, morally, practically, and strategically, and it is 
unworthy of our Nation,” declared Rep. Alan Cranston (D-CA).101 Cranston 
followed up Pell’s statement by arguing that the Contras committed acts of terrorism 
while Washington purported to pursue multilateral efforts to defeat terrorism 
elsewhere. “Through the Contra program, the American taxpayer is bankrolling a 
mixed bag of thugs, mercenaries, former Somocistas and disaffected Sandinistas who 
are trying to terrorize the Nicaraguan people into taking up arms against their 
Government.” He likened the request from Reagan to the consistent requests for 
more funding in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Cranston also noted reports by the 
General Accounting Office of the inefficient manner of using funds already 
appropriated for Contra support and to other reports that the Contras enjoyed very 
little popular support in the Nicaragua and that they proved militarily inadequate 
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against the Nicaraguan government forces.102 Cranston acknowledged that he 
opposed the form of government the Sandinistas had established in Nicaragua, but he 
also argued that, if the administration really believed it presented a danger to the 
United States, it should make the case that the Sandinista government should be 
overthrown. He called for an end to Contra support.  
Despite a television and radio address in mid-March by the president 
appealing to the nation to support the freedom fighters and again tying the FSLN to 
the Soviets, the White House still could not bring to its side enough members of the 
House to pass the proposal. The House narrowly defeated the measure 210-222.103 
The Nicaragua Network saw three factors that worked in favor of its opposition. 
Swing voters waited until just before the vote to reveal their position, and those 
House members stated that the large number of calls and letters received to their 
offices swayed their opinions. Second, the effort by the administration at “red-baiting 
and bribery” turned a lot of members against the administration. Third, members 
voted against the Contra aid believing that they could agree to a compromise 
package later, allowing them to still appear strong on national security and 
communism but not directly fund the war. Contra opponents argued that any money 
or supplies, military or not, for the Contras funded the war. Nevertheless, hope for 
Contra funding lived on as Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill agreed in April to bring 
the issue to another vote for fiscal year 1987, at which several Democrats offered 
alternatives to the president’s earlier proposal. 104 
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In a piece in The Washington Post on March 14, 1986, Rep. Dave McCurdy 
voiced the concerns of many of those swing voters looking for a compromise to 
avoid continued repression and violence.105 During his time in Congress, McCurdy 
belonged to the conservative wing of the Democratic Party and had been reluctant to 
oppose the president on defense issues.106 McCurdy turned into a key ally of 
Reagan’s for the previous funding vote and helped to turn around many of his 
colleagues. However, this time, he chastised the president for going too far and 
seeming to conflate aid to the Contras with policy rather than seeing it as a tool to 
affect policy, but he also accused Democrats of opposing Reagan as a policy of their 
own rather than as a strategy for affecting policy. McCurdy called for a bipartisan 
effort to bring change to Central America. The administration’s failure to pursue real 
change had only led to greater levels of repression within Nicaragua. Rather than 
relying solely on the Contras through military aid, McCurdy advocated supporting 
the peace process and long-term economic growth in Central America.107 
The willingness of Democrats to negotiate on Contra funding presented a 
serious threat to the NGO goal of eliminating all Contra aid. The Nicaragua Network 
wrote to its supporters asking for continued efforts to defeat all Contra aid requests. 
The organization reminded its membership and allies of the victories in persuading 
Congress to water down or restrict military aid and to defeat bills entirely earlier in 
the year. The Nicaragua Network attributed that success to the grassroots 
mobilization throughout the country and within the organization, which included 
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letter writing, public demonstration, phone bank campaigns, and delegation visits to 
the offices of members of Congress. The organization asked for Contra opponents to 
keep working.108 Swing voters in Congress continued to receive a high volume of 
calls from constituents at their district office and in Washington.109 Protestors also 
gathered at Congressional district offices and state capitols to protest Contra 
policy.110 
To address the specific arguments of the Reagan administration, the 
Nicaragua Network countered that the Contras did not offer a viable democratic 
alternative to the Sandinistas. Supporting the FDN and its political counterpart, the 
Unidad Nicaragüense Opositora (UNO), did not promote human rights. The 
Nicaragua Network cited the work by other NGOs such as AW and the depositions 
taken by Reed Brody as evidence of the brutality against civilians used by the 
Contras to undermine the Sandinista government and the Nicaraguan economy and 
society. It also cited an Edgar Chamorro letter to the editor in The New York Times 
arguing that terror represented the most effective and favorite weapon of the 
Contras.111 The Nicaragua Network claimed that the “majority of people killed by 
the Contras have been civilians. There are presently over 7,000 orphans in 
Nicaragua…, one hundred forty-eight school teachers and 27 health care workers 
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have been killed. The civilian death toll for 1985 was estimated at 281.” The 
operations of the Contras affected more than those in the line of fire. Attacks, not to 
mention depleted government resources caused by defense spending, reduced the 
quality and availability of health care, causing rising incidents of malaria, 
tuberculosis, and infant mortality, while malnutrition worsened after the destruction 
of food storage facilities.112 
The Nicaragua Network also argued that no evidence existed to connect the 
Sandinistas to arms sales to Salvadoran insurgents that so concerned administration 
officials. However, revelations of mining Nicaraguan ports and the release of a 
manual for psychological warfare training and political assassinations by the CIA 
represented clear evidence of the administration’s intent to do more in Nicaragua 
than simply interdict arms sales. The Nicaragua Network argued that the Sandinistas 
worked to correct the errors of the past, particularly when it came to relations with 
the Miskito Indians and violations of human rights in the early years of the 
revolutionary government. The Nicaraguan government had also entered talks with 
the Atlantic Coast people regarding autonomy, and Managua tried to work with those 
Indian communities who wished to return to their lands.113  
Notwithstanding the arguments of NGOs, Democrats in the House had a hard 
time voting against more funding. In June, lawmakers bought into Reagan’s position 
that voting “no” equated to abandoning the Contras and leaving Nicaragua to the 
Sandinistas. With the question successfully framed as either supporting the Contras 
fighting for democracy or allowing the communists complete control of Nicaragua, 
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enough members of both parties in the House (221-209) voted for the Contras.114 
After the victory, Reagan wrote to Alfonso Robelo and affirmed his commitment to 
human rights and peace for Nicaraguans. He also let Robelo know that he intended 
discussing the conflicts in Central America and human rights issues with Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev at their meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland.115 Robelo could 
“convey [Reagan’s] greetings to your colleagues, and my admiration to all who fight 
for freedom in Nicaragua. In your struggle you can count on America’s continuing 
moral and material support.”116 
As the tide turned against human rights-conscious opposition to the Contras, 
NGOs evaluated their organizations and the progress they had made. CFNFP’s Bob 
Alpern, Maureen Field, Bob Tiller, Jack Malinowski, and David Reed met as part of 
a Central America/Human Rights Review Group to discuss how the CFNFP would 
engage in human rights advocacy going forward. They agreed that the Coalition still 
needed to ensure that lawmakers in Washington always considered human rights 
implications regarding US foreign policy decisions and that the organization needed 
to develop stronger “relationships with allies in Congress and in the public.” 
However, the group determined that CFNFP’s future success and influence depended 
on the strength of its grassroots mobilizing. “The center of gravity for influencing 
Congress is changing in many ways to the grassroots and the Coalition is very much 
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a part of that reality.” CFNFP leadership resolved to create stronger integration 
between the lobbying in Washington and field work across the country.117 
Likewise, the Nicaragua Network’s Coordinating Committee gathered in 
August 1986 for a strategy session to determine how to move forward in the hostile 
political environment of Washington. The Coordinating Committee agreed that the 
organization could build on its strength and experience in disseminating information 
and directing a large, diverse group of grassroots organizations throughout the 
country. The Nicaraguan Network staff also felt the organization had adapted to fluid 
situations, as tended to happen in debates over controversial bills before Congress.118 
However, they also determined that anti-Contra advocates failed to reframe 
the debate that took place in Washington over the previous legislative cycle, citing 
the Contra opposition’s “lack of clarity [in mission] at the national level.”119 The 
Coordinating Committee found that the movement put too much emphasis on 
funding debates and hearings in Congress, arguing that “having Congress as an arena 
to fight in can be very demoralizing.”120 Congress remained a key target for lobbying 
and activism, but grassroots activism emerged as an essential point of focus to 
influence national perception going forward. The Coordinating Committee members 
concluded that the ongoing debate over how, or whether, to use the Contras to 
pressure the Sandinistas contradicted Nicaraguan human rights.121 The premise of the 
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debate assumed that the United States had a role influencing Nicaraguan politics, 
which contradicted Nicaraguans’ right to self-determination. In addition, human 
rights activists should strike at the idea that the United States could support a group 
like the Contras.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Congressional support for the Contras in 1985 and 1986 came despite what 
many saw as clear evidence of human rights violations by Reagan’s proxy fighters. 
However, these violations differed from the mining of the Nicaraguan ports by the 
CIA or the administration’s disregard for the International Court of Justice because 
the Contras were not U.S. personnel. There was enough separation to maintain clean 
hands. As such, supporting the actions of the Contras in defense of democracy 
fulfilled Reagan’s original conception of human rights as components of foreign 
policy. The United States would support those governments, or insurgents, fighting 
for freedom and civil liberties because that served the long-term goal of promoting 
democracy, and promoting democracy throughout the world served human rights. 
WOLA and Americas Watch did tap into a strategy for human rights 
advocacy that CFNFP and the Nicaragua Network soon came to adopt. Rather than 
comparing the Contras with the Sandinistas, or addressing the Sandinistas in any 
way, NGOs learned to simply tie the human rights violations of the Contras to the 
United States government. Noam Chomsky, the well-known philosopher and 
political activist and also a friend and advisor of the Nicaragua Network, offered a 
pointed criticism of the Nicaragua Network’s messaging during the campaign against 
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Reagan’s 1986 funding proposal. Chomsky challenged the organization’s leaders to 
change the premise of their argument, shifting away from the policy debate. 
Debating who committed the worst or most human rights violations or arguing over 
who had the more reliable sources played into the hands of the president and Contra 
supporters. The Nicaragua Network and other NGOs could not win a debate with the 
president of the United States that involved the degree, number, specifics, and 
veracity of human rights violations. Reagan commanded the power and credibility of 
the U.S. government and could too easily frame that debate within the Cold War 
political construct that Americans already believed. Furthermore, administration 
officials skillfully slid past questions of Contra abuse by challenging human rights 
advocates for their hypocrisy in calling out the Contras but not someone else: “what 
about the Sandinistas?” or “what about the insurgents in El Salvador?” This 
rhetorical tactic distracted from the larger issue of U.S.-supported violence 
producing human rights violations. 
Chomsky instead advised challenging the underlying premise of U.S. support 
for violence as a human rights violation in itself.122 The Nicaragua Network and 
other NGOs needed to move beyond nuance in defending, or even addressing, the 
Sandinistas and, rather, condemn any violence supported and/or funded by the 
United States. NGOs did this by mobilizing thousands of activists throughout the 
country in coordinated campaigns against Reagan’s Contra policy.  
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CHAPTER 5 – DAYS OF SCANDAL AND DECISION: GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING AND 
THE END OF THE CONTRA WAR, 1985-1988 
 
The administration accomplished a remarkable turnaround in 1986 with 
respect to winning support for the Contra War as Ronald Reagan reached the height 
of his power as president. Reagan convinced Congress to support the Contras and 
grant him full authority to conduct the covert war as he saw fit. However, the 
narrative of the administration supporting freedom fighters as defenders of 
democracy and human rights did not hold up.  
A Latin America-driven peace process and the Iran-Contra scandal opened 
new opportunities for Contra opponents to attack the president and his administration 
through human rights. Nicaraguans worked among themselves and with Latin 
American governments to negotiate peaceful settlements to the conflicts facing 
Nicaragua. The Reagan administration was left as a spectator to the peace process 
and scrambling to remain relevant. The Iran-Contra scandal broke in late 1986, 
further undermining Reagan’s hold over the public and his ability to persuade 
Congress to continue following his Nicaragua policy.1 The allegations that U.S. 
officials took money from the sale of arms to Iran and transferred that money to the 
Contras all seemed to contradict previous assertions by the president and violate 
federal law.2 It took NGOs and grassroots activism to force lawmakers to confront 
issues deeper than superficial questions regarding Congressional oversight, 
consultation, and who knew what about the Iranian arms sales. Anti-Contra activists 
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emphasized how the scandal symbolized the administration’s dangerously narrow 
focus on anti-communism at the expense of human rights and the rule of law.  
NGOs learned from the previous years that lawmakers had a flexible 
interpretation of human rights and were best persuaded through constituent activism. 
Nicaragua policy debates through the previous two years showed that Congress 
shared the president’s view that the United States should help those fighting against 
communism, but they would not do so at the expense of human rights. They also 
tended to shift their priority based on constituent demand. NGOs focused their work 
on those constituents to create change. Grassroots campaigns took advantage of 
renewed energy in the movement, a developing peace process, and the Iran-Contra 
scandal to reshape how Americans saw Nicaragua as a human rights crisis outside 
the Cold War political construct. In doing so, NGOs helped shut off funding for 
Contra military operations and push opposition forces to accept a peace treaty and 
cease-fire.  
 
1. Peace, Scandal, and Changing Perceptions 
As the Contras waged a guerrilla war and Washington debated whether to 
fund that war, a multi-faceted peace process moved along in fits and starts, 
demonstrating to all involved the difficulty of reconciling the various interpretations 
of how best to serve human rights in Nicaragua. Groups within Nicaragua, such as 
the Miskito Indians, did not have a direct part in the Contra War but suffered under 
Sandinista repression. They advocated for their own interests based on their 
interpretation of human rights and the role of government in Nicaragua while the 
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Sandinistas and Contras remained at odds. By 1988, these groups found a way to 
resolve their disputes enough to coexist peacefully. That left the Reagan 
administration to reconcile its desire to prolong the war to promote democracy or 
follow the rest of Latin America and work toward peace. At the same time the 
administration faced the dramatic Iran-Contra scandal that threatened the whole 
Contra program. The perceptions of Contras as freedom fighters seeking democracy 
and human rights, and of an administration working toward peace, were changing. 
The United States did not have a primary role in regional peace talks, and the 
more progress the parties made toward peace, the greater pressure the president faced 
from NGOs, from Congress, and from the American people to stop the fighting and 
reign in the Contra operation. Peace in Nicaragua, though seeming to serve human 
rights by at least reducing the violence, potentially ran counter to administration 
objectives if Reagan could not set the terms of the peace. Reagan demanded the 
Nicaraguan government satisfy certain democratic reforms before he would agree to 
back down. The Sandinistas refused to consider many of those demands because, as 
the Sandinistas had argued for years, Reagan’s position and his attempted influence 
on Nicaraguan politics ran counter to the Nicaraguan people’s right to self-
determination and to Nicaraguan sovereignty. Furthermore, the president, according 
to Nicaraguan officials, supported a terrorist group and lacked the moral or political 
authority to make any demands on the Nicaragua state.  
Meanwhile, the Sandinistas hoped to resolve the tension with indigenous 
groups and put a better face on the human rights debacle of the Miskito relocation. 
So, beginning in 1984, the Sandinistas started a dialogue with indigenous groups to 
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negotiate a settlement.3 Brooklyn Rivera, the general coordinator of a coalition of 
indigenous groups referred to collectively as MISURASATA, met with Daniel 
Ortega in New York City in October to begin negotiations.4  
Before talks began, Rivera made clear that MISURASATA did not seek 
independence. Yet, MISURASATA was in the paradoxical position of seeking rights 
for indigenous people as articulated through the Anticolonial Human Rights 
discourse from a government adhering to the same discourse for its own purposes. 
The indigenous groups Rivera represented wanted a greater degree of self-
determination within the Nicaraguan state that would preserve self-governance and 
ethnic identity.5 Rivera also had harsh words for the Nicaraguan government and its 
apparent plans to obstruct the social and cultural rights of indigenous people by 
incorporating them into Sandinista reforms. He accused the Sandinistas of engaging 
in the “same traditional, racist politics as any other ultraconservative government of 
the Americas… trying to convert the indigenous peoples into a new type of ‘Indians’ 
who would be without ethnic identity or rights, assimilated into the culture of the 
ladinos (the dominant non-Indians) and subjected to the interests of the State.” The 
relocation camps provided the evidence of this policy to Rivera and revealed the true 
philosophy underpinning Sandinista relations with the indigenous people.6 
The conflict between the Sandinistas and indigenous groups of the Atlantic 
Coast was, at its core, over different issues than the Contra War. MISURASATA did 
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not represent an ideological position, and, according to Rivera, MISURASATA took 
no position on Cold War politics. According to Rivera, both sides of the conflict had 
victimized the indigenous people of Nicaragua. He declared that he and 
MISURASATA sought peace, and he asked for solidarity among those concerned 
about peace and justice for Indians in Nicaragua.7 
Though the underlying issues remained distinct, the Contra War influenced 
how the Nicaraguan government handled talks with MISURASATA. Negotiations 
continued among representatives at meetings in Bogota and Mexico City through 
1985, but the two sides could not reach a final agreement.8 Comandante Luis 
Carrión, a delegate from the Nicaraguan government to talks in Bogota, found that 
Rivera came to the negotiations with an “arbitrary and absurd attitude,” demanding 
that the government demilitarize a large area along the Atlantic Coast, which Carrión 
claimed would leave the nation unable to defend itself in a time of active insurgency. 
Rivera also required that observers come from the World Council of Indigenous 
Indians, the OAS Human Rights Commission, and the Nicaraguan Conference of 
Bishops, a condition that Carrión interpreted as relinquishing state sovereignty. The 
Sandinistas held as sacred the right of state sovereignty and the right to self-
determination. Furthermore, Carrión objected to Rivera’s claim that MISURASATA 
had nothing to do with guerrilla tactics. Carrión accused the group of deploying the 
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same terror tactics as the Contra groups in attacking civilian populations and 
communication lines.9  
By 1987, Indian groups formed a new coalition called YATAMA through 
which to negotiate with the Sandinistas. YATAMA focused on Indian interests and, 
like MISURASATA, claimed to exist separate from other anti-Sandinista groups.10 
Brooklyn Rivera again represented the coalition and entered into negotiations with 
the Sandinistas from January 26 to 28, 1988. In a joint public announcement, the 
Nicaraguan government and YATAMA stated that the Moravian Church and the 
Council of Protestant Churches of Nicaragua would facilitate the discussions by 
chairing meetings, offering recommendations, and overseeing the progress of 
negotiations. The parties also invited Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, 
Holland, Norway, and Sweden to send ambassadors to witness the negotiations and 
creation of agreements and to offer support to the peace process. Both sides called on 
their respective forces to stop any military action during the pendency of 
negotiations. The Sandinistas and YATAMA continued in discussion, resolving their 
outstanding issues that same year.11  
The Contras also hoped to negotiate a peace agreement with the Sandinistas, 
but their resolution took more time and depended on external factors. The Contras 
formed a diplomatic wing to their insurgency that engaged the Sandinistas in 
negotiations and enumerated the principles upon which the movement sought to 
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build a Nicaraguan state. The Contras remained steadfast in their opposition to a 
Sandinista government as long they enjoyed the encouragement and financial 
support of the president of the United States to keep fighting. Meanwhile, the 
Sandinistas refused to accept the Contras as a legitimate opposition movement, 
declaring them terrorists and a proxy force of an imperialist foreign power. Both 
sides considered the other a threat to human rights in Nicaragua.  
A coalition of Contra groups formed the Unidad Nicaragüense de 
Reconciliación (UNIR) and issued a statement in January 1985 to state their 
preconditions for participating in peace talks. UNIR required an end to the repression 
of political and civil rights and the termination of the State of Emergency and other 
restrictions on Nicaraguans’ freedoms. It demanded a general amnesty for political 
prisoners and those in exile outside Nicaragua and accused of political crimes. UNIR 
also sought the removal of all foreign advisers and military personnel and a system 
of verification by international observers regarding the government’s compliance 
with the preconditions.12 
In a statement from UNIR leadership, which consisted of Alfonso Robelo of 
the Alianza Democrática Revolucionaria Nicaragüense (ADREN), Adolfo Calero of 
FDN, and Wycliffe Diego of MISURA and the Black Creoles, UNIR proposed 
various terms to a peace agreement with the Sandinistas to ensure that the human 
rights of Nicaraguans remained inviolable. UNIR proposed an independent judiciary 
and a restructuring of security forces to ensure professionalism and independence 
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from the Sandinistas. UNIR further advocated for a non-aligned foreign policy to 
protect the sovereignty of the Nicaraguan people and remove Nicaragua from the bi-
polar Cold War conflict. The Contra coalition also wanted to integrate the Indians of 
the Atlantic Coast into Nicaraguan society with guarantees for the respect and 
preservation of the culture, identity, and rights of the Indians.13 
The proposed terms did not differ much from what the FSLN sought, but the 
FSLN also required the Contras to lay down arms and cut ties with the United States. 
The Sandinistas rejected UNIR’s proposed terms and declared negotiating with the 
Contras with the current relationship with the United States inconsistent with the 
rights of Nicaraguans and the sovereignty of the Nicaraguan government. Carlos 
Tünnermann Bernheim, Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States, argued that 
Managua supported Contadora and even accepted the September 1984 Contadora 
peace proposal. However, the government would not engage a group led by former 
National Guard officers who formerly brutalized the Nicaraguan people. 
Tünnermann cited NGO human rights reporting, arguing that “[r]ecent reports by 
Americas Watch and the International Human Rights Law Group – respected 
American human rights organizations – confirm dozens of My Lai-type atrocities by 
contra forces and accuse the contras of a deliberate campaign of terror against 
civilians.” Tünnermann also denied that the Contras had any standing to negotiate 
with the government because they had no constituency in Nicaragua. Rather than 
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forming organically through a real social or political movement, the Contras 
emerged out of a CIA operation.14 
Tünnermann affirmed that the Nicaraguan government sought peace, 
democracy, and an open society. In January 1985, the government issued a general 
amnesty to resistance fighters who laid down arms and returned to society. Those 
returning fighters could also stand for office and vote in elections. The government 
would repeal the State of Emergency and restore all political and civil rights 
promised by the revolution that had been restricted due to the war. Tünnermann 
stated that, if the Contras were “really fighting for democracy, as their propagandists 
claim, they can have it. It has already been offered to them.” He called the proposal 
offered by the Contras one of “the CIA’s propaganda moves to make the contras 
appear to be peace-loving democrats—which they are not—and to justify more 
congressional funding for this illegal and immoral war.”15 A chief concern of the 
Sandinistas remained the influence of the United States.   
A regional peace accord could change the dynamics of Sandinista-Contra 
relations, but, through 1985, the Contadora process achieved very little, prompting a 
reset of the talks. Foreign ministers of the Contadora nations, Mexico, Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Panama, and other supporters of the initiative met on January 11 and 
12, 1986, in Caraballeda, Venezuela, to discuss the obstacles to a settlement and how 
the process should continue. They agreed that peace should come from agreement on 
certain fundamental points that articulated a shared understanding of human rights 
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for Latin America. Peace needed to come from terms set by Latin Americans, not an 
outside power or from considerations of Cold War geopolitics. Any agreement 
should include terms prohibiting foreign intervention in the affairs of Latin American 
nations and respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty. The Contadora 
nations also wanted pluralistic democracy and universal suffrage without any foreign 
military presence and influence. The gathered ministers affirmed their intent to 
pursue an agreement that respected human rights, including civil and political 
rights.16 
The Contadora process withered, but the ideals of the Caraballeda statement 
laid a foundation for a subsequent attempt at regional peace talks initiated by the 
Central American nations led by Costa Rican president Óscar Arias-Sánchez in 
Esquipulas, Guatemala. Arias proposed a framework for an agreement that included 
arms limitations, an end to the guerrilla warfare, and greater democratization in 
Central American countries.17 The framework did not include the Contras as parties 
to the peace process, which drew the ire of the White House. The State Department 
would try to bring the Contras into the fold, but Secretary Shultz understood that 
Arias believed that including the Contras would impede talks with the Sandinistas. 
Administration officials still hoped the other Central American leaders would 
support the U.S. insistence on including the Contras, but Washington’s influence 
seemed to be diminishing.18 
                                                 
16 Augusto Ramirez Ocampo et al., “Caraballeda Message for Peace, Security and Democracy in 
Central America” (Caraballeda, January 12, 1986), 1–2, Digital National Security Archive. 
17 Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, 218. 
18 George P. Shultz to U.S. Embassy Guatemala, “Official-Informal (Week of February 2),” Cable, 
February 7, 1987, 2, Death squads, guerrilla war, covert operations, and genocide: Guatemala and the 
United States, 1954-1999; Accession number: GU01100, Digital National Security Archive. 
231 
 
Nevertheless, the participants at Esquipulas made progress. Daniel Ortega 
and the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras signed the 
Declaración de Esquipulas (Declaration of Esquipulas) on May 25, 1986, affirming 
their commitment to continue meeting to craft a peace agreement.19 The conference 
then produced a draft treaty in June. Although the participants did not reach a final 
agreement, the prospects for a peaceful resolution to conflict in Nicaragua and an 
end to the violation of human rights looked more possible through the middle part of 
1986.20 However, the Central American leaders, the Sandinistas, and NGOs worried 
that the Contras and the appropriation in June by Congress of $100 million of 
unrestricted funds would torpedo any progress made at Esquipulas. 
With that appropriation, the administration looked to further expand the 
Nicaragua operation, to develop a political opposition movement and popular base of 
support for the counterrevolution in Nicaragua, and to firm up support elsewhere in 
Latin America and in Europe for the Nicaraguan opposition groups. Operation 
planners also proposed ramping up the level of military support for the Contras, 
providing the insurgents “howitzers, armed boats, [and] ground support aircraft.” 
The CIA hoped to leverage the new support and funding increase from Congress to 
build a “thriving insurgency with three active fronts able to conduct sustained 
operations in Nicaragua” that could challenge the Sandinista for control of 
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territory.21 For the moment, however, the Contras enjoyed little popular support in 
the United States or anywhere else, except among the Cold Warriors of Congress.22 
The president had failed to change that.23 
Indeed, the Contras had an image problem caused by the consistent human 
rights accusations and the nation’s aversion to supporting covert action and guerrilla 
warfare.24 The administration responded to negative portrayals with reassuring 
descriptions of the Contras as a smoothly operating and popularly supported 
resistance force, a perception that U.S. officials knew did not match reality. 
Secretary of State George Shultz had determined that the Nicaraguan opposition 
movement needed reform before it could broaden its popular appeal in the United 
States and in Nicaragua. Shultz reported that UNO had long suffered from internal 
dissention and seemed unable to control the FDN. State Department officials 
believed that UNO also needed to force out “the most obstructionist FDN leaders” 
and diversify UNO’s representation of Nicaraguan sectors. 25 The White House and 
Congress hoped a new human rights program for the Contras, paid for out of the 
$100 million appropriation of October 1986, would create positive change in the 
structure and conduct of the resistance. 
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The funding included $3 million for the creation of the Asociación 
Nicaragüense Pro-Derechos Humanos (ANPDH) to investigate and report on human 
rights violations by the Contras.26 ANPDH consisted of Nicaraguan lawyers and 
operated out of a main office in San José, Costa Rica.27 The Contra human rights 
program also involved teaching soldiers proper conduct and training officials to 
investigate misconduct. Creating a justice system within the military structure 
enabled the Contras to enforce the programs and education established through U.S. 
guidance.28 U.S. advisors helped to integrate human rights education into all aspects 
of training for military personnel rather than just one class to make the instruction 
more meaningful, practical, and seamless within the broader training regimen of 
soldiers. The instruction consisted of the laws of warfare, the Geneva Convention 
protocols for guerrilla warfare, treatment of enemy forces, prohibition of forced 
military service and summary executions, respecting the Red Cross and its 
operations, and defending principles of democracy.29 
ANPDH did not impress the U.S. human rights community. After several 
months of ANPDH in operation, WOLA criticized the organization for the 
seemingly farcical nature of its human rights investigations and reporting. Congress 
had instructed ANPDH to focus on the conduct of the Contras. WOLA accused 
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ANPDH of spending much of its resources investigating the Nicaraguan government. 
John Burstein of WOLA wrote in the Baltimore Sun in September 1987 that 
“ANPDH has spent virtually all its energies on publicizing alleged abuses by the 
Sandinista government while all but ignoring those by the contras. The ANPDH 
Washington office can list no more than six cases of contra abuses after seven 
months in operation.” Meanwhile, President Reagan relied on the reporting of 
ANPDH to assess the human rights record of the Contras in reports that the 
administration transmitted to Congress as the basis for requesting additional 
funding.30 
The public relations profile of the Contras took another severe hit in 1986 
when, in November, press reports linked the secret sale of U.S. arms to the Iranian 
government to funds received by the Contras, violating the restrictions enacted by 
Congress. In 1984, with the Boland Amendment still in place, the president’s 
intelligence and national security advisers determined that Congress may not be a 
reliable source of funding for the Contra operation. The White House looked 
elsewhere for Contra funding.31 In addition to third-party countries, the NSC worked 
with private individuals and organizations to raise money. 
On November 3, 1986, a Lebanese magazine, Al-Shira’a, reported that a U.S. 
national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, met in secret with representatives of the 
Iranian government. The report raised alarm in the United States about how and why 
a highly-placed official in the Reagan administration would be in contact with an 
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adversary and an alleged supporter of international terrorism. Though the nature of 
the meetings remained uncertain in late 1986, the negotiations appeared to involve 
the transfer of U.S. military equipment to Iran. Many in the U.S. and international 
media speculated a deal might relate to the release of hostages held in Lebanon. On 
November 13, Reagan acknowledged that some defensive military hardware had 
been shipped to Iran as a sign of good faith in negotiations to reestablish ties with 
Iran and build better relations, bring an end to the Iran-Iraq War, reduce state-
sponsored terrorism, and arrange the release of the hostages. Reagan assured the 
American people that his administration did not break any law in shipping arms to 
Iran and did not make concessions in the negotiations for the release of the hostages. 
32 
Reagan’s assurances notwithstanding, the story got worse. Less than two 
weeks after the president’s address, Attorney General Edwin Meese declared that Lt. 
Col. Oliver North had diverted to the Contras the money paid by the Iranians for the 
arms shipments. Through this arrangement, North secured between $10 to $30 
million for the Nicaraguan guerrillas. Meese stated that National Security Advisor, 
Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, had known about the plan. Reagan maintained 
that he had no knowledge of the scheme while Poindexter and North took much of 
the blame. Reagan let the American people know that going forward, national 
security initiatives would proceed only with his direct authorization. This was too 
little, too late, and Democrats in Congress were furious. On November 26, the 
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Justice Department announced that the FBI would open an investigation into the 
Iranian arms deal and diversion of funds to the Contras.33  
The Iran-Contra Affair weighed heavily on Congress as it considered how to 
proceed on Nicaragua policy. Some lawmakers opposed any additional aid for the 
Contras in light of the administration’s transgressions that seemed to reinforce how 
misguided Reagan’s approach to Nicaragua had been. The peace process under the 
stewardship of President Arias looked even more attractive as U.S. Nicaragua policy 
descended into Congressional inquiry and criminal investigations.34 It took the work 
of NGOs to interpret the two narratives together and as representative of a larger 
threat to human rights in Nicaragua. 
Iran-Contra confirmed for Reagan’s critics the deceitful and unlawful tactics 
of the administration and its disregard for the human rights implications of its 
policies. Anti-Contra advocates declared that the human rights violations of the 
Contras, the illegal arms sales to Iran, and the diversion of funds by administration 
officials demonstrated the moral bankruptcy of a policy to blindly support guerrillas 
who claimed to fight against communism. Organizations and activists used the 
revelations against further Contra aid, while holding out the peace negotiations in 
Central America as the example for the United States to follow. 
CFNFP disagreed with claims that Iran-Contra came from a few bad actors in 
the administration. Coalition activists argued that the scandal represented a broader 
pattern of administration misbehavior, particularly as it related to Nicaragua. “The 
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contra operation as presented to congress has been permeated with fraud in all its 
phases, in creating, training, and sustaining of the anti-Sandinista forces.” The 
CFNFP argued that the greatest fraud the administration committed against Congress 
and the American people with respect to the Contras was to represent the resistance 
forces as legitimate and worthy of U.S. support. Furthermore, in selling arms to Iran, 
a state known to support international terrorism, and then sending the proceeds to the 
Contras, the administration disregarded human rights records multiple times to 
conduct its foreign policy. As of December 1986, $40 million of the $100 million 
appropriated in October had yet to be released by Congress for distribution to the 
Contras. The CFNFP called on Congress to prevent the release of that final $40 
million and refuse to further fund the administration’s unlawful policy. Releasing the 
money would actually provide the Contras more than the intended $100 million after 
accounting for the diverted funds from Iran arms sales.35 The Iran-Contra scandal 
demonstrated that the administration had no accountability for the use of funds for 
the Contras.36  
 
2. The Central American Peace Accord  
The Caraballeda announcement, Esquipulas, and the Iran-Contra Affair 
damaged the credibility of the Contras and the president. The narrative that the 
Contras stood for democracy and human rights seemed less plausible. NGOs seized 
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the opportunity to reinforce how Reagan’s Contra program violated international law 
and human rights. With the changing circumstances surrounding Nicaragua, the 
NGOs were able to build successful grassroots campaigns against Contra funding 
and turn Congress against continued support of the war. 
 The Central American peace process raised hopes in the United States that 
Nicaraguans could resolve their conflict without further bloodshed or U.S. 
involvement. That hope further undermined the Reagan administration’s position for 
more Contra funding without some connection to advancing the peace process. To 
keep his administration relevant in resolving the crisis and reassert control in Central 
American affairs, Reagan moved to work out a bipartisan peace agreement of his 
own.37  
On August 5, 1987, House Speaker Jim Wright and the president agreed to a 
cease-fire between the Sandinistas and Contras.38 Among the conditions of the cease-
fire, the agreement prohibited any Soviet bloc or Cuban military bases in Nicaragua, 
the Nicaraguans had to reduce the size of their military, and Nicaragua could not 
serve as a safe-haven to insurgents launching attacks on other countries. Only after 
the OAS verified that both sides complied with the terms of the cease-fire would the 
United States suspend military aid to the Contras. In turn, the Nicaraguan 
government would no longer receive aid from Cuba, the Soviet Union, or other 
communist nations. Managua would also suspend the State of Emergency, schedule 
new elections, and respect the human rights of its citizens. The proposal also called 
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for a formal plan for reconciliation, dialogue, and amnesty for resistance forces and a 
plan for demobilization of both Sandinista and resistance forces.39 Reagan made a 
bold move by working with the Democratic speaker of the House to offer a peace 
agreement for Nicaragua, but the basic structure did not differ significantly from 
what Reagan had always sought for Nicaragua. The Sandinistas and the Contras 
played no role in this negotiation process.  
While Reagan and Wright negotiated in Washington, Arias kept working 
with the Central American leaders and crafted an agreement articulating a vision of 
human rights consistent with the Anticolonial Human Rights discourse as put 
forward by the anti-Somoza coalition in 1980 and the Sandinistas thereafter with 
strong statements for individual liberty. The Central American nations first produced 
their own framework for a deal in late July 1987. They invited the Contadora nations 
to a meeting in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on July 31 and August 1, to discuss the 
progress.40 The summit led to a proposed peace treaty, known as the Guatemala 
Accords or the Esquipulas II Accords, on August 7, 1987, two days after the 
announcement of the Wright-Reagan proposal.41 Esquipulas II included obligations 
for each country to negotiate cease fires in any ongoing civil war and to pursue a 
path toward democratization.42 The agreement stated that the  
 
Governments commit themselves to promote authentic democratic, pluralistic 
and participatory process that included the promotion of social justice; 
respect for human rights, [state] sovereignty, the territorial integrity of states 
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and the right of all nations to free determine, without outside interference of 
any kind, its economic, political, and social model….43 
 
 
As part of the democratization process, the countries agreed to free speech, free 
association, and political pluralism for all groups. The Accords called for a national 
dialogue among opposition groups to facilitate democratic reforms, justice, and 
peace. It contained a provision that called for an amnesty decree by each government 
that guaranteed “the inviolability of life; as well as freedom in all its forms, property 
and the security of the persons to whom these decrees apply.” The agreement also 
called for the creation of a National Reconciliation Commission to verify the steps 
taken to carry out the terms of the Accords.44 
Esquipulas II also addressed the critical question of foreign influence. 
Signatory countries agreed to terminate all assistance from foreign nations and 
request that all nations cease providing aid to paramilitary forces in the region, but 
that prohibition did not preclude aid to help repatriation of irregular forces such as 
the Contras. This meant that the Central American governments expected the United 
States to terminate military aid to the Contras but would allow funding to assist 
reintegrating the Contras into Nicaraguan society. Each nation also agreed to no 
longer allow their countries to serve as staging grounds for operations to destabilize 
another government.45 The Central American plan still allowed outside military 
support for governments, and the agreement did not require elections to be scheduled 
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sooner than those already on the calendar.46 All Central American governments 
requested that the United States refrain from further Contra aid until after the 
scheduled January 1988 summit.  
Speaker Wright supported the Arias plan despite its differences with the 
Wright-Reagan proposal. Ironically, he argued that to expect Latin America to adopt 
an agreement reached in Washington without their involvement would be naïve and 
arrogant and counterproductive for U.S. foreign policy. He did suggest that the 
Wright-Reagan agreement motivated the Central American leaders.47 Wright stated 
that determining Nicaragua’s compliance with the terms of Esquipulas II should be 
up to the Central Americans and not the United States. Wright would give great 
weight to the words of Arias and others.48  
McCurdy also expressed his support for the peace agreement adopting 
Anticolonial Human Rights discourse language in his interpretation of U.S.-
Nicaragua relations. In an op-ed in the Los Angeles Times, McCurdy wrote of peace, 
democracy, and human rights in broad, inclusive terms. He wrote that the Arias-led 
effort followed the principle that “democracy is not accomplished simply by free 
elections.” He recognized that the “Costa Rican experience shows that when there is 
security, social justice can be maintained. The message was clear: We must help the 
democracies make democracy pay off in social and economic ways, as well as 
politically.” He argued that not only economic aid was needed for Central American 
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democracies to thrive, but also more robust trade and investment. In even more clear 
terms than he had used in the past, McCurdy rejected the underlying policy of 
Reagan that accepted violence and human rights abuse as the price to pay for 
building democracy.49  
By September 1987, McCurdy believed that the Contra insurgency had failed 
and that it could no longer maintain an effective fighting force or political influence 
in Nicaragua. He argued that the United States needed to give full support to the 
Central America peace process. Furthermore, the Nicaraguan government planned to 
hold elections, which had been the ultimate goal of the Reagan administration’s 
policy. McCurdy argued that the U.S. government should stay consistent and allow 
democracy to take root through the electoral process.50  
Reagan did not provide the same level of support for Esquipulas II as did 
Wright, and he did not share McCurdy’s open-minded approach to democratic 
reform. Foreign intervention remained the key element for Reagan as it did for the 
Sandinistas. The president rejected the Arias plan because he claimed the agreement 
failed to eliminate Soviet support for the Sandinista government. The Wright-Reagan 
plan linked an end of Contra support from the United States to an end to Sandinista 
support from the Soviets, regardless of the level of support received by the 
Sandinistas.51 After rejecting the plan, the administration announced in September 
that it would seek $270 million in additional funding for the Contras in a November 
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vote, even though Esquipulas II called for an end to outside support for insurgencies. 
It had little chance of success with many lawmakers turning against the Contras. The 
administration postponed its proposal until after the first of the year.52 
The Contra forces, having united under the banner of the Resistencia 
Nicaragüense (RN) on May 13, 1987, pushed back against what it saw as the 
Sandinista party dictating Nicaragua’s future.53 Writing for the RN, Ernesto Palazio 
declared that the resistance forces supported the Central American peace accord and 
accepted that the Sandinistas would continue to play a large role in the future of the 
country, but the RN objected to the Sandinistas proceeding as if they were the only 
relevant political party. RN claimed that a unilateral ceasefire declared by Ortega 
denied a voice to opposition groups and contradicted the peace accord that called for 
a negotiated cease-fire.54 Nevertheless, the RN formally accepted the terms of 
Esquipulas II in November 1987 and called on Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo to 
mediate talks between them and the Sandinista government.55 In November 1987, the 
Sandinistas proposed a mutual cease-fire and reintegration of the guerrillas into 
Nicaraguan society through amnesty. The cease-fire would begin no later than 
December 5, 1987, and last until January 7, 1988, during which the Contras could 
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turn in their arms and receive amnesty, all under the supervision of the International 
Verification and Follow-up Commission (IVFC).56 
Reagan’s administration seemed to have lost much of the influence it may 
have once had over Central American affairs, which NGOs exploited to mobilize and 
to reclaim control of the narrative. The idea that the Sandinistas represented an 
unacceptable threat to democracy and to human rights in the Western Hemisphere 
receded as the Contras and the Reagan administration now looked like the obstacles 
to peace and human rights. Growing dissent forced the administration to seek 
funding for the Contras, if at all, in more limited amounts than officials had hoped. 
Human rights advocacy created a message of resistance that incorporated Iran-
Contra, the peace process, and the atrocities committed by the Contras. Reframing 
the Contra question helped to eliminate any additional military aid for the Contras 
and helped convince the Sandinistas and Contras to sign a peace agreement ending 
the war. 
 
3. Days of Decision 
Deploying large grassroots campaign, NGOs threw their full organizational 
weight behind both Esquipulas II and the Nicaraguan government’s proposed cease-
fire and amnesty agreement. Organizations were building off their experiences and 
networks developed over eight years of Contra opposition and activist cooperation. 
In April 1987, CFNFP joined with labor organizations and churches to sponsor a 
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mobilization effort against U.S. policy in Central America and South Africa. Staff 
considered “the mobilization… a tremendous success in intensifying public debate: it 
reverberated through churches and campuses and to the AFL-CIO executive 
council.”57 The effort also drew considerable attendance and national attention. 
Organizers believed the march through Washington went well, despite poor weather. 
An interfaith service attracted more than the facility could hold. Protesters gathered 
at CIA headquarters in Langley in a non-violent demonstration, sitting in front of the 
gates, holding signs or wearing other symbols honoring victims of violence, and 
causing long traffic jams while gaining a large amount of media coverage.58 The 
demonstration at Langley protested the U.S. intervention, covert and overt, in Central 
America and Southern Africa and the violence caused by those policies.59 CFNFP’s 
organizing effort also turned out approximately four hundred delegation visits to 
Congressional offices.60 
In the summer of 1987, as Oliver North testified to Congress in hearings that 
captivated television audiences, national and local organizations took on an even 
bigger coordinated, national campaign called Days of Decision. The campaign, 
described by participant organizations as a uniting of “many of the organizations 
working for a just and lasting peace in Central America,” represented “the broadest 
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and largest coordinated effort yet to stop contra aid.”61 Approximately forty national 
groups, including human rights, social justice, and religious organizations, took part 
in Days of Decision. Organizers marshalled the efforts of hundreds of local groups 
around the United States, directing Congressional lobbying, public demonstrations, 
and media engagement. A Steering Committee formed to set the agenda and 
direction for the Campaign, including crafting messaging to respond to policy and 
legislation in Congress. A two-person staff coordinated the work of the Steering 
Committee, carried out the Campaign’s administrative work, created the mailers, and 
responded to correspondence.62 Days of Decision represented an important moment 
in the anti-Contra movement because, according to those involved, it “made possible 
a qualitative leap in broad, sustained interaction between national and local 
campaigns.”63 
NGOs organized Days of Decision in anticipation of the president asking 
Congress for up to $270 million in military aid for the Contras.64 Eleanor Milroy, 
Field Director for the CFNFP, Salley Timmel, Director of Church Women United, 
Rev. George Chauncey, Director of Washington Office Presbyterian Church (USA), 
and Rev. Robert Tiller, the Director of Office of Governmental Relations of 
American Baptist Churches, wrote on behalf of the Days of Decision campaign to 
supporters that “Congress is preparing to make the most significant policy decision 
since the Vietnam War – Whether to continue the contra war against Nicaragua.” 
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They declared that “[i]f contra aid passes in the wake of the Iran-contra scandal, it 
will define a foreign policy based on the violation of both our Constitution and our 
sense of morality.” The letter appealed to supporters to work to prevent the “brutal 
war” from becoming a fixture in U.S. foreign policy even amid the scandals.65 
Days of Decision consisted of mass public events such as a demonstration in 
September 1987 in front of the Russell Senate Building in Washington that brought 
national attention to the cause.66 The campaign helped local groups organize phone 
banking efforts, made possible rapid messaging responses to administration policy 
and Congressional debates, formed public education efforts to explain the status of 
funding requests and voting, and maintained regular updates to local groups 
regarding actions of Congress. Local groups flooded their senators and representative 
in Congress with over ninety thousand letters opposing continued Contra aid, and, on 
September 15, approximately 120 public demonstrations took place around the 
country, including Washington, D.C. Over one hundred communities engaged in 
public action on September 29, such as demonstrations, prayers, and delegation visits 
to Congressional offices. The day’s events included Rep. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and 
Sen. Tom Harkin speaking against Contra aid. By October 1987, local groups had 
staged over three hundred delegation visits to local Congressional offices, and many 
groups engaged in weekly delegation visits to the district office. On November 4 and 
5, public demonstration took place again in more than fifty cities. Adolfo Pérez 
Esquivel, a Nobel Prize Laureate, and Paul Fischer and Father Enrique Blandón, both 
                                                 




kidnapped by the Contras in early October, spoke at a November 4 event in 
Washington.67  
As a primary organizer of the campaign, CFNFP saw important returns on its 
grassroots work. It reported that “[w]ork in the districts of the House leadership, 
traditional contra aid opponents, and Rules Committee members (none of them 
‘swing voters’ on contra aid) began to show important results. Scores of 
Representatives have now indicated an unwillingness to vote for more aid, in any 
form, even if buried in a continuing resolution with the support of the House 
leadership.”68 The CFNFP also declared that “[t]hrough the fall, the Days of 
Decision campaign has emerged as the coordinating center of a very large part of the 
Central America movement. The campaign has allowed the movement as a whole to 
reach a new level of shared political sophistication.”69 Grassroots work changed 
attitudes among lawmakers. The pressure from constituents created by grassroots 
mobilization empowered human rights groups to shape the terms of the debate, rather 
than simply follow the agenda of liberals in Congress, and emphasized peace and the 
danger to human rights posed by the Reagan administration.70 The mobilization and 
pressure applied to Congress by constituents forced the Reagan Administration in 
late 1987 and 1988 to back down from planned Contra aid requests and seek smaller 
non-military funding compromises.71 Even Contra aid backers in Congress, such as 
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Kansas Senator and presidential hopeful Bob Dole, acknowledged the changed 
political environment and difficulty for winning a vote on aid. 72 
NGOs met in April 1988 to evaluate Days of Decision, discuss the 
takeaways, and talk about future activities.73 Participants considered the campaign a 
victory on which to build.74 National organizations reported that they appreciated the 
coordinated effort, but they did want to see the campaign come to a conclusion to 
allow them to move on to their own initiatives. Local organizations enjoyed the 
coordination and hoped for similar efforts in the future.75 Local organizations 
considered the campaign coordination well-organized and provided important 
assistance to the grassroots level activism. Those groups put a lot of value in phone 
banks and correspondence, which had influence but the impact diminished over time 
because the message lost shock value. In addition, all organizations appreciated the 
reports regarding actions and debates taking place in Congress. The reports increased 
transparency in Congress and produced more pressure from constituents.76 
Organizations also valued the centralized forum for crafting strategy for 
Congressional lobbying efforts and passing along information quickly. Lobbying 
delegations were very effective in transmitting the movement’s message.77 
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Looking toward the future, organizations saw ways to build on the success of 
the Days of Decision Campaign, and CFNFP prepared to step into a more defined 
role of guiding a national human rights and anti-Contra movement. The campaign 
received praise for the offensive strategies involved in the grassroots mobilizing 
throughout the country, a change from NGOs’ typical defensive or reactive ways.78 
National organizations wanted to see the forum function of the Days of Decision 
campaign continue.79 CFNFP members considered implementing such a forum 
through its Field Organizing Group (FOG) that would work in coordination with 
CAWG in crafting legislative initiatives and priorities, devising strategy for 
lobbying, issuing calls to action to grassroots organizations, and distributing 
information among local and national organizations. NGOs also noted that the 
campaign increased the level of participation in Contra aid resistance throughout the 
country, which established a greater base of activity for the future. However, many 
participants lamented the narrow focus on Nicaragua and the campaign’s inability to 
incorporate the broader Central America region into the strategy and lobbying 
efforts.80  
David Reed considered applying the energy and organizational capabilities to 
a broader objective. CFNFP leadership understood that changing the terms of the 
debate over Central America away from the Cold War ideology of democracy versus 
communism, or freedom versus totalitarianism, would serve to create effective and 
lasting peace. Experience with the Nicaragua debate demonstrated that activism and 
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a debate over legislation already proposed by the White House or Congress put the 
progressive human rights community at a disadvantage. Those debates favored the 
established foreign policy ideology of containing communism through political and 
military confrontation. CFNFP sought and advocated for an alternative approach to 
foreign relations, one based on the Anticolonial Human Rights discourse.  
The expanded approach to activism, called the Beyond Containment Project, 
served the anti-Contra movement in the short-term, as activists had long protested 
against the containment philosophy and single-minded democracy promotion in the 
context of Nicaragua, but the initiative also established a foundation in the long-term 
for a broader philosophical change grounded in Anticolonial Human Rights. Reed 
and CFNFP believed that rejecting containment policy and the philosophy of anti-
communism would undercut U.S. policies that justified political, economic, and 
military aggression that historically led to widespread violence, human rights 
violations, a nuclear arms race, and rising inequality at home and abroad.81 They also 
wanted to prevent the Reagan administration or future administrations from 
institutionalizing the Reagan Doctrine or similar far-reaching strategies based on 
military intervention. 82 
Nevertheless, the Reagan administration continued pursuing a military 
solution to Nicaragua’s conflict even as the peace process continued. By the time the 
Central American leaders gathered again in January 1988, the Sandinista government 
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had fulfilled the obligations of Esquipulas II and showed it was serious about 
reconciling with domestic opposition groups, but Reagan wanted to keep the 
pressure through the Contras. The Sandinistas agreed to engage in direct negotiations 
with the Contras, a step the government had previously refused to take.83 Ortega 
ended the State of Emergency through decree and reinstated all rights guaranteed by 
the constitution.84 He also ended anti-Somocista tribunals.85 Then, on February 2, 
1988, Managua signed an accord with YATAMA to reconcile with indigenous 
groups.86 As Reagan lost control of the peace process, he also could no longer push 
through Contra aid in Congress. NGOs mobilized to help defeat his new proposal 
and effectively terminated any additional Contra funding that would perpetuate the 
war.  
In January 1988, the president requested Congress transfer $36.25 million in 
unobligated funds for use in support of the Nicaraguan resistance, to be available 
until spent. The request specified that $32.65 million would be used for non-lethal 
assistance, including $450,000 specifically earmarked for human rights education 
and enforcement within the resistance force. The administration would not deliver 
before March 1, 1988, and it would deliver no lethal aid after February 28, 1988, 
unless, on or after March 31, 1988, the president certified to the speaker of the House 
and president of the Senate that a cease-fire had not been achieved, that the failure to 
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maintain a cease-fire resulted from a lack of good faith by the Sandinistas, and that 
the Contras had put forth a good faith effort toward peace negotiations. The president 
would suspend aid if the parties did agree to a cease-fire.87 These terms gave Reagan 
wide latitude in assessing the progress toward peace, and he always accused the 
Sandinistas of failing to live up to his standards when given the discretion to do so. 
Reagan declared that the additional aid was “essential to enhance the national 
security of the United States by advancing the prospects for democracy in Nicaragua 
and security for all of Central America.” The president found the efforts under the 
Arias Plan “far from complete” in bringing the Sandinistas closer to democracy. 
Reagan argued that only with the continued pressure of the Nicaraguan Resistance 
would the Sandinistas accept democracy and no longer present a threat to the rest of 
Central America. He affirmed the administration’s commitment to diplomacy, but 
the president also found that success through diplomacy would only come with 
continued support of the resistance.88 Reagan argued that the pressure from the 
Contras pushed the Sandinistas to the point they were at and that he would continue 
empowering the Contras to keep up the pressure the Sandinista government.89 
 
NGOs turned out to oppose the president’s new aid proposal, but the harder 
task came with the Democratic alternative. As communicated by the administration 
through hearings and the president’s own statements, members of Congress 
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understood that the Contra operation intended only to bring Daniel Ortega to the 
negotiating table for democratic reforms. Having done that, additional Contra 
funding for military purposes seemed pointless.90 Consequently, a Democratic 
alternative looked much more likely to pass than did the president’s proposal. 
In letters sent directly to members of the House, Diane Kuntz, Human Rights 
Coordinator for CFNFP, let lawmakers know she spoke for over sixty national 
organizations making up CFNFP, and all hoped for a “humane and positive approach 
to the region’s [Central America] problems.” Kuntz urged representatives to reject 
any further Contra aid and referred to the Central American peace process as “the 
only realistic hope for an end to the regional conflict.”91 She argued that more Contra 
aid would only undermine the peace process, perpetuate war, and create more human 
rights violations against the Nicaraguan people.92 Knowing that Democrats planned 
to offer an alternative to the president’s proposal, the Days of Decision Campaign, 
still operating as a national coordinated anti-Contra effort, rejected the possibility of 
any aid for the Contras as long as the Contras remained armed. Days of Decision 
called for Congress to abide by the terms of Esquipulas II, particularly with respect 
to requiring the Contras disarm before distributing aid through a neutral third-party. 
Speaker Wright agreed with the negative assessments of Reagan’s aid 
proposal, labeling it a “major escalation in the contra war.” He also called the 
provision requiring the president to certify the peace process failed before Congress 
released the funds a “ruse to get more contra aid. The President always reports that 
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nothing has been accomplished” when issuing similar certifications. A memo 
internal to Wright’s office further indicted the diplomatic efforts of the 
administration, arguing that “[e]very major diplomatic initiative that the President 
has promised to undertake has been ignored as soon as contra aid was approved. The 
United States has not engaged in bilateral talks with Nicaragua since 1984.” 93 The 
president’s continued support of the Contras seemed out of touch with developments 
in the region toward peace. 
Other Democrats in Congress also found this new aid request senseless and 
potentially damaging to the fragile peace process. The party’s “Fact Sheet” 
addressing the president’s policy argued that, in contrast to the Contras, the 
Nicaraguan government took affirmative steps to protect human rights. The 
Sandinistas terminated the six-year-old State of Emergency, agreed to grant amnesty 
to over 3,000 political prisoners, planned to hold local elections, and engaged in 
bilateral peace negotiations with the Contras to develop a cease-fire. Ortega also 
promised to observe the political rights of the Nicaraguan people, and he wrote to 
Reagan proposing to reduce the size of Nicaragua’s military and to expel the Soviet 
and Cuban military advisers so reviled by the administration. A report by the 
Democratic Study Group (DSG), an organization composed of Democrats in the 
House, contrasted the cooperation of the Sandinistas with the intransigence of the 
Contras, which had made demands for sweeping reforms that would effectively take 
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the Sandinistas out of power, an obviously unreasonable request. 94 DSG argued that, 
should the resolution win approval in both houses, “the amount of direct and indirect 
contra aid since the peace process began six months ago would total more than $89 
million.” Instead, DSG touted its Democratic alternative, which would provide funds 
only for humanitarian aid. 95 Rep. Jim Slattery (D-KS) argued that “[t]he United 
States lacks the moral justification to pursue a military solution until diplomatic 
remedies have been exhausted.” He accused Reagan of failing to do all he could to 
resolve the conflict in Central America diplomatically and scolded the administration 
for not engaging in high level talks with Nicaragua since 1984 in Manzanillo, 
Mexico.96  
The Central American leaders also came out publicly against more Contra 
aid. Arias, winner of the Noble Peace Price in 1987, argued that additional support of 
the Contras could give the Sandinistas a reason to avoid negotiations.97 This line of 
thinking matched that of Dave McCurdy, who raised the concern that the aid 
proposed by the White House would actually give Ortega an excuse to back out of 
negotiations, and he asked his colleagues to vote down the president’s request.98 
Other leaders called it counterproductive to the peace process.99 
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Grassroots organizing by NGOs fed the fire against Reagan’s Contra policy. 
Nicaragua Network members engaged in demonstrations throughout the nation. On 
January 25, 1988, 170 demonstrations took place, in addition to phone banking and 
media events, all to pressure Congress members to vote against Contra aid in the 
February 3 vote. The Nicaragua Network considered February 3 a “watershed 
moment,” claiming that if “contra aid is not stopped now, it is because the 
Democrats refused to kill it and we will have to face the challenge of ‘all out war’ in 
Nicaragua and a continued and deepened U.S. war policy towards Central America 
that is likely to extend to the next administration.” The organization also set plans in 
motion for protests on February 4 in case it lost the vote, but the House voted down 
the president’s proposal.100 
NGOs interpreted the February 3 vote as a vindication for their opposition to 
the Contras. CFNFP assessed the defeat as recognition in Congress that Nicaraguans, 
even those opposed to the Sandinista government, acknowledged that the country 
was stable and that the economic problems faced by the country came from the 
insurgency funded by the Reagan administration. The Coalition declared that Reagan 
had failed to dislodge the Sandinistas, and the Contras were left only with diplomatic 
negotiation.101 Days of Decision declared the effort to defeat Contra aid amounted to 
the “largest, most coordinated effort to date to stop contra aid,” in which “over 100 
national organizations representing labor unions, churches, and diverse communities 
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joined together to give voice to a U.S. public overwhelmingly opposed to war in 
Central America.”102 Hundreds of thousands committed to sending letters, making 
phone calls, and visiting their member of Congress. The religious and civil rights 
communities represented by the campaign looked “forward to supporting a U.S.-
Central America policy based on diplomacy rather than deception and self-
determination rather than military intervention. The Days of Decision release 
declared that the United States now needed help to disarm the Contra force and assist 
Nicaragua in returning guerrillas to society in a non-partisan manner.103 
However, the Contra proponents kept pushing, and NGOs anticipated the 
Democrats offering their alternative funding bill as a compromise to proponents of 
the peace process and those who wanted to continue helping the Contras. The Days 
of Decision campaign wrote to prepare their members for the Democratic alternative, 
explaining that Congressional leadership had promised Democrats and moderate 
Republicans an alternative before they voted against the president’s proposal. 
Democrats wanted to offer a proposal to avoid the Republicans offering their own 
alternative that would certainly include lethal aid.104 The consensus within Congress 
was that some form of funding would pass, so Democrats wanted to set the terms for 
how the administration used the money. 
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4. The End of War Funding 
The Democratic Study Group put forward an alternative funding bill as a 
compromise that advanced the peace process but did not abandon the Contras. NGOs 
came out against the compromise proposal in principle, contending that Congress 
could not have it both ways. However, activists also recognized that lawmakers 
feared that rejecting the Democratic plan would bring a more objectionable 
Republican alternative with which Congress would face immense pressure to pass 
just to get something done. NGOs and staunch Contra opponents in Congress held 
firm, intending to force the defeat of any funding bill, and, in doing so, motivated the 
Sandinistas and Contras to approach peace negotiations with a new sense of 
determination to bring the war to a close. 
The fact that Democrats had defeated the president’s proposal with a narrow 
eight-vote margin raised concerns among Democratic leadership that failing to adopt 
the DSG proposal would mean a certain victory for the Republican alternative 
waiting in the wings. Passing a Republican alternative with military aid included 
would further encourage the Contras to undermine the cease-fire agreement and 
peace process. DSG concluded that the Democratic alternative was the only viable 
option to preserve the Nicaragua peace process, and it would demonstrate to the 
Contras that Congress would approve no more military aid.105 
The House Democratic leadership, through the DSG, offered its alternative 
package for a vote on March 3, 1988. DSG claimed to represent a “spectrum of 
House Democrats” and had invited Republicans and the administration to participate 
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in drafting the alternative proposal, but both refused. The total aid package proposed 
by DSG consisted of $30.8 million over four months. The package provided $14.6 
million for “sustenance aid,” which consisted of food and other necessities. The 
Defense Department, rather than the CIA, would administer the aid for the Contras 
and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees and the General Accounting 
Office would have access to aid sites for inspection. If the parties reached a cease-
fire, aid delivery would be transferred to an international agency such as the 
International Red Cross. The bill offered no funding for weapons or ammunition for 
the Contras, it prevented the delivery of previously appropriated but undelivered 
military aid, and it contained no “non-lethal” aid that consisted of military equipment 
that supported the military operations of the Contras. The proposal earmarked $14.6 
million for treating injured children, while the president’s February 3 packaged 
contained no such aid, and it designated $1.4 million for indigenous groups, which 
Reagan’s proposal also did not include.106 
Democrats correctly believed that resistance from human rights and anti-
Contra groups jeopardized their plan. National organizations, including Witness for 
Peace, the Days of Decision campaign, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, 
the Jesuit Social Ministries, NETWORK: A Catholic Social Justice Lobby, and the 
Presbyterian Church all expressed their objection to the Democrats seeking money 
for the Contras for any purpose.107 On February 26, 1988, DSG wrote to CAWG to 
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ease the pressure from CAWG’s member organizations demanding Democrats vote 
against the bill. DSG conceded that the bill did not go as far as they wanted and 
acknowledged that CAWG members expected more. DSG wrote that “[t]he bill does 
something that we… have consistently and strongly opposed for the past several 
years. It provides aid to the contras in the form of food, clothing, medical supplies, 
and shelter, and it provides that aid without cessation of the hostilities condition that 
we wanted to impose.” However, DSG still looked for CAWG’s support on the bill 
because “realities leave us no choice.” Lawmakers explained that defeating the DSG 
alternative might set the table for Congress passing the Republicans’ proposal.108 
In March 1988, Congressional leadership expressed its approval of the peace 
proposal while also advocating for Contra opponents to support the Democratic 
alternative to military funding of the Contras. Senate Majority Leader Tom Foley, 
Majority Whip Tony Coelho (D-CA), and Deputy Majority Whip David E. Bonior 
(D-MI) addressed a letter to “Contra Aid Opponent” in which they shared their hope 
for a new “partnership [between the United States and Central America] based on 
peace and democracy, instead of war and retribution.” They argued that the February 
3 rejection of Contra aid in the House represented a “critical first step toward peace 
and reconciliation in Central America.” The next step in the process required 
Congress passing DSG’s alternative aid package on March 3 to prevent further 
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military aid. Leadership referenced the close vote, arguing that “[t]he narrow margin 
in Congress against military aid cannot be sustained if this assistance is defeated.” 
Furthermore, with the Republican bill, even non-lethal assistance could be used for 
military operations and to support additional Contra fighting, and the CIA would 
administer aid. Reagan would also be able to request a vote on additional military aid 
within forty-five days and, according to leadership, likely receive the aid 
requested.109 
After nearly a decade of lobbying by NGOs, the Democrats recognized the 
difficulty for these organizations in accepting a proposal that included more Contra 
aid. Democrats had also adopted the rights language of NGOs in the Anticolonial 
Human Rights discourse when they assured activists that “[w]e are committed to the 
principle of self-determination for all the people of Central America. We believe 
U.S. policy must work to bind the wounds of war and to address the social and 
economic inequalities in the region. Toward that end, we must continue to work with 
all the Central American nations to support the principles outlined in the Guatemala 
peace agreement.” However, for this bill, Democrats asked the anti-Contra groups 
for compromise and for their full support to continue the peace process.110 
NGOs opposed to Contra funding struggled to guide their members regarding 
the DSG proposal. The Nicaragua Network noted that DSG and the Republican 
substitute aid package would provide some form of aid to the Contras, whether lethal 
or not, that would enable them to continue fighting. However, the organization 
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acknowledged that “there are other factors at play” that Contra aid opponents must 
consider with respect to long-term strategy for ending the war.111 Quest for Peace 
condemned the choice between two bad alternatives, and it informed members of 
Congress that it would not support either piece of legislation. However, Quest for 
Peace would not seek “any retribution” against lawmakers who voted for the 
Democratic alternative, understanding that many Contra aid opponents were 
concerned about what else might pass if the Democratic alternative failed.112 
Likewise, the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. and other religious organizations 
condemned both proposals, but they believed the peace process could proceed even 
if the Democratic bill passed.113 Witness for Peace refused to accept any form of aid 
to the Contras that enabled them to continue their indiscriminate killing of civilians, 
but Director Jean Walsh stated that “we will understand your decision” if members 
of Congress voted for the Democratic plan.114 WOLA supported the Democratic 
alternative as an important step along a non-military path to resolving the conflict in 
Central America and turn away from Reagan’s focus on military solutions. 
Alexander Wilde, writing to members of Congress on behalf of WOLA, 
acknowledged that even humanitarian aid to the Contras enabled them to continue 
“the crimes of a war we have long deplored,” but passing the proposal from the 
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Democrats prevented an even worse proposal from Republicans and the president.115 
Days of Decision called the vote “one of the most agonizing decisions since the 
beginning of the contra war.”116  
Paul Reichler, an attorney who represented the government of Nicaragua at 
the ICJ and in negotiations with the Contras for the cease-fire, disputed the framing 
of the question and spoke with human rights advocates about the current state of the 
Contras and the status of peace negotiations. Reichler stated that the Nicaraguan 
security forces had all but defeated the Contras, and only 4,200 guerrilla fighters 
remained in the field while their leadership continued to splinter. The air defense of 
the Nicaraguan government prevented most supplies from reaching the Contras, and 
the army was squeezing the Contras toward a cease-fire. Military aid, whether called 
lethal or non-lethal by Congress, would embolden the Contras, raise their hopes for 
additional military aid, and lead to an escalation of the fighting. Reichler argued that 
Congress must defeat proposals that include any form of Contra aid.117 
Based on Reichler’s statements and its own assessment of the circumstances 
in Washington, the Nicaragua Network resolved to oppose any aid for the Contras 
and to demand that Congress take responsibility for ending the war without engaging 
in half-measures or compromises. However, the Nicaragua Network softened its 
position somewhat by calling on Contra aid opponents to allow members of 
Congress to vote in favor of the DSG alternative in the face of complex 
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circumstances and long-term goals of the anti-intervention movement. In furtherance 
of its own anti-intervention advocacy, the organization called for activists to demand 
Congress to take steps to end the war and for lawmakers to take strong public stands 
against allowing the war and Contra support to continue. It also called on members 
of Congress to stop arguing over the level of aid for the Contras and how the aid 
should be categorized. The terms of the debate and Contra opposition should shift to 
“refuting and exposing the Reagan Administration’s lies about Nicaragua and 
denouncing all contra atrocities” while preventing any more aid for the Contras and 
demanding bilateral talks to resolve the conflict.118 
Liberals in Congress maintained a principled stand and refused to 
compromise to the benefit of the Contras.119 The House defeated the Democratic aid 
proposal and the Republican proposal.120 In defeating additional Contra aid, NGOs 
forced Congress to deliver a message to the Nicaraguans that the United States might 
provide humanitarian aid in the future, which it did, but also that the United States 
would no longer fund the war effort, whether through military aid or supposed non-
lethal aid that served as critical supplies to a fighting force.121 Military aid ran out on 
February 28.122 
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After Congress failed to act, the Sandinistas and the Contras met in the town 
of Sapoá on March 21, 1988 and signed an agreement on March 23. Defense 
Minister Humberto Ortega led the government delegation and Adolfo Calero led the 
Contra delegation. Though Ortega and Calero seemed to work together in a 
reasonable, pragmatic way, their hardline constituents opposed any agreement. The 
failure by Congress to approve additional Contra military aid motivated the parties, 
particularly the Contras, to compromise.123  
The Sapoá agreement fulfilled a part of the agreement reached at Esquipulas 
in 1987 and established a sixty-day cease-fire starting April 1, 1988, while 
negotiations continued over a permanent cease-fire. The Contras would move to 
cease-fire zones by April 15. The Nicaraguan government granted amnesty to 
political prisoners, including former members of the National Guard. The agreement 
prevented the Contras from receiving any foreign aid except food, clothing, shelter, 
and medical supplies and only from non-partisan organizations. The government 
agreed to recognize freedom of expression and political participation for 
Nicaraguans, including the Contras. An independent commission headed by Cardinal 
Obando y Bravo and OAS Secretary General João Soares would verify the cease-
fire.124 The parties generally followed the Sapoá agreement, but setbacks did happen. 
Reports showed that both sides violated the cease-fire agreement with some five or 
six occurrences, but no one submitted any formal complaint. Both sides seemed to 
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acknowledge that maintaining the cease-fire would be difficult, even when both sides 
acted in good faith.125 
 
5. Conclusion 
NGOs used the ongoing peace negotiations and the Iran-Contra scandal to 
successfully reframe the issue of Contra support against the administration and help 
bring the Contra War to an end. The Contra War was a symptom of a larger ailment 
embedded in U.S. political culture that prioritized geopolitical strategy over human 
rights. With respect to Iran-Contra, activists argued that the Reagan administration 
circumvented the political process and Congressional oversight, violated federal and 
international law, and disregarded human rights concerns to pursue a reckless foreign 
policy. To fully address counterrevolution in Nicaragua and U.S. foreign policy of 
the future, CFNFP and other NGOs determined that activists needed to address the 
political culture institutionalized in Washington. 
The success of Days of Decision reflected the importance of activism in 
creating change in American politics, but the Contra War created a unique set of 
circumstances for activism. As the peace process moved along and the Iran-Contra 
scandal weakened the administration, the investigations and reporting of WOLA and 
AW and the testimony in Congress combined the grassroots mobilization. The 
influence of thousands of potential voters and massive demonstrations and the 
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strength of the human rights-based arguments against the Contras helped persuade 
Congress to terminate any more funding of the Contra War.  
After the signing of the peace agreement, U.S.-Nicaragua relations had 
moved to something different, a relationship not influenced by militarism. NGOs still 
argued in support of Nicaraguan sovereignty and self-determination, but that version 
of human rights never took hold in Washington. Reagan’s hardline application of the 
Democratic Human Rights discourse did not prevail in the Nicaragua context, but 
lawmakers still had not fully embraced the expanded bundle of rights guaranteed in 






CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE 
When Ronald Reagan won the presidency in 1980, human rights advocates 
feared that he would reverse the gains made throughout the previous decade. 
Members of Congress, frustrated with years of U.S. foreign interventions, had 
worked to institutionalize human rights in the federal government. Similarly, 
activists believed the 1970s represented the beginning of something new in 
international relations, the start of a movement to hold governments accountable for 
deprivations of the liberty, dignity, and life of individuals in violation of accepted 
norms as articulated through international covenants and conventions beginning with 
the UDHR. Reagan as a candidate and then as president did minimize the importance 
of human rights, considering them secondary to winning the Cold War.  
Reagan’s Nicaragua policy magnified a philosophical dispute over human 
rights in U.S. foreign policy and in international human rights discourse that had 
been developing since World War II. The UDHR and related covenants and norms 
embraced rights of economic security, cultural identity, self-determination, and 
social security, in addition to political and civil rights—what this study has called the 
Anticolonial Human Rights discourse. The Sandinistas and opposition parties in 
Nicaragua put forth an Anticolonial Human Rights discourse with respect to the 
future of Nicaragua. After decades of foreign influence, Nicaraguans sought self-
determination and respect for Nicaraguan sovereignty.  
In parallel, the United States articulated a Democratic Human Rights 
discourse that correlated with Cold War geopolitics. Human rights and Cold War 
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objectives were intertwined in U.S. foreign policy from the 1950s through the end of 
the Cold War in 1991, with a brief reordering of priorities in the 1970s with Carter. 
Democratic Human Rights valued above all others those political and civil rights 
associated with a functioning democracy. With these rights would naturally flow 
economic and social equality, respect for cultural identity, and other social safety 
nets, if the electorate chose to implement them.  
Democratic Human Rights protected choice and enforced government 
inaction. Alternatively, Anticolonial Human Rights maintained government 
protections and social benefits. The differences in interpretations of human rights 
and the role of government in society underpinned the conflict between the United 
States and Nicaragua once the Sandinistas took power in 1979, but those differences 
did not lead to war. Reagan’s backing of guerrillas brought war to Nicaragua.  
Nicaragua presented a unique set of facts that exacerbated the tension over 
human rights. Unlike relations with authoritarian governments in Latin America or 
elsewhere, in Nicaragua President Reagan pursued a policy of collaboration with 
what he considered an anti-communist guerrilla insurgency. That insurgency 
consisted of, in part, the remnants of Somoza’s hated National Guard. In funding the 
Contras, Reagan advanced a policy of destabilizing a sitting government through a 
civil war to force democratic reforms that would serve human rights. Nicaraguans 
argued that this policy constituted U.S. imperialism and violated Nicaraguan self-
determination and sovereignty as the Sandinistas implemented reforms to improve 
economic conditions, to raise the quality of health care, and generally improve the 
quality of life. 
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NGO resistance to Reagan’s Contra policy focused on stopping intervention 
into Nicaraguan politics. NGOs formed a resistance movement initially against what 
they saw as Reagan’s withdrawal from human rights norms and his refusal to 
consider human rights as a guiding principle for US foreign policy. Although the 
anti-Contra movement started small, by late 1984, activists intervened in the 
Nicaragua debate to the extent that the White House reframed its Contra policy as 
one fulfilling human rights. NGOs successfully brought human rights into the 
discussion and then turned the debate around to brand the Contras and the Reagan 
administration as the ones violating human rights. This rhetorical shift was a major 
achievement of 1980s NGOs. 
To be sure, activists took advantage of external factors. Evidence of the 
mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the discovery of the CIA manual for torture and 
assassination, and the Iran-Contra Affair, for instance, undercut the argument that the 
president and the Contras stood for human rights. Those external factors proved 
essential to offer as evidence that supporting human rights in Nicaragua was not 
consistent with backing the Contras. 
NGO activism for Nicaragua did not start in 1980 fully formed and capable 
or inclined to deploy a national grassroots campaign. It took time, it took failures 
from which to learn, and it took consistent networking to build a nationwide 
campaign among local organizations and activists. The anti-Contra movement also 
did not begin in 1980 by seriously contemplating turning issue-oriented activism and 
organizing into a broad-based effort to change the entire philosophy of U.S. foreign 
relations. This study is one of adaptation and evolution as activists pursued the most 
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effective methods for delivering a morally compelling case that would stop a policy 
of violence they abhorred. The culmination of their human rights activism came with 
the Days of Decision campaign that brought together thousands of activists across 
the country. Only through such massive display of opposition to the Contras could 
activists move Congress because they could not hope to change the mind of the 
president. The detailed analyses of WOLA, AW, and AI based on first-hand 
investigations and interviews by respected, highly-credentialed individuals had 
almost no influence by themselves on Congress, other than offering lawmakers of 
both sides additional talking points. The mass mobilization of activists energized by 
the human rights reporting turned the tide against the Contras. 
In the mid-1980s, NGOs could see that fact-based analysis of Nicaragua 
made little difference in Washington. If anything, NGOs involved in human rights 
reporting found themselves the targets of political attacks from the White House and 
private Contra supporters. These attacks threatened to shut down the open, robust 
debate surrounding Nicaragua policy. Yet, when the administration or intelligence 
officers acted in the name of democracy and anti-communism, anything seemed 
possible. Despite the human rights reporting and the testimony before Congress, the 
prevailing human rights narrative cast the Sandinistas on the side of totalitarianism 
and repression, leaving the armed opposition, the Contras, fighting for freedom and 
democracy, and, therefore, standing for human rights. 
NGOs concluded that grassroots activism combined with direct lobbying 
offered the best opportunity to create change. As WOLA, Amnesty International, and 
Americas Watch published and presented their reports trying to correct the public 
273 
 
record, the Nicaraguan Network and CFNFP worked against the Contra War through 
grassroots activism and lobbying delegations. They mobilized and articulated their 
message through numbers as thousands took part in demonstrations, letter-writing, 
office visits, and other tactics throughout the country to communicate opposition to 
their representatives in Congress. Activists interpreted the peace process as a human 
rights failure by the president because he offered no regional leadership, seemed to 
stand in the way of peace, and wanted to continue funding the war. Constituents 
demanded something different. NGOs also interpreted the Iran-Contra Affair as 
evidence of an administration with no moral compass and no interest in human 
rights. The scandal received much press for the violations of law and the sensational 
accounts of NSC staffers shredding documents. NGOs revealed the episode as 
symbolic of the extreme measures the administration took in furtherance of a 
Democratic Human Rights discourse. North, Poindexter, and MacFarlane all 
operated with the intent of bringing democracy to Nicaragua. The ends justified the 
means. 
Grassroots activism helped to turn the country and Congress against 
additional military aid for the Contras, but it took until 1987 to accomplish the goal. 
The process of building the anti-Contra movement and working against the accepted 
Cold War narrative took time. By the final year of Reagan’s term in office, Congress 
was no longer willing to fund the war in light of the abysmal human rights record of 
the Contras and the lack of trust in Reagan. In early 1988, that message convinced 




After 1988, Contra funding no longer enjoyed strong support in Washington, 
and U.S. adversaries lost their drive to push the issue. The interests and abilities of 
Washington, Havana, and Moscow for continuing to support their respective proxies 
in the Nicaraguan civil war declined. The Iran-Contra Affair, the conclusion of the 
peace agreement and cease-fire by Nicaraguans, and the constant raising of human 
rights issues by NGOs turned Contra military funding into a toxic issue of which the 
new administration of George H. W. Bush wanted no part.1 Bush did not have the 
same approach to foreign policy nor the same passion for aggressive confrontation 
with the Soviets as did Reagan, and he had no interest in fighting with Congress over 
Nicaragua. Bush approached Nicaragua seeking a middle ground by looking for a 
way to provide humanitarian aid to the Contras that did not further their insurgency 
or encourage them to break the cease-fire. He did this initially through a bipartisan 
humanitarian aid package passed by Congress in April 1989. The funding bill 
prohibited covert action to provide funds to Contras for military or paramilitary 
operations, and it barred administering aid to any group that retained an individual 
who engaged in human rights violations or drug smuggling.2  
The Sandinistas and the Contras met for the National Dialogue on August 3 
and 4, 1989, in Managua where they signed a permanent agreement. The agreement 
scheduled elections for president and vice-president on February 25, 1990. The 
agreement confirmed amnesty for Contras and called on other nations to end covert 
actions that might interfere with the elections. The agreement called for a free 
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electoral process for Nicaraguans and established a process of national 
reconciliation, enacting laws to reduce restrictions on civil liberties and reforming 
the judicial and penal system.3  
In October 1989, Congress appropriated aid for the Bush administration to 
fund opposition candidates for the Nicaraguan elections. Congress approved the aid 
believing that language in the legislation and personal assurances from the 
administration closed the door on any more covert action by the CIA. This was a 
mission to influence the election through foreign money and politics.4 Congress gave 
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) authority to determine how best to 
use the funds in accordance with the law against aid going to any candidates for 
public office.5  
The Nicaragua Network and other NGOs tried to counter the covert work of 
the Bush administration intervening in the Nicaraguan elections to tip the scale in 
favor of opposition candidates. However, activists did not have the same level of 
influence after the Nicaraguans signed a peace agreement ending the violence. 
Activists argued that U.S. covert aid to interfere in Nicaragua democracy 
contradicted U.S. conceptions of political freedom and human rights. Implementing a 
ban on covert aid would deliver a message to the world that the United States 
supported free elections in Nicaragua.6 These arguments were nuanced and based on 
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legal principles and not the evidence of atrocities or the strength of thousands of 
grassroots activists. NGOs in this instance failed to influence Congress. 
The effects of U.S. intervention on the 1990 elections were hard to measure, 
but the incumbent for president, Daniel Ortega, running with the support of a far 
stronger political organization than his opponent, lost the election. Former Junta 
member Violetta Chamorro won with fifty-five percent of the vote.7 The loss also 
may have had much to do with the state of the Nicaraguan economy and Nicaraguan 
society after years of rebellion against the Somoza regime followed by nearly ten 
years of guerrilla warfare with the Contras. The inability of the Sandinistas to fully 
deliver on the promises of the revolution damaged the party’s chances in the 
election. Nicaraguans wanted change. The weak economy concerned voters, and a 
large number expressed concern regarding FSLN economic policies going forward.8 
The people suffered from war, poverty, and inflation while they watched the 
Sandinista leadership maintain their wealth, leading to simmering resentment toward 
the revolutionary government. UNO and Chamorro benefited from being something 
different from the Sandinista regime.9  
After the 1990 election, the FSLN remained a viable political party but 
drifted away from its revolutionary leftist policies. Daniel Ortega prepared to make 
his comeback. 
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APPENDIX: ABBREVIATIONS  
 
ACLU   American Civil Liberties Union  
ADREN Alianza Democratica Revolucionaria Nicaragüense  
AI Amnesty International 
ANPDH  Asociación Nicaragüense Pro-Derechos Humanos 
AW Americas Watch 
CAWG Coalition for a New Foreign Policy’s Central America 
Working Group 
CFNFP  Coalition for a New Foreign Policy 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency 
CPDH   Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos 
DSG   Democratic Study Group 
FDN    Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense 
FOG   Coalition for a New Foreign Policy’s Field Organizing Group 
FSLN   Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 
ICJ    International Court of Justice 
NED   National Endowment for Democracy 
NSC   National Security Council 
OAS   Organization of American States 
UDHR   Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN   United Nations 
UNIR   Unidad Nicaragüense de Reconciliación   
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UNO    Unidad Nicaragüense Opositora 
WOLA  Washington Office on Latin America
 
